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Abstract 
Conceptual Certainty as Fallen Reality 
St. Augustine of Hippo and the Natural Law Tradition 
by 
Miles Christ ian Ho l l i ngwor th 
This thesis ге іп іефгеїз the significance of the Doctr ine o f the Fall to 
Augustine's relat ionship w i t h the Natural Law Trad i t ion by arguing that his 
l i teral reading o f events in the Garden o f Eden supports not jus t the tradit ional 
narrative o f a fa l l f r om righteousness, but also the descript ion o f a move f rom 
one epistemic condi t ion to another. F rom such beginnings i t is concluded that 
pol i t ical society is remedial not just in relat ion to s infu l nature but also a 
metaphysical fact; and i n this way the Fall 's diagnostic potent ial is broadened, 
setting i t up as the premise for an intel lectual ly solvent meta-narrative account 
o f the human condi t ion. 
For my Father 
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Preface 
This thesis aims to re-assess the significance of the Doctr ine o f the Fal l to Augustine's 
relationship w i th the Natural Law Tradi t ion by arguing that his l i teral reading o f events in 
the Garden of Eden supports not just the tradit ional narrative o f a fa l l f r om righteousness, 
but also the description o f a move f rom one epistemic condi t ion to another. From such 
beginnings it w i l l be concluded that pol i t ical society is remedial not jus t i n relat ion to 
sinful nature but also a metaphysical fact. In this way the Fall 's diagnostic potential w i l l be 
broadened, setting i t up as the premise for an intel lectual ly solvent те їа-пштайуе account 
o f the human condi t ion. Moreover, this treatment o f the Fal l w i l l colour a particular 
approach to the Natural Law Tradi t ion, in that the latter w i l l be taken to comprise two 
distinct elements: the Natural Law Idea and Natural L a w Theory. Before cont inuing, 
however, i t is important to explain how this dist inct ion w i l l work i tself out in practice, or 
more part icular ly, what is meant by the epistemologica! signif icance o f the Fal l . 
In the Garden of Eden Adam and Eve were subject to a voluntarist conception o f law. The 
authority o f God's commands was content independent and having known nothing else, 
Adam and Eve saw no reason to question this. The certainty and security they enjoyed was 
a f o r m of bl issful ignorance; w isdom was the fear o f God. Had they persisted in this state 
o f being they wou ld have become wise after the manner o f a ch i ld g rowing into adulthood. 
Look ing back over the path o f obedience, they wou ld have perceived the goodness and 
righteousness o f God's plan for their l i fe ; something they could not have conceived look ing 
forwards. For them, the point o f obedience was absent o f any impulse to understand the 
rightness o f the action they were launching out on. In the end, what led to the shattering o f 
this paradisial mode of certainty was the uttering o f four simple words: D i d God really 
say?' Adam and Eve were exposed to a question which could never have occurred to them 
had it not been put to them. For the f irst t ime, man faced the prospect o f uncertainty; and 
for the f irst t ime, the w isdom o f God was called into question. 
Pride had necessarily to fo l l ow doubt as A d a m and Eve faced the possibi l i ty o f their 
becoming a source o f truth independent f rom God. They had been corrupted but they had 
not yet sinned; i t remained for them to w i l l to disobey God, a choice that wou ld be 
consummated in the b i t ing o f the apple. The effect o f their choice was immediate: their 
eyes were opened and they lost their innocence. Before, as Ho l l i ngwor th describes it , 
'...they had looked to God for all their s e e i n g . . N o w , banished f r om His presence, they 
had to look to themselves for all their seeing. This lef t them to l ive out a disjunctive 
existence in what now appeared a hostile and mysterious wor ld , and two consequences 
M a r t i n H o l l i n g w o r t h , This Fragile Knowing ( F o r t h c o m i n g ) . 
з 
pressed upon them wi th a terrible urgency. The f irst was the hitherto unimaginable fear o f 
what the future may ho ld ; the second the need for a cr i ter ion o f t ruth. The former marked 
the move f r om eternity to temporal i ty; the latter the abandonment o f God as the source o f 
w isdom. 
That, very br ief ly , is what is taken to be the epistemologica! signif icance of the Fal l . I t 
should be clear in what way i t lends i tsel f to a meta-narrative account o f the human 
condi t ion. Human l i fe , intel lectual, cultural and social, i s a quest for survival apart f rom 
God, wh ich is effect ively the impulse to remedy the fears and uncertainties t føown up by 
temporal i ty. I t is this disposit ion wh ich is re fened to by the term Natural L a w Idea, and i t 
should now be obvious why i t is regarded as contingent upon a 'metaphysical fac է ไ 
However, one need not fear its broad appl icat ion, or suppose that the Natural Law 
Tradi t ion has been del imited beyond the bounds o f pol i t ical discourse. A l though i t might 
be admitted that on such a reading the Natural Law Idea stands as the spring for all human 
endeavour, by doing so, i t merely sets Natural Law Theory in stark relief, as chief amongst 
a number o f attempts to make good the events in Paradise. 
The term Conceptual Certainty, as used in the tit le o f this work , refers to the f o rm taken by 
the cr i ter ion o f truth called into being by the Fal l . As has already been pointed out, to 
Adam and Eve, the authority o f God's commands was content independent. In other words, 
they were to be obeyed not because they were good o r j u s t or true, but because they issued 
f r om God. Indeed such moral categories wou ld have been anathema to Adam and Eve, for 
to them G o d was God, and H is W i l l , the on ly real i ty they had ever k n o w n . The phrase 
նԱտտքս1 ignorance' has already been used to describe this state o f being, and in the Book of 
Genesis is found a negative af f i rmat ion o f this i d iom, where i t is wr i t ten that through 
disobedience, ไ..the eyes o f both o f them were opened'.^ Yet as August ine careful ly 
elaborates, this occurred, ไ..not so that they might see... for they could see already, but so 
that they might dist inguish between the good that they had lost and the evi l into which they 
had fallen，.3 In other words, they had indeed attained to the knowledge o f good and ev i l , 
but not in the sense that the รефепЇ had promised they wou ld . His words had been: '...you 
w i l l be l i ke God, knowing good and e v i l / He knew fu l l we l l that in b i t ing the apple, they 
wou ld come to know evi l through experience, wh ich is di f ferent to the knowledge of ev i l 
possessed by God in His inf in i te w isdom. 
I t was f r o m this fal len perspective, no longer look ing to God for al l their seeing, that Adam 
and Eve could begin to perceive their previous state o f being in dist inct ion, as something 
lost. Where once it had been reality, i t was now concept; where once God had been God, 
H e was now good. This need to see and th ink independently f r o m God imbued concepts 
and ideas w i th a hitherto unimagined importance, as they wou ld become the units out o f 
wh ich A d a m and Eve wou ld construct a new, Fallen Real i ty. Bu t now, w i th this def in i t ion 
o f terms complete, i t is t ime to turn to the layout o f the thesis. 
The above thoughts w i l l be unpacked across four chapters. The f i rst , Law in Paradise, win 
largely consist o f a commentary on Augustine's narrative account o f the events in the 
Garden o f Eden. Particular attention w i l l be given to observing how he assembles then 
disassembles the Paradisial cast o f m ind . This w i l l be a propaedeutic exercise, w i th the 
object being to forge a l ink between epistemology and pol i t ical behaviour ism by v iewing 
G e n 3:7. 
' De Civitate Dei, XIV， 17. Cf . Enchiridion, 3， 1 1 . 
the former as the cause of, and the latter as the response to, the metaphysical fact o f 
temporal i ty. In the second chapter, Խพ Since Paradise, these ideas w i l l be developed in 
l ine w i th the a im of drawing out the meta-narrative potential impl ic i t in Augustine's 
epistemic reading o f the Fal l . Granted the mythopoeic status o f the events in Paradise, the 
method w i l l be to treat Augustine's reading o f them as a cr i t ica l device. I t w i l l be asked 
whether the questions i t raises do indeed resonate w i th in the human compound. This 
approach w i l l invoke the dist inct ion between the Natural Law Idea and Natural Law 
Theory, for both w i l l be regarded as paradigms, the former o f the poverty o f Reason and 
the latter, the rat ional foundations o f ethics. The intent ion is for the th i rd chapter, The 
Political Animal, to mark the conclusion o f this approach. It w i l l hopeful ly be shown that 
far f rom representing, to the analytical sensibi l i ty, the least satisfactory element in his 
socio-pol i t ical thought, Augustine's Doctr ine o f the Fal l presents the higher synthesis to 
reconcile the elements o f thesis and antithesis (what is being referred to here is the clash 
between his dogmatic theology on the one hand, and his psychological ly compel l ing 
pol i t ics on the other) evident throughout his wr i t ings. F ina l ly , in the fourth and concluding 
chapter, an assessment w i l l be made of how these f indings impact upon Augustine's 
posit ion w i th in the Natural Law Tradi t ion broadly conceived. 
Gen 3:5. 
Chapter One 
Law in Paradise^ 
M y people have committed two sins: They have 
forsaken me the spring of l iving water, and have dug 
their own cisterns, broken cisterns that cannot hold 
water. 
Jeremiah 1:13 
1.1 Man's Design and Equipment 
As August ine makes clear, The pre-eminence o f man consists in this, that God made h im 
to H is own image by g iv ing h im an intel lect by wh ich he surpasses the beasts... ^ A n d the 
purpose of this intellect, or Reason, was to enable h i m to attain to Wisdom. In De Libero 
Arbitrio, August ine explains how this faculty is to relate to its purpose by setting out, at 
book 3， XXIV， an answer to the fo l l ow ing question: I f the f i rst man was created wise, then 
why d i d he a l low h imsel f to be seduced? Bu t if, however, he was created as a stupid 
fe l low, then why isn't God the author o f vices, since fo l l y is the greatest o f vices?' 
Immediately he perceives that so framed, the question harbours a very important 
A s was i m p l i e d i n the pre face, th is chapter w i l l , i n its i n i t i a l stages, resemble a c o m m e n t a r y on the re levant 
presupposit ion, namely, that Wisdom is a qual i ty o f nature. However , this seems contrary 
to common sense; for, 'Just as i t is senseless to cal l an infant stupid, so i t wou ld be even 
more absurd to cal l i t wise, even though it is already a human being. , 7 In the l ight o f this, 
W isdom should clearly be thought o f in terms o f capacity. I t is something that a man 
becomes, and in this sense implies a process; between potent ial i ty and actuality sits a 
device by which what is innate acMeves fullness o f nature.^ 
August ine has already shown that what is innate to man is that by which he shares in God's 
own image - intel lect - whi ls t by fullness o f nature is clearly meant W isdom. Furthermore, 
this schema, by support ing the idea of Wisdom as a process o f becoming or development 
proper to man с arries w i th i t the converse idea that foolishness or fo l ly is a revolt against 
this process, and thus an expl ic i t denial o f innate potent ial i ty. This wou ld seem to be 
supported by the use o f the term ' f oo ľ in ordinary language. The qual i f icat ion for cal l ing 
someone a Tool ' is the bel ief that they have chosen to turn away f r o m the course o f action 
in accordance w i th Reason. What this suggests is that bound up w i th the ideas o f Wisdom 
and fo l l y is an element o f choice or free w i l l . Bu t August ine is wel l aware that this fact is 
lost on those who v iew Wisdom as a qual i ty o f nature. For i f W isdom is something man 
either has or does not have in f u l l , then there seems l i t t le hope o f understanding the events 
o f the Fal l . One is trapped by the logic o f the premises: a wise man could not have fa l len; 
God could not have created a fool ish man. Thankfu l ly , August ine points towards a way out 
o f the d i lemma. 
A u g u s t i n i a n texts. 
Հ De Genesi Ad Litteram, XII， 6. 
ι De Libero Arbitrio, 3， X X I V . 
^ Confessiones, X I I I , 10. 
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The solut ion is once again found at De Libero Arbitrio 3， xxrv, where August ine, p ick ing 
up his previous train o f thought, declares that, Vrom this it appears that there must be some 
intermediate state through which a transition is made f r om Wisdom to fo l ly , a state to 
which i t is impossible to ascribe either Wisdom or f o l l y . ^ Next, he puts his f inger on the 
d i f f i cu l ty , po in t ing out that, Th i s intermediate state cannot be understood in this l i fe by 
men, except through contraries.'^^ I t is important that no ambiguit ies are left to c loud this 
characteristic o f the move f rom Wisdom to foolishness, or vice versa, as may wel l be the 
case: 
Thus, no mortal man may become wise unless he passes from foolishness to 
wisdom. I f the passage itself is foolishly made, it is not well done 一 but this 
sounds like senseless talk, for i f the transition is wisely made, then the man was 
already wise before he passed from folly to wisdom. This is no less absurd. 
From this we may understand that there is an intermediate state which we 
cannot call by either name. Thus when the first man passed from the citadel of 
wisdom to folly, the passage itself was neither wise nor foolish.'^ 
This seems a puzzl ing proposit ion. Is one really to believe that the move f r om intellect to 
Wisdom is effected by a device who l l y indi f ferent to either state o f being? That certainly 
seems contrary to the Socratic ideal o f knowledge as vir tue. B y banishing any possibi l i ty 
o f understanding f rom the intermediate stage between intel lect and Wisdom, Augustine 
appears in danger o f bypassing the role o f Reason altogether. Can he real ly be meaning to 
do this, or more to the point , what role does he envisage for the rat ional facul ty in such a 
pursuit o f Wisdom? Augustine's reply is perfectly frank: 
De Libero Arbitrio, 3， X X I V . 
？ Ibid. C f . Enchiridion, 4， X I V . 
՚ ¡bid 
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I t is one thing to be rational (that is, to be capable of thought), and another to be 
wise. Through reason, everyone is capable of comprehending a command, 
obedience to which is the first duty of faith, so that he can do what he is 
commanded to do. Just as it is the nature of reason to understand commands, it 
is the wi l l which carries them out. Just as the importance of a rational creature 
lies in its capacity to receive commands, so the value of obeying commands lies 
in the Wisdom thereby received.'" 
T o the statement w i th wh ich this chapter was begun, that 'God made man to his own image 
by g iv ing h i m an intel lect by wh ich he surpasses the beasts', can now be added the 
fo l l ow ing : 'For man.,, is better than the beasts because he is able to apprehend a command. 
He is better st i l l when he has accepted a command, and again better when he has obeyed it . 
A n d he is above all better when he has been blessed w i th the E te rnฝ l ight o f Wisdom.'*^ 
Th is , then, is the equipment to match the design. 
1.2 The Nature of Wisdom. 
I t is now necessary to explicate this Eternal l igh t o f W i s d o m ' that August ine believes men 
are designed for. Thankfu l ly , the discussion so far has at least produced a negative 
def in i t ion: i t is clear that Augustine's austere command/obedience dynamic precludes any 
element o f understanding in his not ion o f Wisdom. Intel lect enables man to process a 
command, that is, to comprehend what i t is that he is being asked to do. I t does not equip 
h i m to uncover some deposit o f rightness or goodness lodged w i th in it, some cri terion by 
wh ich i t can be judged worthy o f obedience. As August ine makes clear: 'Just as a 
command does not issue f rom the man who is subject to the command, but f rom the one 
ᄂ De Libero Arbitrio, з, X X I V . One finds a s im i l a r idea i n Ar is to t le 'ร Politics, 1253 a， 9: ' . . . l anguage serves 
to dec lare w h a t is advantageous and wha t is the reverse . , . ， (tr . Sir Ernes t Barker" O x f o r d , T h e C la rendon 
Press, 1948) . 
1 0 
who commands, so also w isdom does not have its source in the man who is enlightened, 
but in H i m who enlightens. ՚^ ՛*^  There is no room for a rat ional ver i f icat ion mechanism 
here.^^ This is voluntarist law p la in and simple: Thus man, although now spiritual and 
"renewed unto knowledge o f God according to the image o f H i m W h o created h i m , " ought 
to be "a doer o f the l a w " and not a judge.'i6 A n d as August ine continues, 'Nor does i t seem 
jus t before Y o u that in exactly the same way as L igh t unchangeable knows itself, so i t 
should be known by the mutable being enl ightened by i t . Therefore, " m y soul is l ike earth 
wi thout water unto Y o u . " Just as i t cannot o f i tself enl ighten itself, so i t cannot o f i tself be 
suff ic ient to itself.'^^ 
Faced w i th this evidence, i t is on ly possible to conclude that for August ine, Wisdom is a 
state o f being; for i f i t is a state o f knowing , then i t is devoid o f al l the qualit ies normal ly 
associated w i th understanding and intel lectual certainty. This is not to say that there is no 
attraction in unquestioning obedience, fai th and trust. These are, after a l l , the marks of 
ch i ldhood comfor t and safety. I t is rather that this f o rm o f bliss is inde l ib ly associated w i th 
ignorance, wh ich wou ld seem to a l ly August ine w i th ant i- intel lectual ism o f an extreme and 
pernicious sort. A n d after a l l , is one really supposed to believe that were i t not for the 
serpent's words, A d a m and Eve wou ld have cont inued b l i nd to their intellectual 
capabil i t ies, l i v i ng out the feeblest and blindest o f faiths? This seems to be exactly what 
August ine is saying. So just how does his support for voluntar ist law relate to his 
understanding o f Wisdom? 
\ De Libero Arbitrio, 3， X X I V . 
Լ Ibid. 
Լ See b e l o w , pp . 4 9 - 5 1 f o r a deta i led d iscuss ion o f th is p r i nc ipa l i n re la t ion to L o g i c a l P o s i t i v i s m . 
； Confessionei X I I I , 23 . 
7 Ibid, X I I I , 16. C f . De Civitate Dei, XI， 10: '... just as the a i r g rows dark w h e n dep r i ved o f l i g h t ( fo r w h a t is 
ca l l ed darkness i n the софогеа і sense is n ö t n i n g bu t a i r l a c k i n g l i g h t ) , so the sou l g rows dark w h e n it is 
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Conceming God's commandment to Adam not to eat f rom the Tree o f the Knowledge of 
Good and E v i l , August ine has the f o l l ow ing to say: B u t God's command required 
obedience, and this virtue is, in a certain sense, the mother and guardian o f all other virtues 
in a rational creature. For man has been so made that i t is to his advantage to be subject to 
God, and harmful to h im to act according to his own w i l l rather than that o f his Creator.'^^ 
In fact, this disjunctive ethic issues in an even bolder assertion, namely, that the sovereign 
W i l l o f God stands as a watershed between truth and falsehood. As such, 
When a man lives according to truth, then, he lives not according to self, but 
according to God; for it is God Who has said, " I am the truth." When he lives 
according to self, however... he then certainly lives according to falsehood. This 
is not because man himself is falsehood; for his Author and Creator is God, who 
is by no means the Author and Creator of Falsehood. Rather, it is because man 
was created righteous, to live according to his Maker and not according to 
himself, doing his Maker's wi l l and not his own: falsehood consists in not l iving 
in the way for which he was created.'^ 
This dist inct ion is the key to understanding Augustine's def in i t ion o f W isdom, for truth 
becomes no mys t i cฝ pr inciple or v is ion but rather seeing things as they really are. A n d 
here lies the rub: to see things as they really are is not to penetrate to some hidden depth o f 
meaning concerning them, but to perceive them in the service o f God's W i l l . The truth in 
any given situation becomes the course o f action decreed by God ; t ruth is known not 
through static contemplat ion but in the l i v ing o f i t : 'And Your law is the truth, and You are 
dep r i ved o f the l i gh t o f w i s d o m . ' 
'8 De Civitate Dei, X I V , 12. C f . Contra Adversariam et Prophetarium, B k . I， 19: 'A f te r a l l , w e were g iven 
f ree cho ice i n such a w a y that w e have to l i ve under the powe r o f a better nature. ' 
19 Ibid, X I V , 4 . 
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the t r u t h . T h e point to grasp, and it is crucial in what fo l lows, is that for Augustine, 
W isdom can only un fo ld in the wake of obedience. In other words, i t manifests itself as 
one looks back over the affairs o f this wor ld to perceive not chaos and disorder, but control 
and government. As Julian of Norw ich wrote: Th ings wh ich God's foreknowledge saw 
before creation, and which He so r igh t ly and wor th i l y brings to their proper end in t ime, 
break upon us suddenly and take us by 8ифґІ8е. A n d because o f this blindness and lack o f 
foresight we say they are chances and hazards ƒ ^ This bel ief is, o f course, echoed in 
Augustine's wr i t ings, but in his case, worked to a stem rebuke in a sermon: 
Consider a painter. Various colours are set before him, and he knows where to 
put each colour. The sinner, of course, wanted to be the colour black; does that 
mean the craftsman is not in control, and doesn't know where to put him? How 
many things he can do, in ful l control, with the colour black... As for you, just 
you think about what you want to be; doni worry about what order you wi l l be 
put in by the controller who is incapable of going wrong; He knows where to 
put you.^^ 
A n d again: 
Someone or other has decided to be a burglar. The law applied by the judge 
knows he has acted against the law; the law applied by the judge knows where 
to put him... From being a burglar he wi l l become a convict in the mines. How 
many public works are constructed from the work o f the mine convict! The 
2? Confessiones, 【V， 9. 
շ ւ Ju l ian o f N o r w i c h , tr . C l i f t o n W o l t e r s , Revelations of Divine Love ( H a r m o n d s w o r t h , Pengu in , 1978)， p. 80. 
A l this po in t i t is w o r t h p o i n t i n g ou t , e s p e c i ฝ l y inso far as the a rgument deve lops in the second chapter, 
that HeracIe i tus o f Ephesus (500 B . c . ) he ld a remarkab l y s im i l a r v i e w : T h e L a w {Logos), t hough men 
associate w i t h i t most c lose ly , yet they are separated f r o m i t , and those th ings w h i c h they encounter da i l y 
seem to t h e m s t range . 'Herac le i tus , fg t . 72， in Ka th leen F reeman , Aneilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers: 
A Complete Translation of the Fragments in Diels, F ragmente der V o r s o k r a t i k e r ( O x f o r d , Bas i l B l a c k w e l l , 
1948) , p. 29 
Sermones, cxxv, 5. Cť. De Civiîate Dei, XI， 18; 10， П ; Enchiridion, 26. 
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punishment of that convict contributes to the improvement of society... Is the 
One who knew how to create you going to be at a loss how to control you?^^ 
1.3 The Metaphysics of Obedience 
I t is at this juncture that Augustine's def in i t ion o f W isdom begins to show its metaphysical 
import , for i f his command/obedience dynamic is to result in the type of 'sanctified 
hindsight'^'^ out l ined above, then man must logical ly be restricted to a present moment. By 
this is meant quite s imply ' f ixed in t ime', that is, unable to fa thom what the future may 
hold. I t is possible to see this necessity at work in a conjecture o f Augustine's concerning 
the beatitude o f A d a m in Paradise, 
...as far as the enjoyment of present good is concerned, the first man in Paradise 
was more blessed than any righteous man in this condition of mortal infirmity. 
As regards the hope of future good, however, every man who not merely 
believes, but who knows as a certain truth, that he is to enjoy without end the 
most high God in the company of angels and free from every evi l : this man, no 
matter what bodily torments afflict him, is more blessed than him who, even in 
the great happiness of Paradise, was uncertain of his fate.^^ 
W i t h regard to what has been said thus far, i t is clear that short o f this uncertainty 
concerning his fate, obedience wou ld have sat very l ight ly on Adam's shoulders. Indeed, i t 
could have had none of the significance attributed to i t by Augustine's understanding o f the 
proper use o f the rat ional faculty. For simple obedience, premised on the fact that he had 
' Sermones, cxxv, 5. C f . Confessiones, V I I , 1 1 : Y o u have t o l d m e that no man's s in e i ther hurts Y o u or 
d isrupts Y o u r government . . . ' 
^ I came across th is t e r m in a l i t t l e k n o w n b o o k by O s w a l d Chambers ca l l ed , Not Knowing Whither ( L o n d o n 
： ： E d i n b u r g h , M a r s h a l l , M o r g a n & Scot t , 1957) , p. 12: T h e ca l l o f G o d o n l y becomes clear as w e obey, 
never as w e w e i g h the pros and cons and t ry to reason i t out . T h e ca l l is G o d ' s idea, not our idea, and o n l y 
o n l o o k i n g back over the path o f obedience do w e real ise wha t is the idea o f G o d ; G o d sanct i f ies m e m o r y . ' 
' De Civitaîe Dei, 1 1 , X I I . H o w e v e r , too m u c h shou ld not be read in to Augus t ine 's men t i on o f the 'man w h o 
not mere l y bel ieves bu t k n o w s that he is to en joy w i t h o u t end the mos t h i g h G o d ' . H e cons idered th is an 
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never known anything else, was al l that safeguarded Adam's innocence i n the Garden o f 
Eden. So long as his rational faculty remained humbled in the service o f obedience, in a 
purely instrumental capacity, there could be no possibi l i ty o f thought or action independent 
f rom God. In other words, there cou ld be no disjunct ion between the W i l l o f God and the 
w i l l o f man. For as August ine observes, ไ., al though, in Paradise, before his sin, man could 
not do everything, he d id not at that t ime wish to do anything that he could not do, and 
therefore he could do all that he wished. ՚^ ^ A n d again, Y o u r best servant is he who looks 
not so much to hear f r om Y o u what he wants to hear, but rather to want what he hears f rom 
Y o u ^ ^ This is not to be pedantic; does not the convergence o f the w i l l o f man on the W i l l 
o f God, through the tw in principles o f instrumental rat ional i ty and perfect obedience, 
render obsolete that long standing dispute between philosophers and theologians as to the 
relationship between moral i ty and rel igion? As Hudson describes i t in the preface to 
Professor Bartley'ร monograph, Morality and Religion: H o w are rel igious beliefs about 
what God's W i l l is logical ly related to m o r ฝ judgements as to what men ought to do? Is 
there a logical gap between the is and the ought here? Or is the ought groundless apart 
f rom the B y the terms o f the August in ian narrative o f the Fal l , these questions 
become redundant, as they require for their maintenance one o f two condit ions, both o f 
which are precluded by the August inian command/obedience dynamic. The f i rst o f these 
condit ions is a static conception o f God's W i l l and the second, a static conception o f truth. 
Yet as has been shown, the August inian command/obedience dynamic cuts at the root o f 
both by supporting a l i v ing W i l l and a l i v i ng truth. It leaves no possibi l i ty for reason or to 
mark an i r rupt ion between man and God. Rather, i t fu l f i l l s its role in the order o f the 
except iona l case and c i ted i t o n l y to t h r o w an aspect o f Adam's Parad is ia l c o n d i t i o n in to stark re l ie f . 
De Civiîaîe Dei, XIV， 15. 
Confessiones, X， 26. 
2 8 W . พ . Ba r t l ey I I I , Morality and Religion ( L o n d o n , M a c ๗ l l a n , 1971) , p. i x . 
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sacramental l i fe, receiv ing commands, then translating and presenting them to be freely 
acted upon. 
I t is only having reduced the Paradisial state o f being into these, its crude mechanics, that it 
is possible to appreciate the fu l l signif icance o f free w i l l . For as may reasonably be asked, 
' i f Adam was designed and equipped for perfect obedience, why d id God bother w i th free 
w i l l ? ' In reply, i t is only necessary to consider man divest o f his faculty for free choice. 
A n d by this is meant not just severe restrictions on the condi t ions o f his choosing, but 
rather, an inabi l i ty to choose altogether. He wou ld clearly be left a mere automaton, a body 
devoid o f its animating pr incip le. In relat ion to a god demanding obedience w i th in a 
scheme o f d iv ine providence, he wou ld be no more than a robot, his lot to act out the 
programmes o f his creator. He wou ld be perfect ly obedient, yes, but he wou ld have no 
capacity to love or appreciate the goodness in what he was doing: '...right reason tells us... 
that that creature is good which has i t in its power to control a forbidden pleasure that may 
arise, so that it rejoices not on ly in lawfu l and just actions but also in the control o f 
pleasure. ՚^ ^ Perhaps most important ly, a closer analysis o f the logic o f the matter reveals 
much about August ine'ร understanding o f sin. 
A n y choice presupposes a chain o f reasoning f rom some self interest to that wh ich is 
perceived to suff ice for its satisfaction. In August in ian thought, a self interest is defined as 
an action or outcome calculated to result in max imum happiness. That this ut i l i tar ian ethic 
f inds a place in the thought of so vaunted a Cathol ic saint is due entirely to the fact that 
August ine took man to be designed for one th ing, and one th ing only, wh ich was to obey 
De Genesi Ad Litt e ram, XI， 7. 
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God; and it f o l l owed f rom this that i t was only through l i v i ng out this purpose that man 
could be truly happy. Herein also lies the reason why for August ine, sin was synonymous 
w i th falsehood. For as he observed, al though, M a n does indeed wish to be happy... he 
lives in such a way that i t is not possible for h im to be so. What cou ld be more o f a 
falsehood than this?"^*^ It wou ld seem, then, that the sinful l i fe is to be distinguished not by 
its aims but by its methods, a fact wh ich w i l l be highl ighted by turn ing back to an 
examination o f the methods of the 'sacramental l i fe ' , or the l i fe l i ved in accordance w i th 
God's W i l l . 
The m o t i f wh ich August ine used to describe the sacramental l i fe was that o f ' form'. I t was 
one o f his more overt ly Neo-Platonic ideas, though more Plot inus than Plato. In the 
Enneads (2.4.5 and 6.7.17), Plotinus adopted the concept o f 'emanation' as the metaphor to 
explain the i l luminat ion o f the lower hypostases f rom the One, in a process that Armstrong 
described as, ไ..a spontaneous and necessary ef f lux o f l i fe or power f r o m the One, which 
leaves their source in i tself undiminished. ՚^ ՛ In the notes to his translation o f De Genesi Ad 
Litteram, Taylor careful ly points out that whi ls t August ine was happy to use this idea to 
explain the format ion of the rational creation, he d id not f o l l ow Plotinus in imagin ing the 
Second Person o f the Blessed Tr in i t y to have emanated f r o m God in the manner o f the 
Nous f r o m the One. 32 This was for a reason made dear by B r o w n , that, ไ..the outward-
going d i f fus ion o f the One coincides w i th a continuous tension o f every part to 'return' to 
the source o f its consciousness.՚^՛^ W i t h such an idea of tension imp ly ing a degree of 
in fer ior i ty on the part of the lower hypostases, i t wou ld be an inadequate device by which 
' De Civitate Dei, X I V , 4 . 
A . H . A r m s t r o n g , ' " E m a n a t i o n " in P lo t inus ' , Mind, N e w Series, V o l . 4 6 N o . 181 (Jan., 1937) , p. 6 1 . 
' A u g u s t i n e , De Genesi Ad Litteram, tr. John H a m m o n d T a y l o r , ร . J. , շ vo ls . ( A n c i e n t Chr i s t i an Wr i t e r s , 
The W o r k s o f the Fathers in T rans la t i on , N o . 4 1 ; N e w Y o r k , N e w m a n Press, 1982) , p. 224 . 
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describe the relations hold ing between the Blessed Tr in i ty . Yet as has already been pointed 
out, these fai l ings aside, Augustine found i t perfect ly suited to describing those relations 
ho ld ing between Creator and created. Indeed, he believed that in the case o f a spiritual 
creature, either man or angel, i t is by, '...turning towards its Creator that i t receives its fo rm 
and perfect ion, and i f i t does not thus turn, i t is unformed. ՚^ ՛^  
Cr i t ica l ly , this fo rm and perfection was understood to be received by the creature as a 
stream o f commands and inward promptings received from Christ Jesus, the W o r d o f God: 
The Word is the source of whatever being and Life it has, and to the Word it 
must tum in order to live wisely and happily. The beginning of an intellectual 
creature's life is indeed eternal Wisdom. This Beginning, remaining 
unchangeably in Himself, would certainly not cease to speak by interior 
inspirations and summons to the creature of which He is the Beginning, ๒ order 
that it might turn to its First Cause. Otherwise such a creature could not be 
formed and perfect. Hence, asked who He was, the Divine Word repUed: " I am 
the Beginning, for I am even speaking to you"^^ 
In the case o f man, then, i t is, Б у Your direct ion, [that] he h imsel f establishes what is 
Your W i l l , what is the good, and the acceptable, and the perfect thing.՚^^ This oneness of 
W i l l means that in effect a fu l l y formed intellectual creature knows God's m ind always: 
'He does this by the mind's understanding, through which he "perceives the things that are 
o f the Spir i t o f God . " Otherwise, "man when he was placed in honour d id not understand; 
he has been compared to senseless beasts, and made l ike to them.""^^ For, 'When men see 
Peter B r o w n , Augustine of Hippo: A Biography ( L o n d o n , Faber & Faber , 1979) , p. 98 . 
二 De Genesi Ad Litte ram, ι, 1 . 
3 6 Confessiones, X I I I , 22 . 
37 Ibid, X I I I , 23 . 
18 
these things through Your Spir i t , you see in them. Therefore, when they see that they are 
good, Y o u see that they are good, and whatsoever things are pleasing because of You , in 
them Y o u yoursel f are pleasing, and such things as are pleasing to us because of Your 
Spir i t are in us pleasing to you.՝^^ 
Against this closely worked backdrop it should now be possible to appreciate the reasons 
why Augustine's statement that Adam was 'uncertain o f his fate'^^ need carry no negative 
connotations. Qui te to the contrary, i t points up the nature o f his innocence in God, and by 
doing so, prefigures the way in which i t wou ld eventual ly be lost: '...man was happy in 
Paradise before he sinned, although he was uncertain about his future fa l l . . . He was not 
f i l led w i th vain presumption, l ike a fool being certain about the uncertain, but he was 
strong in fa i th and hope... enjoying a happiness that was r e a l / ^ As can in fact be seen, 
August ine reserves all negative connotations for that type of understanding commit ted to 
al leviat ing the temporal restrictions o f t ime and space. The wise man, by look ing to God 
for all his seeing, enjoys perfect certainty in the present moment ; the foo l , on the other 
hand, is 'certain about the uncertain'. George MacDona ld furnishes a typical ly luc id 
description o f the metaphysical ramif icat ions o f the wise man's certainty in God by way o f 
an ingenious analogy w i th the non-rational creation. As he wri tes, T h e bliss o f the animals 
lies in this, that, on their lower level, they shadow the bliss o f those ― few at any moment 
on the earth - who do not " look before and after, and pine for what is no t " but l ive in the 
holy carelessness o f the eternal ทowý^ I t remains apposite in this case because it ranges 
itself against al l that wou ld be considered praiseworthy in Reason. It drives home the point 
Confessiones,Xllh3i. 
39 See above , p. 13. 
40 De Genesi Ad Litteram, X I , 18. 
41 С. ร . L e w i s (ed. ) , George MacDonald An Anthology: 365 Readings ( N e w Y o r k , Touchs tone , 1990)， p. 
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that l i v i ng in the 'eternal now' o f the present moment, and harbouring no fears, doubts or 
insecurities, A d a m and Eve wou ld have had no need to jus t i f y or quant i fy their existence. 
To them, eternity was vert ical ; though created in t ime, on ly the present moment was real, 
for they had no reason to look beyond it . They d id not, in those words o f MacDonald's 
l o o k before and after, and pine for what is not', but instead looked upwards to behold the 
Face o f the Lo rd . In so doing, they fu l f i l l ed their particular ca l l ing as intellectual creatures, 
receiving f o r m in accordance w i th their design and equipment. W i th this idea o f Vertical 
eternity', the assembly o f the paradisial cast o f m i n d promised in the preface is complete. 
What remainร is to fo l low the course of Augustine's narrative as he disassembles it , and 
most important ly o f al l , to log the epistemologica! consequences. 
1,4 'Did God Really Say?' 
Before cont inuing, i t wou ld probably be best to retrace the argument to this point. Very 
br ief ly then, in the Garden of Eden Adam and Eve remained subject to a voluntarist law. 
Their obedience was uncondit ional, w i th their rat ional faculty invo lved solely in 
processing commands. It was not that they d id not th ink, far f r o m it, but rather that they 
d id not think apart f rom God. This complete dependence was the mark o f the certainty they 
enjoyed. I t was a certainty that f r om this present perspective cannot but appear in f in i te ly 
naïve and foo l ish, for it existed in the absence o f any cr i ter ion o f էաէհ.՛^^ Yet such a device 
wou ld have been anathema to A d a m and Eve, for to them, the W o r d o f God was truth 
itself. They were happy in this state o f perfect obedience because they had been created 
w i th free w i l l s . Thus, in choosing to obey, they expressed both their love for their Creator 
130, Read ing 314， 'E te raa l N o w ' . 
"^^As Augus t i ne observes o f Pau l , at De Civitate Dei, XIV， 9: T h e y beho ld h i m jea lous f o r the 
Cor in th ians ,and i n that j ea lousy fea r ing that the i r m inds shou ld be co r rup ted f r o m the s i m p l i c i t y w h i c h is 
in Chr is t , ' 
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and their appreciation that only His WiU COฟ^ suff ice for their needs as rational creatures. 
Moreover, lov ing God as the greatest good and look ing to H i m for al l their seeing meant 
that they existed in concert w i th the ordained goodness o f creation. Incidental ly, in a very 
important series o f papers on Natural Law Theory, c . ร . Lewis wou ld p ick up on this 
feature o f August in ian thought, g iv ing the fo l l ow ing as the August in ian def in i t ion o f 
v ir tue: \..ordo amoriร, the ordinate condi t ion o f the affections in wh ich every object is 
accorded that k ind and degree of love which is appropriate to it.'"*^ However, i t might we l l 
be thought that this statement contradicts the earlier proposi t ion made at section 1.2， to the 
effect that '...to see things as they really are is not to penetrate to some hidden depth o f 
meaning concerning them, but to perceive them in the service o f God's W i l l . ' In other 
words, that c . ร . Lew is ' understanding o f August in ian vir tue as Ordinate affectat ion' runs 
contrary to the not ion o f vir tue as 'perfect obedience'. Indeed, i t might appear that the ordo 
amoriร wh ich с . s . Lew is is ta lk ing about has the capacity to overr ide Goďs arbitrary W i l l 
by proposing an alternative basis for right action. Yet this is not so; for closer inspection 
reveals i t to be a phenomenon pel lucid only to those who are f u l f i l l i ng the f i rst condi t ion o f 
obedience: lov ing the L o r d their God w i th al l their heart, w i t h al l their soul, and w i th all 
their m ind . The ordo amoriร, then, is contingent upon ' look ing to God for all one's 
seeing'.'^'* As August ine wou ld explain i t : T h e good you love is f r om H i m , but only insofar 
as i t is used for H i m is i t good and sweet.՚**^ Further evidence can be garnered f rom his 
disputes w i th the Manichees, where he went to great lengths to emphasise the fact that God 
had created everything good to vary ing degrees, the universe displaying a natural hierarchy 
o f goodness: '...it was made manifest to me that You have made al l things good, and that 
there are no substances whatsoever that You have not made. Since Y o u have not made all 
С. ร . L e w i s , The Abolition of Man ( N e w Y o r k , Н а ф е г C o l l i n s , 2 0 0 1 ) p. 14. 
44 See above, p. 2 . 
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things equal, i t fo l lows that all things, taken one by one, are good, and al l things, taken 
together, are very g o o d / ^ B y not lov ing God as the greatest good, a man puts himself out 
o f sync w i th this ordo amoriร, or in other words, disregards its natural inequal i ty. To return 
to that earlier def in i t ion o f sin, he commits a falsehood by seeking happiness in some good 
other than God: 
This life which we live here has its own allurements, which come from its own 
particular mode of beauty and its agreement with all these lower beauties. The 
friendship of men, bound together by a loving tie, is sweet because of the unity 
i t fashions among many souls. Wi th regard to all these things, and others of like 
nature, sins are committed when, out of an immoderate l iking for them, since 
they are the least goods, we desert the best and highest goods, which are You, о 
Lord our God, and Your truth and Your law."^^ 
As August ine wou ld reflect, Ί asked, "What is in iqu i t y?" and I found that i t is not a 
substance. I t is a perversity o f w i l l , twisted away f r om the supreme substance, yourself, о 
God, and towards lower things, and casting away its o w n bowels, and swel l ing beyond 
itself.՚՛^^ For, '...in comparison w i th the Creator's knowledge, the knowledge of the creature 
is l ike a k i nd o f evening l ight . Bu t when our knowledge is directed to the praise and 
veneration o f the Creator, i t dawns and is made morn ing ; and night never falls whi le the 
Creator is not forsaken by the creature's love/^^^ In a word , the ordo amoriร, st i l l fo l lows in 
the wake o f obedience, and can thus in no sense challenge the August in ian def ini t ion o f 
W isdom. Wh i l e there w i l l later be an opportuni ty to examine these matters in greater 
' Confessiones, IV， 12. 
\ Ibid, V I I , 12. 
' Confessiones, II， 5. 
՝՝ Ibid, V I I , 16. 
' De Civitate Dei, XI， Ί 
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detail, for now, i t is necessary to return to Augustine's disassembly o f the Paradisial cast o f 
mind. 
For al l its certainties and securities, Adam and Eve's know ing o f God was fragi le. This was 
because it was safeguarded only by their innocence to the splendour o f their own souls. 
The merest word , even the slightest suggestion, might lead to a catastrophic broadening o f 
their horizons, for as August ine warned: '...if the spir i t o f a rat ional creature should delight 
in its own power and excellence, i t wou ld be swol len w i th that pr ide by which i t wou ld fa l l 
f rom the beatitude o f the spir i tual paradise...*^* The signif icance o f this statement is 
obvious in relat ion to Augustine's understanding o f the sacramental l i fe . The state o f 
beatitude that A d a m and Eve enjoyed was who l l y contingent on their spiritual faculties 一 
both intellect and free w i l l - being trained in the service o f obedience. I t was only in this 
lov ing subordination to God that A d a m and Eve knew themselves t ru ly , for in this way 
they knew themselves as creatures f u l f i l l i ng the purpose for wh ich they had been designed 
and equipped. L i ke the angels, who, ไ.,know every created being not in itself, but in this 
better way: that is, i n the wisdom of God, as i f in the design by wh ich i t was created... 
[Adam and Eve knew] themselves better in God than in themselves, even though they also 
know themselves as they are in themselves. For they were made, and are di f ferent f rom 
H i m W h o made them.'^^ Clearly, such a state o f being cou ld on ly be shattered i f Adam and 
Eve began to v iew themselves, and their facult ies, apart f r om God. For, '...the spiri t is even 
A s V e r a o n J. B o u r k e makes c lear i n the i n t roduc to ry to chapter i v o f The Essential Augustine'. 
' A u g u s t i n e ' s is not a f acu l t y psycho logy ; there are no d is t inc t opera t i ve powe rs in the A u g u s t i n i a n รоฟ.. . 
W n e n A u g u s t i n e descr ibes the func t ions o f m a n ' ร soul i n te rms o f m e m o r y unders tand ing and w i l l 
{memoria, intelligentia, voluntas), he is not at a l l t h i n t óng o f d i f t e ren t p o w e r s . . . the w h o l e sou l is m e m o r y , 
the w h o l e soul is in te l l i gence , the w h o Í e soul is w i l l ' Th i s is the exact sense i n w h i c h 1 use the te rm. C f . 
De Genesi Ad Litteram, X I , 14: ' . . .pr ide is the love o f one's o w n exce l lence. . . 
51 De Genesi Ad Utieram, XI， 13 
52 De Civitaîe Dei, XI， 29. 
23 
nobler when i t forgets i tsel f in its love o f the immutable God.63 Short o f this, there could 
be noth ing for them to proud of, no 'sel f to take things to; and that this could only be 
achieved through a l ie is obvious considering that in their state o f beatitude, A d a m and Eve 
had nothing to gain and everything to lose. Look ing to God, they had the most complete 
understanding o f good and evi l possible, know ing i t through the W isdom o f obedience. As 
August ine wou ld explain it using the physician as an analogue: 
How necessary it is for leading a good life to learn that it is our misfortune to 
learn some things and that it is our advantage not to know others. How much 
better of f would we be not to know diseases and pains. Suppose that a physician 
should forbid us some food that he knows would make us i l l and, for this 
reason, calls it the food of the discernment of health and iUness, because by 
experience human beings would discern through it, when they began to be i l l , 
the difference between the poor health they have acquired and the good health 
they have lost. They would surely have been better of f not to know this and to 
have remained in the health they lost, believing the physician by obedience, not 
the disease by experience... This discernment is not the wisdom of a happy man, 
but the experience of an unhappy one.^ *^ 
As was noted earlier, in Paradise, Adam and Eve lived out the truth of God's Wi l l . Completely 
engaged in His purpose for them, they had never stopped to think about what they were doing or 
why they were doing it. As Holl ingwoith observes: 
There was a t ime... when Adam and Eve were unencumbered by any thoughts 
of l ife, the meaning of it or what it is. For a start, to them it was never an 4ť but 
= De Libero Arbitrio, з, xxv. 
5 4 Contra Adversarium et Prophetariunu B k . I， 19. C f . De Civitate Dei, XIV， 17: T h u s they learned wha t 
they w o u l d have been happier no t k n o w i n g , had they be l ieved i n G o d and obeyed H i m , and so not 
c o m m i t t e d the act w h i c h compe l l ed t hem to learn b y exper ience the h a r m done by i n f i d e l i t y and 
d isobed ience . ' 
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always the reality of God Himself. To think of God in terms of anything other 
than Himself, would be not to think of H im at all, a little like turning away from 
someone in order to see them more clearly; something that would only make 
sense i f we wanted to see them more from our point of view, than face to face.^^ 
To try and frame their own terms of understanding and to th ink independently f r om God 
wou ld be tantamount to breatóng in upon and disrupt ing the perfect flow o f obedience. To 
bend their rational faculties to this риф08е wou ld be l ike th rowing the metaphorical 
spanner in the works: everything wou ld instantly gr ind to a halt. In De Doctrina 
Christiana, August ine emphasised the sheer incongrui ty o f the idea w i th the fo l l ow ing 
example: 
[It would be] rather as i f someone wishing to give you rules about how to walk 
were to warn you not to l i f t the back foot until you have put down the front one, 
and then were to describe in detail the right way of moving the joints of your 
limbs and knees. Wel l , what he is saying is true, and there is no other way to 
walk. But people find it much easier to walk by doing these things than to notice 
them when they do them, and to understand when they are told about them.^^ 
On ly f r o m this perspective is i t possible to appreciate the fu l l magnitude of those four 
simple words: D i d God Really Say?' Quite clearly they were pi tched precisely to endanger 
the concord and order of the sacramental l i fe by suggesting the possibi l i ty o f thought 
before act ion, for on ly such a mechanical change could result in the i r rupt ion o f the rational 
faculty discussed in section 1.3. So, in the t ime it took to utter them, those words laid down 
the precondit ions for pride, cal l ing Adam and Eve out o f their innocence. 
M a r t i n H o l l i n g w o r t h , This Fragile Knowing ( F o r t h c o m i n g ) . 
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Turn ing f r o m God, they saw themselves in a new l ight. Where before they had known only 
fullness o f nature, turning in upon themselves to perceive, for the f i rst t ime, their own free 
w i l l and intel lect in isolat ion f rom God, they saw instead new, unimagined potential : 
It is clear, therefore, that the devil would not have been able to lure man into the 
manifest and open sin of doing what God had prohibited had not man akeady 
begun to be pleased with himself. That is why Adam was delighted when it was 
said, "Ye shall be as Gods." But Adam and Eve would have been better fitted to 
resemble gods i f they had clung in obedience to the highest and true ground of 
their being, and not, in their pride, made themselves their own ground. For 
created gods are gods not in their own true nature, but by part ic ipat ion in 
the true God. B y str iv ing after more, man is d imin ished; when he takes 
del ight in his own self-suff iciency, he fal ls away f rom the One W h o truly 
suffices. 
As such, ไ,.they refused to obey His Law as if, by His proh ib i t ion, He jealously begrudged 
them an autonomy that had no need o f His interior l ight , but used only their own 
providence, l ike their own eyes, to dist inguish good and ev i l . This is what they were 
persuaded to do: to love to excess their own power.'^^ 
Perhaps now, w i th these f irst principles on board, i t is easier to see why August ine held to 
such a broad def in i t ion o f sin. In the case of A d a m and Eve, pr ide sprang into being the 
moment they were faced w i th the possibi l i ty o f know ing good and ev i l on their terms 
instead o f God's, through experience not Wisdom. As such, sin arose out o f the choice 
between the W i l l o f God and the w i l l o f man, where both stood as mutual ly exclusive 
՝ De Doctrina Christiana, I I , 55 : 
De Civitate Dei, XIV， 13. 
De Genesi Contra Manichaeos, II， 15. 
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routes to happiness: ไ., an y movement o f the w i l l away f r o m Y o u who are... is cr ime and 
sin.՝^^ However, the route according to the w i l l o f man was premised on a l ie ; i t could not 
possibly end in happiness because man was not created suff ic ient to be the ground of his 
own being. O f course, in terms o f the rational foundations o f ethics, this broad def in i t ion o f 
sin - a misunderstanding as to what constitutes happiness - has some very interesting 
impl icat ions. For instance, i f true happiness is obedience to God's W i l l , then where does 
that leave philosophies o f r ight action? Or to put i t more expl ic i t ly , i f r ight action is action 
in accordance w i th God's W i l l , and i f God's W i l l is subject to no cr i ter ion o f t ruth, in other 
words, who l l y arbitrary, then outside o f the P i lg r im Ci ty , what is to be done? Even though 
the answers to these questions l ie some way further on ( in the th i rd chapter to be precise), i t 
is wor th bearing them in mind, as they draw attention to the pol i t ica l impor t o f what has so 
far been an overt ly theological discussion. But before that pol i t ical impor t can be 
elucidated in any great detai l , there is f irst some metaphysical material to deal w i t h . 
1.5 Augustine's remarks on Time 
Thus far a great deal o f t ime has been spent emphasising two things: 1) Augustine's bel ief 
that the rational faculty was designed to be o f on ly instrumental signif icance and 2) that 
l i v i ng under God's voluntarist law bought w i th i t a sense o f absolute certitude. Both have 
been taken as characteristic o f Adam and Eve's state o f existence in Paradise and it has 
been suggested, on a close reading o f Augustine's texts, that both were jeopardised by the 
events o f the Fal l . A n attempt w i l l now be made to abstract the metaphysicฝ f irst 
principles f r o m these epistemologica! consequences. This w i l l mean pictóng up one o f the 
threads left dangl ing in section 1.3， namely, the idea of Ver t ica l Eterni ty. I f i t is recalled, 
Confessiones, X I I , 1 1 . 
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this idea was derived logical ly f rom the premise that look ing to God for al l their seeing, 
Adam and Eve had no reason to l o o k before and after, and pine for what is not'.^^ 
However, something that was not pointed out at the t ime (although it was certainly 
impl ied) was that this premise presupposes a naïve, common sense understanding o f t ime. 
This fact is o f crucial importance, for i t al lows the argument to draw on the f indings o f an 
established August in ian scholar, Dr. R. พ . D y s o n ^ \ whose observations on Augustine's 
understanding o f t ime that lend weight to what is here being said. 
To begin w i th , the very idea of Vert ical Eternity requires that t ime be passing by in the 
background in order for i t to be set in relief. Or to put i t another way, for Adam and Eve to 
have had the possibi l i ty o f 'pining', to refer to Macdonald 'ร analogy, there wou ld have had 
to have been a 'before' and an 'after' o f some sort. Recal l ing Augustine's example, for 
Adam not to have been ' f i l led w i th vain presumption', there wou ld have to have been an 
'uncertain' for h im not to be certain about. Yet why labour what seems to so obvious a 
point? The answer is that ordinar i ly , Augustine's phi losophy o f t ime is taken to be far f rom 
straightforward. In an important article, Dyson pinpoints the chief problem.^^ He observes 
that in his discussions o f t ime, August ine seems to present evidence for two conf l ic t ing 
theories: an idealist and an internal-relational.^^ Yet as Dyson points out, '...the universal 
：了 See above, p. 18. 
61 A p a r t f r o m p r o d u c i n g the f i r s t n e w t rans lat ion o f De Civitate Dei f o r a genera t ion [The City of God Against 
the Pagans ( C a m b r i d g e , C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1998) ] , D y s o n has also authored a reader on 
A u g u s t i n e ' ร soc ia l and po l i t i ca l thought [The Pilgrim City: Social and Political Ideas in the Writings of St. 
Augustine of Hippo ( W o o d b r i d g e . B o y d e l l , 2 0 0 1 ) ] . 
R. W . D y s o n , 'St. A u g u s t i n e s Remarks on T i m e ' , The Downside Review, Ju l y 1982. 
63 B y an ideal is t theory o f t i m e shou ld be understand that sub ject i v is t analys is most f a m o u s l y associated w i t h 
K a n t ; that t i m e , t i ke space, is an a priori f o r m imposed by ou r m i n d s upon the objects o f sense percept ion . 
As such, re la t ions o f precedence and succession antedate those o f cause and e f fec t . I n th is sense, t ime is 
absolute, ex is t ing independent l y o f that w h i c h is i n i t . M . M . Schuster in t roduces his ar t i c le , ' A n Ana lys is 
o f Re la t iona l T i m e ' , b y set t ing the Re la t iona l theory in re l i e f against the A b s o l u t e . Schuster i n f o r m s us that 
absolute t i m e , ' . . .posits the ex is tence o f abstract momen ts w h i c h are ar ranged in ser ial order one before the 
other b y v i r t ue o f re la t ions o f precedence (o r succession) be tween t hem, r h i n g s and events par t ic ipate in 
t ime on !y v i ca r i ous l y ， so to speak, j o i n e d to the i r respect ive momen ts b y another k i n d o f re la t ion w h i c h 
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practice (and i t is clearly more than a mere verbal convenience) is to discuss his 
'understanding' or 'analysis' o f t ime in the singular.^''' This is indeed the case. The standard 
approach is to give Augustine's internal-relational material a good air ing, before bu i ld ing 
towards some sort o f subjectivist conclusion. But as Dyson explains, this is unsatisfactory: 
In a word: when he is dealing with the puzzles set by the Manichaeans and 
Epicureans, it is apparently his view that time is physically real: that temporal 
relations would hold even i f minds 一 even if, ex hypothesi, the mind of God -
did not exist to be aware of them. But, i f this be so, then it is surely not open to 
him, when he comes to consider the question of time's existence, to say that it is 
"nothing more than" an extension of mind: it cannot be both a being of nature 
and also only a being of reason.^^ 
The problem, as Dyson sees it , is that August ine does not commi t either way. Hav ing 
shown robust support for an internal-relational theory, he then, u l t imately, 'fails to embrace 
the k ind o f idealist metaphysic wh ich wou ld be necessary to render his idealist theory o f 
t ime t enab le / ^ That this incompat ib i l i ty between Augustine's two theories o f t ime is real, 
is true enough; but i t is not intractable. Indeed closer inspection reveals that i t rests upon a 
particular condi t ion, wh ich is that the incompat ib i l i ty between the two theories can only 
persist i f i t is held that t ime is produced either in the m i n d o f the beholder or in the wor ld 
he beholds. I f a di f ferent bel ief is adopted, namely, that t ime is real, i n an in temal-
W h i t e h e a d cal ls " o c c u p a t i o n " [ A l f r e d N o r t h W h i t e h e a d , The Concept of Nature ( M i c h i g a n , 1957) , p. 3 4 ] . 
T h e overa l l s t ructure presented b y the absolute theory is there fore though t to be as f o l l o w s : one event is 
be fo re another i f bo th are respect ive ly b o u n d b y re la t ions o f occupa t i on to momen ts w h i c h are in t u rn so 
re lated as to be one be fo re the other . Re la t iona l t i m e m e r c i f u l l y s imp l i f i e s th is p ic tu re by a neat b i t o f 
surgery, cu t t i ng away the abstract moments and t y i n g the re la t ions o f precedence d i rec t l y to th ings and 
events themselves. A s a consequence, the parasi t ic re la t ions o f occupa t i on w h i t h e r away. ' M . M . Schuster, 
' A n A n a l y s i s o f R e l a t i o n ฝ T i m e ' , Review of Metaphysics, X V (1961)， p p . 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 . See also Cather ine 
R a u , T h e o r i e s o f T i m e i n A n c i e n t Ph i losophy ' , The Philosophical Review V o l . 62 N o . 4 (Oct . , 1953) , pp. 
514-525 and H e r m a n Hausheer , 'St. August ine 's Concep t i on o f T i m e ' , The Philosophical Review, V o l . 46 
N o . 5 (Sep., 1937) , pp . 503 -512 . 
ご R. W . D y s o n , 'August ine 's Remarks o n T i m e ' , The Downside Review, Ju l y 1982, p. 2 2 1 . 
65 Ibid, p. 229 . 
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relational sort o f way but that its existence is subject to the mind's awareness o f i t , then the 
incompat ib i l i ty disappears; and this is, o f course, exactly what is being proposed w i th the 
idea of Vert ica l Eterni ty. In section 1.3 i t was observed that, L i v i n g in the 'eternal now' o f 
the present moment, Adam and Eve had no need to jus t i f y or quant i fy their existence, for 
they harboured no fears, doubts or insecurities. To them, eternity was vert ical. Though 
created in t ime, only the present moment was real, for they had no reason to look beyond 
iiý^ Perhaps, though, in v iew of the above discussion, i t wou ld be more correct to say that 
for A d a m and Eve, eternity was a state o f m ind . This tall ies w i th Augustine's insistence 
that their uncertainty concerning their fate could not log ical ly issue in a set o f remedial 
presumptions (i.e. to cover the future unknown) for the reason that i t was never able to 
engage their rational faculty. Rather enl ighteningly, the term August ine used to describe 
those presumptions was Vain' , and o f course for August ine, vanity or pride was an 
expression o f se l fw i l l ing , or precisely the desire to engage the rat ional faculty apart f rom 
God and become the ground o f one's own being. 
It wou ld seem, then, that the Paradisial cast o f m ind had a direct bearing on how A d a m and 
Eve perceived t ime, not in a subjecti vist or idealist way, but rather because it condit ioned 
how they perceived the present moment. Support for this v iew is found in Augustine's 
famous conclusion at book X I o f his Confessiones, to the effect that on ly the present 
moment is real: 
It is now plain and clear that neither past nor future are existent, and that it is 
not properly stated that there are three times, past, present, and future. But 
perhaps it might properly be said that there are three times, the present of tMngs 
See above , p. 18. 
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past, the present of things present, and the present of things future. These three 
are in the soul, but elsewhere I do not see them.*^^ 
It m igh t be said that i f one is look ing to God for all one's seeing, then the present moment 
serves only to point up the glory and eternal signif icance o f a free w i l l exercised in 
obedience. In The Great Divorce, c . ร . Lewis , putt ing words into the mouth o f George 
Macdonald, provides a very clear i l lustrat ion o f what is meant: T i m e is the lens through 
wh ich ye see 一 small and clear, as men see through the wrong end o f a telescope 一 
something that wou ld otherwise be too b ig for ye to see at a l l . That th ing is Freedom: the 
g i f t whereby ye most resemble your Maker and are yourselves parts o f eternal reality. ՚*^ ^ 
On the other hand, i f one has turned away f rom God's voluntarist law to become a law unto 
oneself, then the present moment stands immediately symbol ic o f what i t is that law apart 
f r om God must try and achieve; and that men w i l l always strive to l i ve under laws o f some 
shape or f o r m is s imply a ref lect ion o f the fact that to l i ve subject to law is the end for 
wh ich they have been both designed and equipped. Here, then, is an instance o f the meta-
narrative potential in Augustine's analytical reading o f the Fal l : human endeavour takes a 
particular fo rm in relat ion to a metaphysical fact, whose exposi t ion is the subject o f the 
next section. 
1.6 The Temporalisation of the Present Moment 
In book I V o f his Confessiones, August ine set out to describe what he called the 'Fleshly 
Sense', In what fo l lows, i t w i l l be presumed that this term refers to the Fal len cast o f mind, 
but before cont inuing, some just i f icat ion ought to be given for this. 
Confessiones, XI， 2o. 
' c . ร . L e w i s , The Great Divorce, ( L o n d o n , Harper C o l l i n s , 2002 ) , p. 105. 
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In De Civitate Dei, August ine devoted a whole chapter to untangl ing the uses o f the term 
'f lesh' i n Scripture. In his rhetoric, he drew on the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers as 
examples o f men l i v i ng 'according to the flesh'. For instance, he conjectured that one, 
'...may certainly suppose that the Epicurean philosophers l ive according to the flesh; for 
they place man's highest good in the pleasure o f the body. A n d he may also suppose that i t 
is true o f the other philosophers who hold in some way that the good o f the body is man's 
highest good.'™ On the other hand, he entertained the idea that the Stoic philosophers 
provided an example o f men who d id not l ive according to the flesh but rather the spirit. 
This is because they professed to place, '...man's highest good in the mind. . . [and] what is 
man's m ind i f not spirit?'^' However, essaying the Scriptural evidence, August ine came to 
the conclusion that in fact, '...all o f these l ive according to the flesh in the sense intended by 
D iv ine Scripture when it uses the expression.'^^ The reason for this was because, 
'...Scripture does not use the term 'flesh' to mean only the body o f an earthly and mortal 
creature...' '^ There are other usages, and amongst these was, '...that by wh ich man himsel f -
that is, the nature o f man - is designated by 'flesh': a manner o f speaking in which the 
whole is represented by a part...'^"* A l i t t le further on, August ine wou ld give free reign to 
this idea, l i nk ing i t to his doctrine o f the T w o Cit ies: '1 d iv ide the human race into two 
orders. The one consists o f those who l ive according to man, and the other o f those who 
l ive according to God.'^^ A n d as he wou ld elsewhere state, these two cit ies, '...different 
f rom and in imica l to one another, have arisen because some l ive according to the flesh, and 
™ De Civitate Dei, X I V , 2. 
l ՝ I b i d . 
՜は De Civitate Dei, X I V , շ . 
l ' i b i d . 
l i b i d . 
" Ibid, X V , 1. 
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others according to the spirit.'^^ Clearly, then, the term 'flesh ，， when used by August ine as a 
moniker, was intended to refer to a qual i ty o f human nature postdating the Fal l . As such, 
when in book rv o f his Confessiones he observes that although, '...the soul wishes to be and 
it loves to f i nd rest in things that i t loves... such things... flee away, and who can fo l low 
them by fleshly sense,՚^՛^ i t can be assumed that he is referr ing to the Fallen cast o f mind. 
However, before cont inuing, i t wou ld be best to relate what has just been said to the main 
argument as developed thus far. 
I t was stated that the риф08е of this chapter as a whole wou ld be to return the August inian 
narrative o f the Fal l as the premise for an intel lectual ly solvent meta-narrative account o f 
the human condi t ion, and in particular, man's socio-pol i t ical endeavors. This would 
natural ly invo lve analyzing the needs and wants peculiar to the Fallen cast o f m ind , before 
watching them crystal l ize into the single, remedial impulse represented by The Natural 
Law Idea. A t the present stage, these needs and wants are in the process o f being 
enumerated. Hav ing turned from God, A d a m and Eve are, to recall that mot i f o f 
Augustine's, fo rmless/^ Deaf to God's Word , they are for the f i rst t ime in their l ives truly 
lawless. Seduced out o f the reality o f God's presence by a l ie, they have turned inwards to 
discover their ind iv idual selves, and in so doing, have found something new and 
intoxicat ing to love: thoughts o f self-suff ic iency, independence and an in f in i te broadening 
o f intel lectual horizons. However, this opening o f their eyes has not come wi thout a cost, 
for the bliss they have been designed for can only persist through ignorance, or indeed 
innocence, to anything other than the real i ty o f God's presence. But thankful ly , this 
' De Civitate Dei, XIV， 4 . 
Confessiones, IV， 10. 
՝ See Enarrationeร in Psalmos, V， 5: ' T h e t ru th is that w e are lost to H i m , no t because H e was absent W h o 
is eve rywhe re present, bu t because w e tu rned ou r backs o n H i m . ' 
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argument conducts i tself on two distinct levels: the epistemologica! and the metaphysical. 
This is important because whi lst the epistemologica! is related to Augustine's 
understanding o f the sacramental l i fe, and so is open to interpretation, the metaphysical is 
related to his theory o f t ime, which is irrefutable in its contradict ions. From this 
perspective, one might say that this thesis is an attempt to show that an epistemologica! 
theory could make sense o f this metaphysical contradict ion, and that i t is in Augustine's 
narrative o f the Fal l that just such a one is found. 
In book I V o f his Confessiones, Augustine's understanding o f the term fleshly sense plays 
centre stage in an investigation into the nature o f temporal i ty. August ine begins by 
presenting a dist inct ly relational theory o f t ime. He describes the inevi tabi l i ty w i th which 
things in this wo r l d grow and develop unto decay. This process he calls the l a w o f their 
being': 
They rise and they set, and by rising, as it were, they begin to be. They increase, 
so as to become perfect, and when once made perfect, they grow old and die, 
and even though all things do not grow old, yet all die. Therefore, when they 
take their rise and strive to be, the more quickly they grow so that they may be, 
so much the faster do they hasten towards ceasing to be. This is the law of their 
being. So much have You given them, because they are parts of things that do 
not exist all at once, but all of them, by successive departures and advents, make 
up the universe of which they are parts^^ 
Next he observes how the human soul is tortured by the transient nature o f this reality. For 
above al l , ไ..the soul wishes to be and it loves to f i nd rest in things that i t loves. But in such 
* Confessiones, I V , 10. Cf . De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et De Baptismo Parvolorum, I， 2 1 : 'For 
t i m e does not stand s t i i l even fo r a momen t . Rather , i t unceas ing ly s l ips past, and eve ry th i ng i n v o l v e d in 
constant change g radua l l y moves , not towards an end that per fects , but towards one that dest roys. ' 
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things there is no place where i t may f ind rest, for they do not endure.՚^** As was noted 
earlier, T h e y flee away, and who can fo l low them by fleshly Տ6ՈՏ6?՛^^ This fact that the 
soul wishes to f i nd rest in the things that i t loves should be no surprise, for as was observed 
in section 1.3, the desire for happiness is bu i l t into man's design as a rational creature. The 
problem, though, is that the happiness man real ly craves, the happiness that wou ld match 
his design, can only be found in freely chosen obedience to the Creator. As August ine 
exhorts: 
Do not be foolish, О my soul... the Word Himself cries out for you to return, 
and with H im there is a place of quiet that can never be disturbed, where your 
love cannot be forsaken, i f itself does not forsake that place. Behold, these 
present things give way so that other things may succeed to them, and that this 
lowest universe may be constituted out of all its parts. "But do I depart in any 
way?'* asks the Word of God. ' ' 
In t ry ing to f ind happiness anywhere other than in God, the 'f leshly sense' comes up 
against a d i f f i cu l t y pref igured above, for, I t suffices for a certain th ing, for wh ich i t was 
made. It does not suff ice for something di f ferent, namely, to ho ld fast things running their 
course f r om their proper beginning to their proper e n d / ^ This statement certainly seems to 
support what has been said so far about Augustine's understanding o f the rational faculty. 
Indeed, in the example above, i t seems quite overwhelmed by the demands being placed on 
i t by the nature o f temporal i ty, buck l ing under the demand o f having to rescue some 
stabil i ty o f meaning as l i fe flits by.84 That i t could never hope to do so was obvious to 
August ine, as i t had taken ๐ท an impossible task: noth ing less than t ry ing to replace the 
I Confessiones, I V , 10. 
J Ibid. 
՜ Confessiones, IV， 1 1 . 
I Ibid, IV， X . 
^ See De Peccatorum mentis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvoloriim, I， 21， ' [ A d a m and Eve ] lost the 
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happiness and certitude peculiar to Vert ica l Eterni ty. A n d further on, in this same passage, 
August ine wou ld stress that this hopeless mismatch had come about through punishment: 
'...if fleshly sense had been capable o f comprehending the whole, and had not, for your 
punishment, been restricted to but a part o f the u n i v e r s e . . . T h i s , then, was the nature and 
the magnitude of the task August ine bel ieved was faced by the rat ional faculty in the 
formless, Godless l i fe. The moment Adam and Eve lost the certainty o f look ing to God for 
all their seeing, the present moment sheds its in f in i tude, as the new uncertainties o f t ime 
and space rushed in upon them. However, it is not to be supposed that Vert ical Eternity 
equated to the eternal perspective enjoyed by God and the angels in the Heaven of 
Heavens'. As August ine pointed out, '...the supercelestial peoples, who are Your angels... 
always behold Your Face, and, wi thout any syllables o f t ime, they read upon it what Your 
eternal W i l l decrees ƒ However, the fact that they exist in the absence o f any syllables o f 
t ime or present moments in no sense undermines the role o f their free w i l l or the 
importance o f obedience: They read Your W i l l ; they choose i t ; and they love it . They read 
forever, and what they read never passes away. For, by choosing and lov ing, they read the 
actual immutab i l i t y o f Your c o u n s e l . T h i s was the end for wh ich intellect was created. 
Had A d a m and Eve remained obedient, they wou ld have earned eternal fe l ic i ty w i th the 
angels in , '...the intellectual heaven, where i t belongs to intel lect to know all at once, not in 
part, not in a dark manner, not through a glass [C. ร . Lew is ' lens o f t ime, see above, pp. 
28-29] but as a whole, in plain sight, face to Face, not this th ing now and that th ing then, 
but... al l at once, wi thout any passage o f time.'^^ 
s tab i l i t y o f the l i f e in w h i c h they were created and began to m o v e towards death i n ages subject to change / 
Confessiones, I V , 1 1 . 
； Ibid, X I I I , 15. 
ibid. 
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In conclusion, only the fo l l ow ing need be said: A d a m and Eve were created into a wor ld 
that operated according to real, internal-relational t ime, wh ich God had decreed should run 
a course, f r o m a beginning to an end. As such, real i ty for them did constitute a series o f 
present moments, but equipped w i th free wi l l s and intel lects, they had the choice to 
eternalise them through obedience. I n other words, to devolve al l responsibi l i ty for the 
future unknown to God. This is the reason why the two examples that have been given of 
the type of bliss and certainty enjoyed by A d a m and Eve both o f fend against the 
intel lectual sensibi l i ty; i f I envy chi ldren and animals i t is because they sometimes appear 
not to have a care in the wor ld . No surprise then that August ine, heeding Scripture, would 
use the example o f l i t t le ones' to describe the nature o f the beatitude enjoyed by the 
angels: 
Let no-one doubt... that the holy angels in their sublime abodes, though not, 
indeed, co-eternal with God, are nonetheless secure and certain of their eteraal 
and true felicity. It is to their fellowship that the Lord teaches that ffis little ones 
belong. Not only does He say. "They shall be equal to the angels of God'; but 
He also shows what manner of contemplation the angels themselves enjoy, 
when He says; "Take heed that ye despise not one of these little ones: for I say 
unto you, that in Heaven their angels do always behold the Face of my Father 
which is in Heaven. 89 
Though denied God's eternal perspective, and thus prone to al l the uncertainties associated 
w i th a restricted present moment, so long as they obeyed God, A d a m and Eve wou ld not 
be in a posi t ion to give them a thought. 
՝՝ Confessiones, Х П , 13. 
' De Civitate Dei, X I , 33. C f . De Quantitate Animae, 28 : '...the sou l . . .must not f a l l back o n the senses any 
m o r e than necessi ty demands; bu t i t shou ld rather re t i re i n to i tsel f , a w a y f r o m the senses, and become a 
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1.7 The Natural Law Idea and Conceptual Certainty 
The Natural Law Idea describes exactly the impulse to 'give a thought ' to temporal i ty, and 
bearing in m ind its negative connotations, not just to give any thought, but a remedial one. 
As was observed in the preface, this makes it seem an impossib ly broad idea; and 
certainly, i f Augustine's disjunct ive logic is fo l lowed, then i t must be admitted that in the 
same sense that any action outside o f God's W i l l is s infu l , then any thought apart f rom God 
must be remedial . Is this an unworkable del imitat ion? Or to put i t more b lunt ly , given that 
the a im o f this argument is to produce f r om Augustine's narrative o f the Fall an 
intel lectual ly solvent meta-narrative account o f the human condi t ion, too dogmatic a 
premise? There are disquiet ing echoes o f Augustine's infamous dismissal o f Cicero's 
just i f icat ion for Rome's status as a commonweal th . In De Republica, Cicero claimed that a 
commonweal th is formed f rom a body of men bound together by a shared conception o f 
what is r ight. In reply, August ine argued that because the Roman commonweal th 
contained Christ ian and non-Christ ian worshippers al ike, its cit izens could never be united 
in imput ing the Christ ian God the worship due H i m . Thus, according to the Classical 
def in i t ion o f just ice 一 to each his due 一 a port ion o f the Roman ci t izenry were gui l ty o f the 
most heinous injustice.^^ I t hardly seems a fair rebuttal ; yet i t should be remembered that 
the argument thus far has placed no onus o f proof on Augustine's narrative o f the Fal l . The 
strategy al l along has been to place i t upon this present mode of being, for in the interests 
o f object ive scholarship, Augustine's account o f events in the Garden o f Eden should only 
be taken in a mythopoeic sense. Th is does not, however, mean that i t cannot be used as a 
cr i t ical device, an intel lectual tool by wh ich to reflect upon certain aspects o f this present 
condi t ion, and, perhaps, to ί η ί 6 φ Γ 6 ί and order them in a new way. 
c h i l d o f G o d aga in . ' 
' A u g u s t i n e begins the a rgument at book Π , 2 1 o f De Civitate Dei and comple tes i t at book XIX， 2 1 . 
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I f nothing else, Augustine's understanding o f the Paradisial state o f being throws up a 
number o f important questions. In describing man as a creature designed and equipped for 
obedience to voluntarist law, i t asks whether such determinations do indeed resonate 
w i th in the human compound. In other words, what is i t that man has tr ied to achieve by 
Reason, and more to the point, can he in any way c la im to have been successful? As this 
argument sees it, the Natural Law Idea wou ld , o f course, be the answer to the f irst 
quest ion: man has deployed Reason to counter the temporal isat ion o f the present moment. 
But this st i l l leaves the problem that such an answer is so broad as to be practical ly 
meaningless. B y way o f mi t igat ion i t should only be pointed out that the a im of this thesis 
is to investigate the Natural Law Idea not in terms o f its bearing on all human activi ty, but 
rather on a part icular k i nd , which is Natural Law Theory. This pitches the investigation 
f i rm ly into the domain o f ethics, or to recall some o f the earlier comments, 'right action'. 
For as Barry observes, T h e history o f jur isprudence reveals a great variety o f theories of 
Natural Law and perhaps the only common factor in the conf l ic t ing doctrines is an 
aversion to legal positivism.'^^ What this means is that Natural Law theorists believe the 
content o f law affects its val id i ty. As Barry goes on to point out, this content can come 
f rom one o f two sources. Either the bel ief that certain values or judgements o f worth are 
object ively va l id , that they express not empty sentiment but moral t ruth, or f r om some 
organic law o f use and wont, his example being the Engl ish common law.^^ For the 
риф08Є8 of this argument, though, the latter source wi l l be understood as having derived 
f r om the former, leaving al l Natural Law Theory sourced in Va lue-Cogni t i v ism. W i th this 
N o r m a n p. B a r r y , An Introduction to Modern Political Theory ( L o n d o n , M a c m i l l a n , 1994) , p. 32 
Ibid. 
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matter dealt w i t h , i t can now be considered how the Natural Law Idea goes about its 
business. 
It was Bertrand Russell who observed that, T h e c iv i l ised man is dist inguished f rom the 
savage main ly by prudence, or, to use a sl ight ly wider term, forethought. He is w i l l i ng to 
endure present pains for the sake of future pleasures, even i f the future pleasures are rather 
distant.'^^ This def in i t ion clearly catches the mood o f The Natural L a w Idea, but where 
Russell's def in i t ion is most useful is in po int ing out that the use o f forethought necessarily 
involves the prost i tut ion o f the present moment in the name o f future contingency. Where 
he wou ld take it that the savage l ives f rom hand to mouth , the c iv i l i zed man subordinates 
the inst inctual element to the rule o f reason, a sentiment wh ich Ar istot le keenly 
procla imed: 
We ought not to listen to those who exhort us, because we are human, to think 
of human things, or because we are mortal, tMnk of mortal things. We ought 
rather to take on immortality as much as possible, and do all that we can to live 
in accordance with the highest element within us; for even i f its bulk is small, in 
its power and value it far exceeds everything.^'* 
This bel ief was, o f course, a staple o f Classical thought, so no 8ифгІ5е that i t turns up in 
Augustine's De Quantitate Animae: 
The human soul... because of the instruments it uses, reason and knowledge... 
are far superior to the senses, makes itself independent, as far as it can, of the 
body, and gives first preference to joy experienced within; and according as it 
turns aside to the senses, the greater the likeness it gives man to beast.^^ 
こ; Be r t rand Russe l l , л History of Western Philosophy ( L o n d o n , George A l l e n & U n w i n ^ 1946) , p. 33. 
9 4 A r i s t o t l e , Nichomachean Ethics, tr . Roger Cr i sp ( C a m b r i d g e , C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2002 ) , p. 196. 
95 De Quantitate Animae, 28 . 
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A l though making a strong appeal to common sense, it is not altogether clear what the term 
Vul e o f reason'denotes. I f i t conveys anything o f m o r d signif icance, then it is only through 
having invoked ethical preconceptions. Yet on the other hand, i t might be argued that all i t 
can reasonably convey is the sense o f such a rule promot ing an apodeictic standard o f 
behaviour, w i th the understanding that this standard w i l l take the f o rm of a body o f laws or 
axioms. I f this is indeed the case, and considering the esteem in which rules o f Reason 
have tradi t ional ly been held, then this fo rm must embody some intr insic appeal. However, 
in order to understand what i t might be, i t is f i rst necessary to run through a def in i t ion o f 
terms. 
A law, then, is a behavioural norm binding irrespective o f t ime and place unt i l such t ime as 
it has been rescinded; a system of law is a closely related ordering o f such norms for 
application to some specific sphere o f human, or natural, act iv i ty. I f the def in ing 
characteristic o f law is taken to be its b ind ing qual i ty, then i t wou ld surely not be remiss to 
th ink its appeal must l ie somewhere in the region o f regular i ty or predictabi l i ty. A f te r a l l , 
laws provide that stable f ramework w i th in which men can go about their business. More to 
the point, in accounting for certain fundamental human needs, such as security and 
economic wel lbe ing, they ensure that men are freed f rom the travails o f subsistence to 
have a business to go about in the f i rst place. In this sense, i t cou ld be said that laws serve 
to impose over what men do not know the mark o f what they do know, or, in other words, 
that they project into remote futur i ty the condit ions o f the present moment. As such, this is 
how the Natural Law Idea goes about its business. I t involves precisely the type o f action 
that was so sternly rebuked by August ine in section 1.3: ' [Adam] was not f i l led w i th vain 
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presumption, l ike a foo l being certain about the uncertain...^^ In place o f Vert ical Eternity 
i t promotes the ideal o f Hor izonta l Eternity. Both address the issue o f the present moment, 
though whereas the former does so w i th a state o f being, the latter opts for a state o f 
understanding. I f the discussion in section 1.1 is recal led, i t becomes clear that the 
difference between the two states turns on a perception o f W isdom. I n the Paradisial state 
o f being, Wisdom is obedience and the point o f obedience, the end o f understanding. In 
contrast to this i t wou ld appear that the Natural L a w Idea supports systems o f law in which 
obedience is condit ional on understanding the rightfulness or truthfulness o f ind iv idual 
laws. This observation brings the discussion round to the idea o f Conceptual Certainty. 
To understand the rightfulness or truthfulness o f ind iv idua l laws clearly requires a pr ior 
conception or standard by wh ich to judge such qualit ies. As has been shown, in Paradise, 
this was not necessary; for t ruth was a funct ion o f God's W i l l . In turn, reality was a 
funct ion o f obedience. The def in ing characteristic o f this real i ty has already been described 
as a t ru ly ch i ld l ike indif ference to the temporal restrictions o f t ime and space. These 
condit ions could not support an ought-is problem. A n ought can only stand in relat ion to an 
is i f i t is possible to cult ivate a perspective in dist inct ion f r o m the is. In terms of the 
created perfect ion o f the Garden o f Eden this cou ld never have spontaneously occurred. 
The Greek Atomists faced a simi lar problem in accounting for the or ig inal mot ion o f atoms 
in the vo id . Only once they had started mov ing could laws governing the nature o f their 
subsequent col l is ions and interactions come into play. Even Newton ian physics had to 
work f r o m the premise o f a mechanistic f i rst cause. Accord ing to Newton , i t was the hand 
of God that or ig inal ly hurled the planets. In the same sense, i t wou ld take some f irst cause 
' See p. 17 above. 
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to abuse the innocence enjoyed by A d a m and Eve in the Garden o f Eden. In their case, i t 
wou ld be the fact o f having God's monopoly on truth being cal led into question by the 
serpent. On ly then, w i th their eyes opened to the splendour o f their own souls, could they 
begin to look back on God. The real i ty o f God's presence had been something that could 
only be known in the l i v i ng o f i t . It was not something that cou ld be abstracted or reduced 
to formula or creed; A d a m and Eve could not have held for th on the identity o f 
Christ ianity, nor spun out some fundamental truths, for they had not yet been sold the idea 
of knowing God in concept. I t was only once the deal had been closed w i t h the b i t ing of 
the apple that Reason could begin to mark that i r rupt ion between man and God mentioned 
in section 1.3. In that instant, A d a m and Eve moved f r o m becoming God-conscious to self-
conscious. They became naked, God became good and H is W o r d became truth. Before, 
they had no need o f such concepts. They knew all these things in the ful lest sense possible: 
in the l ived real i ty o f obedience. In other words, and not a l i t t le i ronical ly , by not knowing 
them at a l l : Thus , they learned what they wou ld have been happier not know ing , had they 
believed in God and obeyed H i m , and so not commit ted the act wh ich compel led them to 
learn by experience the harm done by in f ide l i ty and disobedience.'^^ B y way of i l lustrat ion, 
i t is wor th recal l ing Augustine's example o f the person learning to wa lk : '...people f ind it 
much easier to walk by doing these things than to notice them when they do them, and to 
understand when they are to ld about them/^^ Where this part icular i l lustrat ion is so useful 
is in h ighl ight ing the fact that concepts take men out o f real i ty. They are parasitic upon 
l i ved experience. Combined and ordered into f rameworks and apparatuses they represent a 
wor ld stretching out in a horizontal sweep, either side o f the present moment. This is the 
wor ld in wh ich opinions and beliefs move; for having spumed God as a source o f truth, 
De Civiîate Dei, X I V , i 7 . 
See above, p. 23 . 
43 
man must discover meaning and shore up understanding outside o f the present moment. It 
is in this wo r l d that cri teria o f truthfulness and rightfulness are constructed then re­
constructed, and by vir tue o f being constructed w i th in i t , they become examples of 
Conceptual Certainty, 
1,8 The Ordo Anions 
Back in section 1.4 this phenomenon was mentioned in passing, as something incidental to 
A d a m and Eve's love for God. There was, however, t ime enough to explain that i t i n no 
sense overrode the August in ian understanding o f the sovereign W i l l o f God. For as 
August ine was forced to assert i n his debates w i th the Manichees, God had created 
everything good, but to varying degrees, such that the created order constituted a hierarchy 
of g o o d n e s s . S o long as Adam and Eve continued to love God as the greatest good, they 
wou ld remain in perfect al ignment w i th this order. Look ing to God for all their seeing they 
wou ld , as i t were, see things in a true l ight: TFor i f the w i l l had remained unshaken in its 
love o f that higher and immutable Good by which is bestowed upon it the l ight by which it 
can see and the f i re by which i t can love, it wou ld not have turned aside f r om this Good to 
fo l l ow its o w n pleasure.''^^ However, the moment A d a m and Eve became intoxicated by 
the splendour o f their o w n souls and were persuaded to l ove to excess their own power'^^\ 
they were th rown out o f al ignment w i th the ordo amoriร}^^ In this sense, Ί ί was in secret 
that A d a m and Eve began to be ev i l ; and it was because of this that they were then able to 
9 F o r an exce l len t account o f Augus t i ne ' ร re fu ta t ion o f the M a n i c h a e a n c o s m o g o n y , see N . Joseph Torch ia , 
О. p.， Creation ex nihilo and the Theology of St. Augustine: The Anti'Manic haean Polemic and Beyond 
( N e w Y o r k , Peter L a n g , İ 9 9 9 ) , ch . 3. 
De avitate Dei, X I V , 13. 
J ' See above, p. 24 . 
02 See De Quantitate Animae, 34 : ' H e a lone is to be adored W h o is the Creator o f th ings tha i are, f r o m 
w h o m a l l th ings come , by w h o m a l l th ings are made, i n w h o m a l l th ings ex is t . ' 
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fal] into overt disobedience.՚^*^՛^ Yet as a result of this disobedience, '...man d id not fal l 
away f r o m his nature so completely as to lose all being. ՚^ ՛^* Through an act o f unmerited 
Grace, God al lowed h im to retain a semblance, almost a Platonic recollection^*^^, o f the 
ordained goodness o f creation: Nonetheless, the image o f God has not been removed f rom 
the human soul by the stain o f earthly loves to such a point that not even the faintest 
outlines o f it remain... That is, what was impressed upon the soul by the image of God, 
when it was created, has not been entirely removed. ՚*^ ^ This impression o f the image o f 
God upon the soul o f man was that selfsame law wh ich Paul talks o f being wr i t ten on the 
hearts o f the Gentiles at R o m 2:14-15. As August ine explained it : ไ..the law o f God, which 
through the O ld Testament was wr i t ten on tablets, is wr i t ten on the hearts o f the fai thful 
through the New. ' 1G7 Had God not a l lowed this impression to remain stamped upon the 
hearts o f men, they wou ld have been left noth ing by which to curb their destructive 
tendencies. It operates through the Conscience and its f indings represent the one ethical 
resource intr insic to humanity. 
This is the resource f rom which the Natural Law Idea plunders the premises i t requires for 
the formulat ion o f Natural Law Theory proper. As was observed in the previous section, 
the term Natural Law Idea describes no more than the impulse to tame the w i l d unknowns 
o f eternity by mak ing them subject to laws o f order and procession. The Natural Law Idea 
cannot o f i tself produce the content for these laws because i t is a product o f Reason, and 
՝ De avitate Dei, XIV， 13. 
՚ Ibid. C f . V， 1 1 : ' . . .neither d i d H e abandon h i m w i t h o u t mercy . T o good and ev i l m e n a l i ke H e gave be ing , 
i n c o m m o n w i t h the stones; and H e gave l i f e capable o f rep roduc ing i tsel f , i n c o m m o n w i t h the trees; and 
sent ient l i f e , i n c o m m o n w i t h the beats; and in te l lec tua l ! i fe , in c o m m o n w i t h the angels a lone. ' 
' T h o u g h w e shou ld note that th is ana iogy o n l y w o r k s u p l o a cer ta in po in t . Plato 's T h e o r y o f Reco l l ec t i on 
presupposed the existence o f souls i n an anter ior l i f e , whereas A u g u s t i n e wen t to great lengths to 
emphasise that h u m a n souls are created good out o f no th ing . 
、 De spiritu et littera, 48 . 
De spiritu et littera, 48 . 
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Reason, as was seen in section 1.1， was designed to be o f on ly instrumental signif icance. It 
was created to f u l f i l l an іп іефге ї іуе rather than a creative role, to be a means to an end, not 
an end in itself. In Paradise, God H imse l f was the premise f r om which Reason worked, but 
w i th Adam's disobedience, Reason was denied this source o f inspirat ion. In the Conscience 
it found a possible replacement. Here was a ready deposit o f moral material that might 
surely f o rm the basis for a new, intellectualist f o r m of law to replace the o ld , voluntarist 
law o f God. A t this point , as things look in danger of becoming complicated, i t helps to 
bear in m ind that in the midst o f these variables, one th ing remains constant: t ime. For 
whi ls t subject to voluntarist law, what might l ie beyond ind iv idua l present moments was o f 
no concern to A d a m and Eve. They s imply moved f rom one to the next in an eternal 
procession, w i th God taking fu l l responsibi l i ty for what lay beyond each one. However, in 
choosing to become the ground of their own being, they took upon themselves this 
responsibi l i ty, or perhaps it wou ld be truer to say that i t was the 】ure o f responsibi l i ty 
wh ich tempted them into disobedience in the f irst place. Either way they were doomed to 
make the fatal discovery that Reason does not suff ice to ho ld fast things running their 
course f r om their proper beginning to their proper end.'^^^ 
See above, p. 33. 
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Chapter Two 
Law Since Paradise 
I have seen the burden God has laid on men. He has 
made everything beautiful in its time. He has also set 
eternity in the hearts of men; yet they cannot fathom 
what God has done from beginning to end. 
Ecclesiastes 3 :10-11 
2.1 The R a t i o n a l Founda t ions o f Eth ics 
I t is possible to reduce to a single proposit ion the premises developed in the preceding 
chapter: 
ethical speculation is generated by the іп іеф іау between the Natural Law Idea 
and the conscience. 
This proposit ion could be reduced to a yet more gnomic f o rm : 
man possesses both an Intel lectual and a Mora l Conscience. 
This further reduction i l luminates an important dimension to the argument, namely, the 
sense of opposi t ion between the two consciences. I f i t is the case that they represent the 
' I f i r s t came across the t e r m ' in te l lectua l consc ience ' i n a paper b y O l a f S tap ledon, en t i t l ed , ๆvir Be r t rand 
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two elements at work wi th in any given ethical speculation, then they are disparate 
elements. In order to understand why, an important ambigui ty must f irst be cleared up. It is 
commonplace to label the moral content o f the human heart a l a w of nature'; and in section 
1.8， this convention was upheld in order not to confuse matters. However, this practice 
tends to distort things. As the Natural Law Idea demonstrates, Reason assumes l a ^ 
whenever addressing the temporali sed present moment, wh ich , i t must be admitted, is the 
greater part o f the t ime. As such, to say that the moral content o f the heart constitutes a 
ใaw of nature' is to have already іпїефгеїесі i t through this lens - a l i t t le l ike observing an 
oar in the water and not taking refract ion into account, presuming its crookedness. In 
actual fact, i t could not be more in imica l to law; for not on ly does the heart constitute a 
source o f moral proposit ions, but i t also intimates an awareness, the briefest gl impse, o f 
the certainty that A d a m and Eve enjoyed whi ls t l i v i ng a l i fe o f f o r m in Paradise. This can 
be seen in the way that i t flaunts in the face o f Reason's hard won principles an effortless, 
almost chimerical v i r tue: '...and the delight and effortlessness w i t h which we obey in that 
f inal peace w i l l be as great as our happiness in l i v i ng and reigning/'^*^ 
The clue as to why this should be surfaces the moment one considers what i t is that the 
Mora l Conscience requires in order to funct ion. In a word , act ion. Its counsel is only 
invoked either in the bu i ld up to or the aftermath o f a choice. F. H. Bradley famously 
stated that, 'We see in i t at once the idea o f a man's appearing to answer. He answers for 
what he has done, or (wh ich he need not separately consider) has neglected and lef t 
undone. A n d the tr ibunal is a mora] t r ibunal ; i t is the court o f conscience, imagined as a 
Russel l 's E t h i c a l Be l ie fs ' , International Journal of Ethics, V o l . 37， N o . 4 (Ju l . , 1927) , pp . 390—402. 
' 1 0 £ ) ๙ Civitate Dei, XIX， 2 7 . 
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judge, divine or human, external or internal.'^'^ In this sense, the certainty that i t so 
imperfect ly conveys is the l i v i ng truth talked about in section 1.3: the truth that is a 
funct ion o f God's W i l l . T o act out o f heart, on impulse, again, need i t be stressed, l ike a 
ch i ld , is to come close to the certitude enjoyed by Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden,'^^ 
As Rousseau lamented, V i r t u e ! Subl ime science o f simple minds, are such industry and 
preparation needed i f we are to know you? Are not your pr inciples graven on every heart? 
Need we do more, to learn your laws, than examine ourselves, and l isten to the voice of 
conscience, when the passions are s i l e n t ? ' ' H o w e v e r the concern is less w i th substantive 
mora l i ty than w i th the model o f certainty i t conveys. This is in keeping w i th the dist inct ion 
between the Mora l and the Intel lectual Conscience that began this section. Indeed, i f the 
terms o f reference are widened to embrace the argument o f the preceding chapter, i t is 
evident that the issue the two consciences come to loggerheads over is in fact t ime. Both 
of fer their o w n solutions to the metaphysical fact o f temporal i ty, though whereas the one is 
circuitous, and only addresses the problem indirect ly, the other is merc i fu l ly 
straightforward. In the case of the former, the answer is God, and the f o rm o f the solution, 
Vert ical Eterni ty. In the case o f the latter, the answer is the Natural Law Idea, and the form 
of the solut ion, Hor izontal Eternity. 
In the f o l l ow ing section there w i l l be an opportuni ty to examine in more detail how 
August ine interpreted the salvif ic potential in these ideas, and in section 3.3, there w i l l 
f o l l ow an expl ic i t discussion o f their impl icat ions to pol i t ica l phi losophy. It is terr ibly 
, F. H . B rad ley , Ethical Studies ( O x f o r d , T h e C la rendon Press, 1967) , p. 3. 
' A s K. E. K i r k w r o t e i n Some Principles of Moral Theology ( L o n d o n , L o n g m a n s , Green & C o , 1926)， p. 
179: Tt is a f i r s t p r i nc ip le o f mora ls that wherever conscience gives a c l e ^ r u l i n g f o r or against an act, i t 
mus t be unhes i ta t ing ly obeyed . . . ' 
' Jean Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences, i n G . D. H . Co le , tr. 
Rousseau 'ร Social Contract Discourses ( L o n d o n , J . M . D e n t & Sons, 1930) , pp . 153-154. 
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important, though, to dispel at this juncture any fears that the former епГефгІ5е may, in 
relat ion to the intended pol i t ical import o f this argument, be entirely gratuitous. To this 
end, i t needs only be pointed out that the salvi f ic mechanism affords a very useful example 
o f these ideas in practice. I f i t can be shown that August ine bel ieved God worked His 
salvi f ic purpose through both the Mora l and the Intel lectual Conscience, then that is all the 
more proof for the argument being developed here. Moreover, i t makes the point that 
Augustine's secular and ecclesiastical thoughts both drew on the same set o f metaphysical 
f irst pr inciples. Yet before this can be undertaken in any great detai l , i t is f i rst necessary to 
inquire whether any developments in the f ie ld o f ethics lend support to the dist inct ion, 
made on the grounds of certainty, between the Mora l and the Intel lectual Conscience. 
W i t h regard to this matter, A . J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic springs immediately to 
m ind . This wo rk created a tremendous stir when i t was f i rst publ ished in England, in 1936. 
It la id out, for the f i rst t ime in the Engl ish language, the fu l l impor t o f the Logical 
Posit iv ist programme. Log ica l Posi t iv ism grew out o f an or ig inal desire to wipe f rom the 
phi losophy o f science, and indeed the natural sciences, all metaphysical traces. This 
agenda was or ig inal ly championed by the Austr ian physicist, Ernst Mach , who held a chair 
in the phi losophy of induct ive sciences as the Univers i ty o f V ienna. When his chair was 
inheri ted in 1922 by Mor i t z Schl ick, also a physicist, the movement started proper. Schl ick 
qu ick ly became the focus o f a discussion group wh ich by 1928 had produced a coherent 
programme for the reduct ion o f all science to physics. It was at this point that the group 
became known as the V ienna C i rc leไ The term Logica l Posi t iv ism was coined in 1931. 
Dur ing the 1920'ร, both Bertrand Russell and L u d w i g Wit tgenstein took part in the group's 
discussions. The publ icat ion o f Wittgenstein's Tractatus ԽտԽօ-Բհսօտօբհւշստ, in 1921， 
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hugely inf luenced the group's maturation. I t was whi ls t attending discussions o f the Vienna 
Circle, in 1933, that Ayer picked up the ideas that wou ld later appear in Language, Truth 
and Logic.^^"^ O f these the most important was the Ver i f icat ion P r i n c i p l e . * I n Ayer 'ร 
words, T h e pr inciple o f ver i f icat ion is supposed to furnish a cr i ter ion by wh ich i t can be 
determined whether or not a sentence is l i teral ly meaningful . A simple way to formulate it 
wou ld be to say that a sentence had l i teral meaning i f and only i f the proposit ion i t 
expressed was either analytic or empir ica l ly verif iable.'* The f i rst th ing to be said is that 
this pr inciple is clearly an example o f what I have termed Conceptual Certainty. Leaving 
aside, for the t ime being, the question o f analytic propositions^ ^՚՛, i t needs hardly be said 
that the qual i f icat ion o f empir ical ver i f icat ion evinces a part icular standard o f truthfulness 
or r ightfulness. In this case i t is, '...that a sentence is factual ly signi f icant to any given 
person, i f , and only i f , he knows how to ver i fy the proposit ion i t purports to express 一 that 
is, i f he knows what observations wou ld lead h im, under certain condit ions, to accept the 
proposit ion as being true, or to reject i t as being f a l s e . ' * A s such, for a sentence to be 
l i teral ly meaningfu l , i t has to represent an hypothesis; i t must be capable o f either 
ver i f icat ion or fa ls i f icat ion by the ordinary methods o f s c i e n c e . * M e t a p h y s i c a l 
proposit ions clearly fa l l outside this category, and as such, are deemed meaningless or 
nonsensical. The result is that ethical predicates such as 'good' and 'right' are regarded as 
having only emot ive meaning. They express a subjective point o f v iew rather than any 
object ive truth. It might not unfair ly be said that this theory represents the apotheosis o f the 
Th i s po t ted h is to ry is based o n the account g i ven i n the Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Modern Christian 
Thought, ed . A l l s t e r E. M c G r a t h ( O x f o r d , B l a c k w e l l , 1995) , pp . 345 -346 . 
' I n sect ion 1.2, a ' rat ional ve r i f i ca t i on m e c h a n i s m ' was re fer red to . T h e in tended mean ing was that o f 
Ayer 'ร V e r i f i c a t i o n Pr inc ip le . 
I A . J. A y e r . Language, Truth and Խջւշ, p. 7. 
T h e y are returned ю Delo w, p. 52 . 
： Α . J . A y e r , Language, Truth and Logic, p. 48 . 
' I n c l u d e d i n th is qua l i f i ca t i on are a l l o r Ayer 'ร ca re fu l d isc la imers conce rn ing the d i f f e rence be tween 
prac t i ca l v e r i f i a b i l i t y and v e r i f i a b i l i t y in p r i nc i p l e , and weak and s t rong v e r i f i a b i l i t y . 
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Intel lectual Conscience, for in taking the physical sciences as the modem paradigm of 
t ruth, i t ends up exhausting moral i ty . Ethical predicates such as those mentioned above 
s imply refuse to be pinned down and made answerable in the same way factual statements 
do. A static conception o f truth evinces nothing f r om them. Labe l l ing them 'emotive' only 
highl ights their consanguinity w i th the wor ld o f choice and action: It is admitted that they 
fal l outside a jur isd ic t ion and left at that. A n d what is this i f not brutal honesty? Have not 
the Logica l Posit ivists merely called the b l u f f on man's use of Reason? For they say that i f 
what he craves is the type o f certainty obtained in the physical sciences, then he must start 
weeding. Out must go al l that is neither analytic nor emp i r i cฝ l y ver i f iable. What is left, the 
neat beds and borders, we l l , that is all he has a r ight to know by the terms of the 
Ver i f icat ion Principle. Ayer 'ร response to the myst ic c la iming an in tu i t ion o f truth wou ld 
be to, '...say that his in tu i t ion has not revealed to h im any facts... For we know that i f he 
real ly had acquired any in format ion, he wou ld be able to express i t . He w o u l d be able to 
indicate in some way or other how the genuineness o f his discovery might be empir ical ly 
determined.՚^^*՛ Man has l i t t le right to compla in; this is truth on the only terms by which he 
wou ld have it , as a funct ion o f the Natural L a w Idea. Augustine's famous exhortation 
concerning the teachings o f Ambrose springs to m ind : H e w o u l d state things which I 
wou ld not as yet know to be true, I held back my heart f r o m all assent and died all the 
more f r om that suspense. I wished to be made just as certain o f things I cou ld not see, as I 
was certain that seven and three makes ten.'^^' In a short speculation but revealing 
speculation, G. E. Moore probed the impetus and methods presupposed by such yearning: 
What, after all, is it that we mean to say of an action when we say that it is right 
or ought to be done? And what is it that we mean to say of a state of things 
A . J . A y e r , LMnguage, Truth and Logic, p. 157. 
Confessiones, VI， 4 . 
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when we say that it is good or bad? Can we discover any general characteristic, 
which belongs in common to absolutely all right actions, no matter how 
different they may be in other respects? And which does not belong to any 
action except those which are right? And can we similarly discover any 
characteristic which belongs in common to absolutely all 'good' things, and 
which does not belong to anything except what is good? Or again, can we 
discover any single reason, applicable to all situations equally, which is, in 
every case, the reason why an action is right when it is right? 
But i f this is indeed the k ind o f certitude that the Intel lectual Conscience demands ― one 
law ho ld ing true for every conceivable instance - then surely i t cannot but appear in imical 
to the Mora l Conscience? Whereas the latter operates in the heat o f the (present) moment, 
presiding over those considerations and reflections that accompany choices, the former 
resides in the static wo r l d o f concepts and ideas; for о i n this wor ld , where the flux and 
change o f real i ty has been broken down and rout inised, can be found the necessary 
precondit ions for cri teria o f truth. For instance, i f ethics were to be placed on the k ind o f 
rational foundations envisaged by Moore, moral i ty wou ld f i rst have to be reduced to a set 
o f universal properties, and what is this i f not a route to that certainty inspired by the 
Natural Law Idea? What else wou ld be the reason to define moral properties i f not to 
produce a set o f markers for future moral action? Such considerations br ing the argument 
round to arguably the most important characteristic o f the Intel lectual Conscience: that its 
relationship to its moral counterpart, though antagonistic, is nonetheless symbiot ic. 
• G . E. M o o r e , Ethics ( O x f o r d , O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1972) , p. 2 . 
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As was observed in section 1.8， Reason cannot i tself be the source o f anything. Moore's 
questions show that i t can reduce, c lar i fy and redefine what i t is g iven, but that i t must be 
given something is a fact o f its operation. For Reason is a means to an end, a way of 
gett ing f r o m A to B, o f producing one truth statement f r om another. Its business, as Quine 
puts i t , '...is the pursuit o f t ruth. What are true are certain statements; and the pursuit o f 
truth is the endeavour to sort out the true statements f rom the others, wh ich are false. ՚^ ՛^^  I t 
is interproüve not creative, put to work in the name o f t ruth, and as Ayer rather 
spectacularly shows, the results are every b i t determined by the premises taken. This thesis 
provides a perfect example. I n fo rm and content i t is s imply a series o f deductions f rom 
Augustine's proposi t ion 'man is designed and equipped to obey a command'. The 
conclusions, as they are arr ived at, should be regarded 'true' on ly insofar as they do not 
contradict this premise. I f by the end o f this process i t can be c la imed that anything new 
has been created, then str ict ly speaking, i t is on ly a new set o f premises, their ' truth' di lute 
in proport ion to their remove, by degrees o f abstraction, f rom the or ig inal . The point that is 
being made is that in matters o f ethical import , rat ional thought, far f r o m evincing new 
truth, serves only to spread an or iginal deposit yet thinner; and that whi ls t this 'original 
deposit ' is discovered by the Mora l Conscience in the present moment, i t is spread either 
side o f i t by the Intel lectual Conscience. 
What is meant by this can be made clear w i th reference to Ayer 's def in i t ion o f analytic 
proposit ions. For h im , an analytic proposit ion is one whose, ' . ..validity depends solely on 
the def ini t ions o f the symbols it contains.՚^^՛* In other words, a proposit ion that can be 
recognised as true solely on the basis that conventions govern the use of its symbols. Ayer 
พ . V . Q u i n e , Methods of Logic, E d . , ( C a m b r i d g e , Mass . , H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1982)， p. 1 . 
A y e r , Language, Truth and Logic, p. 105. 
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gives the f o l l ow ing example: " 'Ei ther some ants are parasitic or none are" is an analytic 
proposit ion. For one need not resort to observation to discover that there either are or are 
not ants wh ich are parasitic. I f one knows what is the funct ion o f the words 'either', Or', 
and 'not', then one can see that any proposit ion o f the f o rm "Ei ther р is true or р is not true" 
is va l id , independently o f e x p e r i e n c e . ' I n effect, the key to the truth o f such propositions 
is that they l ie beyond the reach o f the Ver i f icat ion Principle. I f they are to be true by 
virtue o f symbol ic meaning, then they cannot harbour any factual content, and i f that is the 
case, then, '...no experience can confute them.'i26 To Ayer , this is taken as proof that in 
effect, '...every logical proposit ion is val id in its own right. Its val id i ty does not depend on 
its being іпсофогаІЄ(і i n a system, and deduced f r o m certain proposit ions wh ich are taken 
as self-evident.'^^^ B y the terms o f this argument, however, i t wou ld appear that this 
remains true only so long as the metaphysical fact o f temporal i ty is lef t out. What is meant 
by this is the fo l l ow ing : i f i t is accepted that the symbols mak ing up analytic proposit ions, 
and the analytic proposit ions mak ing up logical systems, need convey nothing o f factual 
import , then i t must be accepted that the truth espoused by such proposit ions and systems 
must be the exclusive funct ion o f the logical relationships invo lved. A n d such relationships 
take t ime. This is not a facetious remark. Take, for instance, the analytic proposit ion ՝p = 
q,. Clearly in this case, truth is not a property o f the symbols 'p' or 'g' considered in 
isolat ion. Rather, i t comes into being the moment they are related by the symbol '='. 
However, for this to be able to take place at a l l , a further qual i f icat ion must be imposed 
upon the symbols ՚բ ' and ՝q) and in l ight o f the discussion o f Augustine's remarks on time 
in section 1,5， i t w i l l be cal led i t the Law o f the Fleshly Sense. I t goes as fo l lows: 'Logic 
enjoins the most reduced of terms/symbols to stand for one th ing, and one th ing only'. In 
A y e r , Language, Truth and Logic, p. 105. 
' Ibid. 
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other words, useful meaning can only accrue i f a symbol such as β is understood to 
represent some f in i te property or col lect ion o f properties. I f this were not the case, then 
logical relationships could s imply not convey truth. What is perceived as true in a logical 
proposit ion or series o f proposit ions is that some def ini te property, dist inguished by the 
m ind in pr inciple, i.e. not necessarily factual, is transported intact through a series o f 
present moments. For instance, the logical thought process ' i f this then that' necessarily 
invokes two present moments for the truth to 'span'. A n d what is true in such an instance is 
s imply the fact that the m ind has perceived (or perhaps imagined wou ld be a better term to 
use in the case o f analytic proposit ions) some irreducible property mov ing through t ime. 
The point is that short o f such movement, there is noth ing to set the property in dist inct ion. 
The effect is not unl ike a man startled by the sudden movement o f a hitherto camouflaged 
beast. This becomes clear i f i t is imagined the second hal f o f the proposit ion cl ipped o f f to 
leave only ' i f this'. Where has the truth gone now? L i t t le more is lef t than a percept in the 
present moment. Bu t is it true, or more to the point, is i t useful ly true? The dist inct ion is 
made because in the case o f a simple sense percept, either mora l or no, where truth could 
quite reasonably be explained on the hypothesis o f existence, i t may we l l seem enough to 
reply in the af f i rmat ive: Y e s , i t is certainly true that at this moment i n t ime I am, for 
example, tasting something sweet or experiencing the emot ion o f pi ty ' . But i t wou ld be 
contended that this naïve fo rm of truth, whi ls t a common enough occurrence in everyday 
language and experience, is not the currency o f rational or logical thought. This is because 
the latter takes place in the wor ld o f concepts and ideas, and its object is precisely to 
ensure that man does not remain a slave to the naive truth o f the present moment. Whi ls t 
analytic proposit ions and logical tautologies are ordinar i ly regarded immune f rom the 
127 A y e r , Language, Truth and Logic, pp . 108-109. 
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problems associated w i th induct ive reasoning, it pays not to be squeamish when it comes 
to facing the poverty o f Reason 
2.2 The God-Shaped Ho le 
A t this point i t is imperative to appreciate that i t is not one o f the aims o f this thesis to 
make the term Conceptual Certainty carry any anti- intel lectualist sentiment. Those 
pragmatic philosophies that take as their central idea the rugged concepts o f l i f e ' or 
'action', though putat ively endorsed by what is here understand by the term, tend to diverge 
f r om the purpose of this argument. Whi ls t i t is true that their broad cri t ique o f 
intel lectual ism seems imp l i c i t i n the def in i t ion o f Conceptual Certainty, this is where the 
similari t ies end. For they work to a diametr ical ly opposed рцфозе. They tear down 
intel lectual ism in order to raise something new in its place. In contrast to this, i t is a major 
concern o f this thesis to show that the def in i t ion o f Conceptual Certainty can never tend 
towards such posit ive restatement. What is, after al l , being constructed here is a meta-
narrative. The a im is to discover whether problems anticipated by Augustine's analytical 
reading o f the Fal l do indeed resonate w i th in the human compound. The accuracy o f a 
diagnosis is being checked, not a cure being developed. T o that end, some conf i rmat ion o f 
the disparity that exists between the Mora l and the Intel lectual Conscience has been 
received in the preceding section. Rev iewing the Logica l Posit iv ist thesis has shown that 
the reduction o f sentiments, emotions and values into work ing premises can be a t r icky 
business; for i f Reason is to gain a decent foothold, and intel lectual credibi l i ty to be 
maintained, these premises must be o f an a priori nature. Much depends on the cri terion o f 
See John Stuart M i l l , A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive ( L o n d o n , L o n g m a n s , Green and Co., 
1925) , b o o k in. 
' T h e w o r k o f Be rgson , B l o n d e l , D e w e y and James spr ing to m i n d . 
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truth chosen. Adopt ing one so severe as Ayer'ร runs the r isk o f seeing r ight through 
mora l i ty ; but clearly the spectrum contains room for a great number. T o return to Moore: 
On questions of this sort different philosophers hold the most diverse opinions. I 
think it is true that absolutely every answer that has ever been given to them by 
any one philosopher would be denied to be true by many others. There is, at any 
rate, no such consensus of opinion among experts about these fundamental 
ethical questions, as there is about many fundamental propositions in 
Mathematics and the Natural Sciences. 
The ramif icat ions o f these thoughts were drawn out in new and alarming ways by Heinz 
พ . Cassirer: 
...while philosophy is supposed to be on all sides a purely rational activity, 
relying upon the intellect and upon the intellect alone, without ever allowing 
itself to be swayed by any personal or emotional bias, there remainร this 
disturbing fact: utterly different conclusions are reached by various thinkers, 
each philosopher arguing with great vehemence and ingenuity in favour of the 
position he wishes to uphold, while yet the possibility is wholly excluded that 
agreement might be reached between him and his opponents. This, of course, 
raises the crucial problem whether any such thing as a reliable criterion of truth 
is available within the compass of philosophical thinking at all.^^* 
Such thoughts f r om so renowned an authority on Kant and Ar is tot le mark a serious pause 
for thought. But perhaps Augustine's understanding o f the Fal len cast o f m ind can offer 
' G . E. M o o r e , Ethics, p. 2 . 
H e i n z พ . Cassirer, Grace and Law: St. Paul and the Hebrew Prophets ( M i c h i g a n , 1988)， pp. x i i i - x i v . 
Jean Jacques Rousseau puts the cha l lenge m o r e d i rec t l y i n h is Discourse on the A rís and Sciences. I quote 
f r o m the E v e r y m a n ed i t i on t ranslated b y G. D. H . Co le , Rousseau 'ร Social Contract Discourses, pp . 150— 
1 5 1 : ' . . .What is ph i l osophy? W h a t is con ta ined i n the w r i t i n g s o f the mos t ce lebrated ph i losophers? W h a t 
are the lessons o f these f r i ends o f w i s d o m . . . One o f then teaches that there is no such th ings as matter, but 
that eve ry th i ng exists o n l y in representat ion. A n o t h e r declares that there is no o ther substance than matter , 
and no other G o d than the w o r l d i tsel f . A th i rd te l ls y o u that there are no such th ings as v i r tue and v ice , 
and that mo ra l good and e v i l are ch imeras ; w h i l e a f o u r t h i n f o r m s you that m e n are o n l y beasts o f prey, 
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some hope here. Af ter a l l , this is just the type of problem that a meta-narrative should be 
able to accommodate, and besides, in section 2 .1 , i t was promised that the salvi f ic potential 
imp l ic i t in the ideas o f Vert ica i and Hor izontal Eternity wou ld be drawn out. 
As has been shown, the August inian narrative o f the Fall portrays man as a creature 
thirst ing after nothing short o f action on the l i teral W o r d o f God. By the terms of 
Augustine's dis junct ive reasoning, every other phi losophy and re l ig ion has to be regarded 
inadequate as a means to this end. However this news need not meet w i th despair, for 
although they cannot provide the solut ion, these rel igions and phi losophies can, in their 
various forms, help to delineate the problem. They are, after a l l , each and every one of 
them, case studies in man's abject fai lure to replicate by his o w n means the certainty lost 
w i th the Fal l . Accord ing to August ine, that he even f inds h imsel f capable o f such 
օոէ6փոտ6 in the f irst place is because he has, through Grace, been gi f ted that impression o f 
God's image upon his heart. I t is this fact wh ich catalyses his desire for certainty, though he 
is disadvantaged f r om the first by taking for his paradigm o f truth the idea o f Hor izontal 
Eternity. For the cr i t ical absence that man has by Grace been equipped to mourn is not o f 
this nature. Those br ief glimpses o f certainty he wins though the Mora l Conscience are o f 
the type only possible under voluntarist law: ' A n d it [the m ind ] remembers the Lord its 
God . . .Bu t i t is reminded, that i t may be turned to God, as though to that l ight by which it 
was in some way touched, even when turned away f r om H i m . For hence it is that even the 
ungodly th ink o f eternity, and rightly blame and rightly praise many things in the moralร o f 
men.'^^^ Unfortunately, though, this fact is often lost in translation f r om the Mora l to the 
Intel lectual Conscience. A l though it might appear so through the lens o f Reason, man's 
and m a y consc ien t ious ly d e v o u r one another. W h y , m y great ph i losophers , do you no t reserve these w ise and 
p ro f i t ab le lessons f o r your f r i ends and ch i l d ren? ' 
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awareness o f the o r d a i n e d goodness o f c r e a t i o n does n o t c o m e t o h i m as a set o f l u m i n o u s 
a x i o m s , that i s , as a set o f l a w s tha t c o u l d be w r i t t e n d o w n a n d s to red a w a y f o r f u t u r e 
re fe rence . I t w o r k s m o r e l i k e B r a d l e y ' s ' m o r a l t r i b u n a l ' : i t f o rces h i m t o a n s w e r f o r 'wha t he 
has d o n e , o r has n e g l e c t e d and l e f t u n d o n e . ' W h a t i t ca l l s f o r is o b e d i e n c e i n the present 
m o m e n t , and i n th is sense i t does i n d e e d possess a l l the i n f u r i a t i n g q u a l i t i e s o f an a r b i t r a r y 
w i l l . I n a w o r d , w h a t is g o o d one d a y m a y be b a d the nex t , w h a t is r i g h t f o r one m a n m a y 
be w r o n g f o r the nex t . L i t t l e w o n d e r e t h i c a l p red i ca tes p r o v e so d i f f i c u l t t o p i n d o w n , f o r 
d e n o t i n g a c t i o n i n acco rdance w i t h the M o r a l C o n s c i e n c e , i .e. as g i f t s o f G r a c e , t he i r 
e f f i c a c y a n d f o r c e o f v a l u e r e m a i n s c o n t i n g e n t o n c o n d i t i o n s o f t i m e a n d p lace . Perhaps i t 
is n o w easier t o see the r o l e tha t Reason o r i n t e l l e c t u a l h o n e s t y m i g h t p l a y i n A u g u s t i n e ' s 
scheme o f r e d e m p t i o n . I t is o n l y b y d i s c o v e r i n g a n d a c c e p t i n g the p o v e r t y o f Reason that 
m a n can r e ฝ i s e h is need to l i v e u n d e r v o l u n t a r i s t l a w , o r i n d e e d t o b e l i e v e b e f o r e he can 
u n d e r s t a n d , f o r w h a t he can u n d e r s t a n d a m o u n t s t o p r e c i o u s l i t t l e . 
T h e despa i r w h i c h t h i s hones t y u n c o v e r s i s n o t m e r e l y t h e f a i l u r e t o l i v e u p t o a m o r a l 
s tandard . I t is w o r s e t han that : i t is the f a i l u r e o f t he s tanda rd i t se l f . I t is t he consequence , 
as P a u l w a r n e d at R o m 2 : 1 7 - 2 8 , o f sepa ra t i ng the l a w f r o m the L i t e r a l W o r d o f G o d . T h e 
g i f t o f t he N e w C o v e n a n t is tha t e v e r y m a n m i g h t d i s c o v e r , b y n o t h i n g m o r e t han a 
s c o u r i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l hones t y , tha t a l i f e l i v e d o n the bas is o f the N a t u r a l L a w Idea s i m p l y 
does n o t w o r k ; and the reason f o r th is is n o t because o f s o m e gene ra l i m p a i r m e n t o f w i l l , 
b u t ra the r because the M o r a l C o n s c i e n c e does n o t l e n d i t s e l f t o i n t e l l e c t u a l l y so l ven t 
c o d i f i c a t i o n . I n o the r w o r d s , i ts p recepts c a n n o t be m a d e t o s tand t o R e a s o n , a n d as has 
1 3 2 De Trinitate, X I V , 2 1 , quo ted i n Herber t A . Deane , The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine, p. 282 . 
՚ 3 3 See b e l o w , pp . 109-110 ՛ 
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been s h o w n , th i s is the resu l t o f the F a l l e n cast o f m i n d ' s c o m m i t m e n t t o C o n c e p t u a l 
C e r t a i n t y - t o a h o r i z o n t a l l y e x t e n d e d c r i t e r i a o f t r u t h . 
I t w o u l d seem, t hen , tha t b y the t e r m s o f the A u g u s t i n i a n na r ra t i ve o f the F a l l , the pa th t o 
s a l v a t i o n is an i n t e l l e c t u a l sp i ra l i n t o f i r s t d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t t hen despa i r , a n d because the e n d 
resu l t is a s u b j e c t i o n t o v o l u n t a r i s t l a w , t h i s means tha t f o r A u g u s t i n e , C h r i s t i a n i t y is a 
Person n o t an a r g u m e n t ; less a 'way o f l i f e ' t han the o n u s o f p e r f e c t i o n t h r o u g h obed ience 
( c o r o l l a r y to th i s b e i n g t h e b e l i e f tha t i m p e r f e c t i o n is n o C h r i s t i a n v i r t u e S i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
th is sa feguards C h r i s t i a n i t y aga ins t the charges o r d i n a r i l y a n d c o r r e c t l y l e v e l l e d at 
sys tema t i c t h e o l o g y : tha t i t r equ i res r e a s o n i n g f r o m p r e m i s e s tha t due t o t h e i r ex t ra -
e m p i r i c a l na tu re , can o n l y be t a k e n o n f a i t h . C l e a r l y a n o t i o n o f C h r i s t i a n i t y p l a c i n g 
e m p h a s i s o n b e l i e f ( i .e . b e l i e f i n the ex i s tence o f G o d ) ra the r than o b e d i e n c e c a n n o t 
c i r c u m v e n t these charges , f o r i n the e n d i t f a i l s at t he p o i n t a l l p h i l o s o p h i e s f a i l : d e m a n d i n g 
o f the d i s c i p l e an i n t e l l e c t u a l l y d i s i n g e n u o u s leap o f f a i t h . T h e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r sys temat i c 
t h e o l o g y are s tark : i f i t is to r e m a i n i n t e l l e c t u a l l y s o l v e n t , i t can d o n o m o r e than m a r k ou t 
t he l i m i t a t i o n s o f h u m a n k n o w l e d g e , a task i t shares w i t h p h i l o s o p h y . T h i s i n t u r n means 
that I n t e l l e c t u a l h o n e s t y m u s t b r i n g a m a n , b y w h i c h e v e r r o u t e , t o a g a p i n g c h a s m , w h i c h 
w i l l h e n c e f o r t h be r e f e r r e d to as the ' G o d - s h a p e d ho le ' . T h i s t e r m is p a r t i c u l a r l y apt 
because t h e c h a s m is , o f cou rse , t he i m a g e o f G o d i m p r e s s e d u p o n the hear t , o r as i t w a s 
ea r l i e r d e s c r i b e d , 'the b r i e f e s t g l i m p s e o f the c e r t a i n t y o f l i v i n g u n d e r v o l u n t a r i s t l a w ' : H e 
^ O s w a l d Chambers makes the po in t w i t h character is t ic u n a m b i g u i t y i n My Utmost for His Highest, ( D e v o n , 
N o v a , 1991) , p. 170: Pr ide is the de i f i ca t i on o f self, and this today i n some o f us is no t o f the order o f the 
Phar isee, bu t o f the Pub l i can . T o say, ' O h , I 'm no sa in t , " is acceptable to h u m a n p r ide , bu t i t is 
unconscious blasphemy against G o d . I t literally means that you defy G o d to make you a saint. " I am 
m u c h to w e a k and hopeless, I a m outs ide the reach o f the A t o n e m e n t . " H u m i l i t y be fo re men may be 
unconsc ious b lasphemy be fo re G o d . W h y are you no t a տաոէ？ I t is e i ther that y o u do not wan t to be a 
saint, o r that you do not be l ieve G o d can make you one. ' 
Th i s is b y no means to prec lude pos i t i ve assert ions o f f a i t h f r o m Chr i s t i an doc t r ine , but rather to make the 
po in t that such statements i n no w a y replace or ove r r i de the l i te ra l W o r d o f G o d as the fundamen ta l fact 
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w i l l teach us, to k n o w a n d l o v e W h o m is happ iness o f l i f e , a n d th i s is w h a t a l l p r o c l a i m 
they are รee tóng , t h o u g h there are b u t f e w w h o m a y r e j o i c e i n h a v i n g r e a l l y f o u n d it.'^՝^^ 
W h e r e a l l p h i l o s o p h i e s , r e l i g i o n s and b e l i e f sys tems b e c o m e s p u r i o u s , is w h e n t hey 
a t t emp t t o f i l l t h i s h o l e w i t h p o s i t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n s , o f f e r i n g t h e m s e l v e s as s o l u t i o n s t o the 
p r o b l e m . T h i s is w h y th i s sec t i on began w i t h the s ta temen t t ha t i t w a s n o t i n t e n d e d f o r the 
d e f i n i t i o n o f C o n c e p t u a l C e r t a i n t y t o i m p l y i ts o w n p o s i t i v e res ta temen t . I f th i s d i s c l a i m e r 
had n o t been i ssued , t hen the A u g u s t i n i a n m e t a - n a r r a t i v e w o u l d h a v e l a i d i t s e l f o p e n to the 
same c h a r g e l e v e l l e d at M a r x ' s c r i t i q u e o f i d e o l o g y : tha t o f h a v i n g f o r e g o n e i ts o b j e c t i v e 
p l a t f o r m t o b e c o m e yet ano the r e x a m p l e o f the p h e n o m e n o n i t w a s c r i t i c i s i n g . O n the 
c o n t r a r y , the A u g u s t i n i a n m e t a - n a r r a t i v e escapes t h i s cha rge because t o p r o m o t e s u b j e c t i o n 
t o v o l u n t a r i s t l a w is n o t t o p u t f o r w a r d an і п і е ф г е ї а й о п o f G o d ' s W i l l . I t is ra the r to leave 
such ma t te rs e n t i r e l y up t o G o d . A s f o r a l l the o the r r e l i g i o n s a n d p h i l o s o p h i e s ( a n d b e l i e f -
c e n t r e d ' C h r i s t i a n i t y is i n c l u d e d a m o n g s t t h e m ) , t h e y b e c o m e o f i n te res t o n l y i n s o f a r as 
they h e l p de l i nea te p e r i m e t e r sec t ions o f the ' G o d - S h a p e d H o l e ' . T h e y m a y p r o v e 
f a s c i n a t i n g at t he p o i n t at w h i c h t hey h i g h l i g h t s o m e l e g i t i m a t e p r o b l e m , b u t t he m o m e n t 
they c a l l f o r tha t i n t e l l e c t u a l l y d i s i n g e n u o u s leap o f f a i t h , one i n s t i n c t i v e l y d r a w s b a c k . 
O n e m a y p o n d e r w i t h P l a t o the q u e s t i o n o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , b u t d i s m i s s h i s W o r l d o f the 
F o r m s ' ; o r a p p l a u d the sens ib le e th ic o f A r i s t o t l e ' s ' G o l d e n M e a n ' , b u t f i n d i t i m p r a c t i c a l i n 
the a p p l i c a t i o n ; pe rhaps set o u t t o S t o i c a l l y e n d u r e t h i s l i f e as a c i t i z e n o f the C o s m o s , b u t 
s t rugg le t o t rans la te the c o n t e n t o f the D i v i n e R e a s o n ; O n e m a y d e c i d e t o f ree o n e s e l f f r o m 
m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n t h r o u g h N ie tzsche ' s ' w i l l t o p o w e r ' , b u t f i n d o n e s e l f a p p a l l e d at t he resu l t ; 
one m a y e v e n res t r i c t one's c u r i o s i t y to e m p i r i c a l ma t t e r s , b u t f i n d tha t i n the e n d one has 
o f Chr i s t i an i t y . 
1 3 6 De Magistro, X I V , 46 . 
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t u r n e d one*ร b a c k o n a l l that is h u m a n . I t w o u l d s e e m tha t each o f these p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
a t tempts at t r u t h en ta i l s a c o m p r o m i s e , a n d i t is at the p o i n t o f c o m p r o m i s e that t hey lose 
i n t e l l e c t u a l c r e d i b i l i t y . 
Y e t i n o r d e r f o r the p h i l o s o p h y o r r e l i g i o n to m o v e b e y o n d the p r o b l e m i t has i d e n t i f i e d 
and b e c o m e the s o l u t i o n , i t m u s t advance i ts p a r t i c u l a r c l a i m t o ( e t h i c a l ) c e r t a i n t y , the 
p r o b l e m b e c o m i n g s u b s u m e d w i t h i n a n e w l y o r d e r e d r e a l i t y . B u t as has been s h o w n , th is 
r e - o r d e r i n g p r o v e s r es t r i c t ed b y the v e r y o p e r a t i o n o f R e a s o n i t s e l f - c o n c l u s i o n s c a n n o t 
c o n t r a d i c t p r e m i s e s a n d p r e m i s e s m u s t b e s o u g h t i f o n e i s t o m o v e f r o m the w e l t e r o f 
e x p e r i e n c e to p r e c i s i o n o f t h o u g h t . I t is h e l p f u l t o t h i n k o f i t as a z e r o - s u m g a m e . T h e b o d y 
o f h u m a n w i s d o m presents coun t less poss ib l e p r e m i s e s , each p a c k a g e d as an a priori m o r a l 
t r u t h . Y e t the H i s t o r y o f Ideas s h o w s tha t as the bases f o r e t h i c a l sys tems such p rem ises , 
f a r f r o m g r o u n d i n g r e a l i t y o n surer f o u n d a t i o n s , t e n d o n l y t o d i s t o r t i t . T h e m i n u t i a e o f 
h u m a n l i f e b e c o m e s a c r i f i c e d o n the a l tar o f u t i l i t y . A s c. s. L e w i s p u t i t : T h e r e neve r has 
been , a n d neve r w i l l be , a r a d i c a l l y n e w j u d g e m e n t o f v a l u e i n the h i s t o r y o f the w o r l d . 
W h a t р и ф о і і t o be n e w sys tems (o r , as t h e y n o w c a l l t h e m ) " i d e o l o g i e s " , a l l cons i s t o f 
f r a g m e n t s f r o m t h e [ N a t u r a l L a w ] i t se l f , a r b i t r a r i l y w r e n c h e d f r o m t h e i r c o n t e x t i n the 
w h o l e a n d then s w o l l e n to madness i n t h e i r i so la t ion . . . ' ^^^ T h e s e se l f same consequences are 
spe l l ed o u t b y A u g u s t i n e i n a passage d e s c r i b i n g h o w one's u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f goodness is 
r e - a l i g n e d w h e n one l o o k s t o G o d f o r a l l one's u n d e r s t a n d i n g : 
...it f o l l ows that al l th ings, taken one by one, are good , and al l th ings, taken 
together, are very good.. . Le t me never say, "These th ings should not b e ! " I f I 
considered them alone, I m igh t desire better th ings; but st i l l . . . because I thought 
o f al l th ings, and w i t h a sounder judgement I he ld that the h igher things are 
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indeed better than the lower, but that al l th ings together are better than the 
h igher things alone. ^՚^^ 
T h e lessons are c lear : t he M o r a l C o n s c i e n c e cons t i t u tes the one e th i ca l r esou rce i n t r i n s i c to 
h u m a n i t y . I t p r o v i d e s f o r b r i e f g l i m p s e s o f tha t r e a l i t y w h e r e , ' . . . a l l t h i ngs toge the r are 
be t te r t h a n the h i g h e r t h i n g s a l one . ' H o w e v e r , as an i n t i m a t i o n o f t he o r d a i n e d goodness o f 
c r e a t i o n , i t can ne i t he r be added to n o r i m p r o v e d u p o n . T h e best tha t can be h o p e d f o r is to 
m a i n t a i n a n d n u r t u r e i t i n the k n o w l e d g e tha t i t is the one m o d e r a t i n g i n f l u e n c e w i t h i n the 
h u m a n c o m p o u n d . O n the o the r h a n d , the i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n s c i e n c e does p r o v e o p e n to 
r e f i n e m e n t a n d i m p r o v e m e n t , t h o u g h b y the t e r m ' i m p r o v e m e n t ' , is i m p l i e d i ts capac i t y to 
m a r k o u t man ' s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a ! l i m i t a t i o n s . I t f o l l o w s f r o m t h i s las t r e m a r k tha t a l l the 
g rea t r e l i g i o n s and p h i l o s o p h i e s c o u l d be d i a c h r o n i c a l l y a r r a n g e d i n the se rv i ce o f th is 
p r i n c i p l e , each one m a r k i n g o u t p e r i m e t e r sec t ions o f t he ' G o d - s h a p e d ' h o l e . I n sec t ion 3.2 
is f o u n d a d i s c u s s i o n o f a r g u a b l y the greatest s i ng le c o n t r i b u t i o n t o th i s p r o j e c t i n the 
p i o n e e r i n g t h o u g h t o f t he P re -Soc ra t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s . 
N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , i t is p o s s i b l e t o see a c lose a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o th is m e t h o d e m p l o y e d b y 
A u g u s t i n e i n h is Confessiones. I n b o o k s th ree t h r o u g h e i g h t he r uns the gaun t l e t o f a l l the 
r e l i g i o n s a n d p h i l o s o p h i e s tha t w e r e a v a i l a b l e t o h i m at t he t i m e . W h a t i t is c lear to see 
t h r o u g h th i s p e r i o d is the r e p e t i t i o n o f the same p rocess . N a m e l y , A u g u s t i n e f i r s t 
e n c o u n t e r i n g a n e w p h i l o s o p h y o r r e l i g i o n p r o m i s i n g t o sa t i s f y h i s des i re f o r t r u t h ( k i n d l e d 
b y tha t m o m e n t o u s r e a d i n g o f C i ce ro ' s Hortensius^^^), t h e n sa id p h i l o s o p h y o r r e l i g i o n 
' c. ร . L e w i s , The Abolition of Man, ( N e w Y o r k , Н а ф е г C o l l i n s , 2001), pp . 43-44. 
' Cow/.essiones, V I I , 12-13 
' Ibid, I I I , 4: H o w I bu rned , о m y G o d , h o w I burned w i t h desire to fly a w a y f r o m ear th ly th ings towards 
you . . . . ' I n de Trinitate Dei, Augus t i ne w o u l d quo te f r o m C i c e r o ' ร Hortensius t o the e f fec t that , \ . . i f the 
souls w h i c h w e have are eterna l and d i v i n e , w e mus t conc lude , that the m o r e w e let t h e m have the i r head 
๒ their natura l ac t i v i t y , that is , i n reasoning and i n the quest f o r k n o w l e d g e , and the less they are caught 
up i n the v ices and errors o f т а п ю п с і , the easier i t w i l l be f o r t h e m to ascend and re tu rn to Heaven 
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s h a p i n g a sec t i on o f the G o d - s h a p e d ho le b e f o r e b e i n g d i s c a r d e d at the p o i n t w h e r e i t 
s p u r i o u s l y a t t emp ts to f i l l i t . A t a n y p o i n t a l o n g th i s p i l g r i m a g e , A u g u s t i n e c o u l d have 
f a l l e n i n w i t h the p h i l o s o p h y o r r e l i g i o n o f the m o m e n t , b u t at each c r i t i c a l j u n c t u r e , h is 
I n t e l l e c t u a l C o n s c i e n c e d r o v e h i m t o re jec t tha t w h i c h d i d n o t a c c o r d w i t h the g l i m p s e o f 
W i s d o m he had w o n w i t h the Hortensias. T h i s was a t o r t u o u s j o u r n e y : ' . , , Ι w a l k e d i n 
da rkness , and u p o n a s l i p p e r y w a y , a n d I s o u g h t f o r y o u ou t s i de m y s e l f , b u t I d i d n o t f i n d 
y o u , the G o d o f m y h e a r t . . . I l os t c o n f i d e n c e , and I d e s p a i r e d o f f i n d i n g t ru th . ' ^ ՚^^ I t w o u l d 
have b e e n f a r eas ier t o h a v e accep ted , l i k e so m a n y o the rs , t he r eady ce r ta in t ies and 
s o l u t i o n s p r o f f e r e d a l o n g the w a y . N o t h i n g m o r e t han s c o u r i n g h o n e s t y k e p t A u g u s t i n e on 
the m o v e : ' . . . n o hos t i l e and s landerous ques t i ons , so m a n y o f w h i c h I h a d read i n 
p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o c o n t r a d i c t one ano ther , c o u l d e x t o r t f r o m m e the a n s w e r tha t Y o u d o n o t 
ex i s t , w h a t s o e v e r m i g h t be Y o u r na tu re ( f o r t h i s I d i d n o t k n o w ) , o r tha t t he g o v e r n a n c e o f 
h u m a n a f f a i r s d i d n o t b e l o n g to You. '^^*^ A n d the m o r e so as he h o m e d i n o n P la to . H e r e 
w a s a p h i l o s o p h e r w h o h a d taken R e a s o n t o the m e t a p h y s i c a l edge , p r e f i g u r i n g C h r i s t i a n 
d o c t r i n e i n a l l b u t t e r m i n o l o g y : 'Ce r t a i n o f o u r b r e t h r e n i n Ch r i s t ' s g race are a m a z e d w h e n 
they hear o r r e a d tha t P l a t o h a d an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f G o d w h i c h , as t hey see, is i n m a n y 
respects cons i s ten t w i t h the t r u t h o f o u r էշ1ւ£10ո/՛^^ I n d e e d , A u g u s t i n e f o u n d w i t h i n the 
P la ton i s t s y s t e m s u p p o r t f o r the f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s : ' . . . that t he re i s one G o d , the A u t h o r 
o f t h i s u n i v e r s e , W h o is n o t o n l y a b o v e e v e r y b o d i l y t h i n g , b e i n g і п с о ф о г е а і , b u t a lso, 
b e i n g i n c o r r u p t i b l e , above a l l sou ls , and is o u r f i r s t p r i n c i p l e , o u r l i g h t a n d o u r good... ' '"^^ 
(C i ce ro , Hortensius, f g t 97 (Opera , I V , 3， ed . M ü l l e r , 1890, p. 3 2 5 ) , c i ted b y A u g u s t i n e i n de Trin. X I V , x i x , 
26， taken f r o m Βΐθ՝^โԼ Augustine of Hippo, p. 40 ) . 
" G Confessiones, V I Д . 
'41 ibid. V ī , 5 . C f . De Utilitate Credendì, X I V : * I am not, am I , sending you to fables? I am not, am I， forcing 
you to b d i e v e rashly? I say that our sou l entang led and sunk i n er ror and f o l l y seeks the w a y o f t r u th , i f 
there be any such. I f this be no t your case, pa rdon m e , I pray, and share w i t h m e your w i s d o m ; but i f you 
recogn ize i n you rse l f w h a t I say, let us, I entreat, together seek the t r u t h . ' 
に; De avitate Dei, vm, 1 1 . 
Ibid, νπΐ, 10. 
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W h a t these P la ton i s t s b e h e l d t h e n , w i t h the eye o f t h e i r m i n d , w a s the G o d - s h a p e d h o l e as 
f e n c e d b y s u c h n e g a t i v e a f f i r m a t i o n s . 
Th is , therefore, is the reason w h y we prefer the Platonists to al l others: because, 
w h i l e other phi losophers have exhausted their ingenui ty and zeal in seeking the 
causes o f th ings and the r ight way to learn and l ive [ in their at tempt to posit 
so lu t ions] , these, by k n o w i n g God , have discovered where to find the cause by 
w h i c h the universe was established, and the Light by wh ich t ru th is to be 
perceived, and the fount at wh i ch we may d r i nk o f happiness. 
T h i s P l a t o n i s t a c h i e v e m e n t s h o u l d c o m e as n o 8ифгІ8Є, b e i n g l i t t l e m o r e than a p r o d u c t o f 
i n t e l l e c t u a l hones t y , A u g u s t i n e b e l i e v e d tha t such u n d e r s t a n d i n g l ay o p e n t o a l l m e n , f o r , 
T h a t w h i c h m a y be k n o w n o f G o d is m a n i f e s t a m o n g t h e m , f o r G o d has m a n i f e s t e d i t t o 
t h e m . F o r H i s i n v i s i b l e t h i ngs f r o m the c r e a t i o n o f the w o r l d are c l e a r l y seen, b e i n g 
u n d e r s t o o d b y the t h i n g s w h i c h are m a d e , a lso H i s e te rna l p o w e r a n d Godhead . ' * ' ' ^ B u t as 
has been s t ressed, the G o d - s h a p e d h o l e p r o v i d e s f o r n o m o r e t h a n the r u d i m e n t s o f 
C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e , a n d even these t h r o u g h the d e v i c e o f n e g a t i v e a f f i r m a t i o n o n l y . Y e t 
because w o n t h r o u g h d u e i n t e l l e c t u a l p rocess , these r u d i m e n t s r e t a i n a b o u t t h e m an aura o f 
c r e d i b i l i t y d e n i e d those e lemen ts o f C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e d e p e n d e n t u p o n D i v i n e r e v e l a t i o n 
( a n d w h i c h h a v e been the ta rge t o f the P o s i t i v i s t b e n t i n m o d e m theo logy ' ' * ^ ) . T h i s is 
De Civitate Dei, V I I I , 1 1 . 
R o m . l:19f i n De Civitate Dei, vin， 10. 
See, G . พ . H . L a m p e , 'Athens and Jerusalem: Jo in t Wi tnesses to Chr is t? ' , i n B r i a n Hebb le thwa i t e and 
Stewar t Su ther land (eds), The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian Theology: Essays Presented to D. M. 
MacKinnon, ( C a m b r i d g e , C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1982) , pp . 14-15 : T h e theo log i ca l r e v o l u t i o n o f 
m o d e m t imes is centred upon changes in the Chr i s t i an unders tand ing o f reve la t i on and, i n par t i cu la r , upon 
the w idesp read abandonment o f the t rad i t iona l be l i e f that reve la t i on is c o m m u n i c a t e d b y G o d to m a n in 
the f o r m o f p ropos i t i ons , so that i t is poss ib le to speak o f revealed doct r ines . . .That consensus has n o w 
been b roken d o w n and can never be put together aga in . D o c t r i n a l s tatements, that is , p ropos i t ions about 
G o d and H i s re la t ion to the w o r l d and t o ourse lves, are no t c o m m o n l y be l i eved t oday t o be c o m m u n i c a t e d 
b y G o d i n such a w a y that somewhere , i n the B i b l e or the creeds or the au thor i ta t i ve teach ing o f the 
C h u r c h , they are accessible to us as a store o f unchang ing and guaranteed t ru ths . ' 
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because the G o d - s h a p e d ho le is n o t i m p l i c i t l y G o d - s h a p e d . I t can take w h a t e v e r shape one 
w i shes . T h e f i n a l shape w i l l a l w a y s c o r r e s p o n d t o w h i c h e v e r p h i l o s o p h y o r r e l i g i o n has 
been c h o s e n t o f i l l the b r e a c h , a m o v e w h i c h m u s t appear i n t e l l e c t u a l l y d i s i n g e n u o u s . 
F r o m a s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l pe r spec t i ve , th is s u m s to a b r o a d l y rea l i s t p o s i t i o n . I n o the r w o r d s , i t 
is i m p o s s i b l e t o m o v e f r o m w h a t one does k n o w ― a m o r a l sense o f g o o d and e v i l 一 t o any 
idea l f o r m o f h u m a n assoc ia t i on w i t h o u t e n g e n d e r i n g the tónd o f c o m p r o m i s e e n v i s a g e d 
b y b o t h c. ร . L e w i s a n d A u g u s t i n e . F r o m the rea l i s t f r o n t l i n e , N o b ē r t o B o b b i o has the 
f o l l o w i n g w o r d s , w h i c h p r o v i d e a c lass ic e x a m p l e o f t he m o v e f r o m i n t e l l e c t u a l h o n e s t y to 
d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t : 
I ref lect on the history o f mank ind , w h i c h is a h istory I a m part of. Th i s history 
has something tragic about i t that I t ry to understand, i n spite o f its complex i ty . 
For me every th ing is so human that I even bel ieve that re l ig ion i tse l f is a 
product o f humani ty. . . I am pessimist ic about the quest ion o f ev i l . The struggle 
fo r l i fe . . . is based on vio lence. Can or ig ina l sin p rov ide an explanat ion[?] . . . 
W h e n , on the other hand, you put your fa i th to one side and start to use reason, 
you become aware o f the uncontainable ev i l o f th is wor ld . . . I can understand an 
օ ո տ ւ բ օ է շ ո է God . I can understand ca l l i ng G o d the enormous mystery o f the 
universe o f wh ich science knows so l i t t le . The greater our knowledge becomes, 
the greater the awareness o f our ignorance. W e k n o w no th ing . W e on ly k n o w 
that there is this great power. Consider the star-covered sky, the famous image 
used by Kant. . . W h e n faced w i t h al l this you k n o w that you k n o w noth ing , and 
therefore you tel l yoursel f that something is e lud ing you . B u t this is beyond 
good and ev i l . G o o d and ev i l are categories invented by human beings in order 
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to l i ve together. Can you imagine the Ten Commandments in re lat ion to the 
immens i t y o f space?*'*^ 
So f o r B o b b i o , a l l m u s t e n d i n m i s e r y a n d d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g to A u g u s t i n e , 
w a s to be r e g a r d e d the one avenue o f hope l e f t o p e n to f a l l e n m e n . H e b e l i e v e d tha t m e n , 
t h r o u g h the use o f t h e i r hear ts a n d m i n d s , m i g h t c o m e t o k n o w a c r i t i c a l absence. T h a t they 
m i g h t t hen c o m e to apprec ia te th is absence as G o d - s h a p e d , w a s s o l e l y d e p e n d e n t o n the 
a c t i o n o f G o d ' s o p e r a t i v e G r a c e i n the i r l i v e s : ' B e h o l d w h e r e H e i s : i t is w h e r e v e r t r u t h is 
k n o w n . H e is w i t h i n o u r hear ts , b u t o u r hear ts h a v e s t r ayed f a r f r o m H i m . . . A n d H e 
depa r t ed f r o m o u r o w n eyes, so tha t w e m i g h t r e t u r n i n t o o u r o w n hear ts and f i n d H i m 
there.՚*՛*^ A s S c r i p t u r e p r o m i s e s , a l l f i n d w h o t h e y t r u l y seek; A u g u s t i n e t o o k th i s qu i t e 
l i t e r a l l y . T h e t h i e f o n the c ross l o o k e d i n t o C h r i s t ' s f ace a n d r e c o g n i s e d H i m as the 
M e s s i a h ; the Phar isees w e r e t o l d , ' Y o u d o n o t k n o w me\^^^ S a l v a t i o n w a s dependen t no t 
u p o n w o r k s o r a w a y o f l i f e , b u t o n r e c o g n i t i o n o f the S o n o f G o d ; and r e c o g n i t i o n o f the 
S o n o f G o d c o u l d o n l y take p l a c e i f one h a d c o m e to the p o i n t o f m o u r n i n g the absence o f 
t he rea l , t o h a v i n g r e c o g n i s e d the h o l e as i m p l i c i t l y G o d - s h a p e d : *Can y o u i m a g i n e t h e T e n 
C o m m a n d m e n t s i n r e l a t i o n t o the i m m e n s i t y o f space? ' A s A u g u s t i n e re la tes the v a l u e o f 
h i s o w n d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t i n the Confessiones: 
I t [was] fo r th is reason, I bel ieve, that Y o u w ished me to come upon those 
[books o f the Platonists] before I read Y o u r Scriptures, so that the way I was 
af fected by them migh t be stamped upon m y memory . Hence, later on , w h e n . . . 
m y wounds had been t reated. . . I w o u l d be able to d is t ingu ish how great a 
d i f ference lies be tween. . . those w h o see where they must t ravel , but do not see 
N o r b e r t o B o b b i o & M a u r i z i o V i r o l i , tr. A l l e n C a m e r o n , The Idea of the Republic, ( O x f o r d , Po l i t y , 2003 ) , 
pp . 6 0 - 6 1 . 
՝՝ Confessiones, Ī V , 12. 
' J o h n 8:19. 
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the way, and those w h o see the way that leads not on ly to beho ld ing our blessed 
father land but also to dwe l l i ng therein. 
P la to h a d d e v i a t e d f r o m t h e t r u t h and f a l i en i n w i t h C o n c e p t u a l C e r t a i n t y the m o m e n t he 
c o n j u r e d u p h is T h e o r y o f R e c o l l e c t i o n and W o r l d o f t he F o r m s i n o r d e r t o e x p l i c a t e the 
p r o b l e m o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . F o r h i m , t hen , the h o l e b e c a m e ' G o o d - s h a p e d \ B u t w h a t w o u l d 
he h a v e h a d t o have d o n e i n o r d e r to m o v e f r o m s i m p l y , ' . . . b e h o l d i n g o u r b lessed 
f a t h e r l a n d . . . ' t o a l so , ' . . . d w e l l i n g t h e r e i n ' ? W h a t w o u l d C o n c e p t u a l C e r t a i n t y have to g i v e 
w a y to? A u g u s t i n e ' s a n s w e r w a s the p e r s o n o f C h r i s t : 
W h a t shal l an unhappy man [such as Plato or Bobb io ] do? " W h o shal l deUver 
me f r o m the body o f this death," unless i t is by your grace, " t h rough Jesus 
Christ , our L o r d " . . . this those wr i t ings o f the Platonists do not have . . . They 
scorn to learn o f H i m because he is meek and humble o f heart. "For you have 
h i d these things f r o m the wise and prudent, and have revealed them to l i t t le 
ones." '^ ' 
P la to h a d c o m e so a g o n i s i n g l y c lose to the t r u t h b y ( n e g a t i v e l y ) a f f i r m i n g tha t , ' . . . t h e w i s e 
m a n is an i m i t a t o r , k n o w e r and l o v e r o f t h i s G o d , a n d is b l e s s e d b y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
H i m . ' ^ ^ ^ Y e t , as has been s h o w n , he s i d e d w i t h a n o t i o n o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i m i c a l t o the 
' f o o l i s h ' d e f i n i t i o n o f W i s d o m g i v e n i n S c r i p t u r e a n d i m p l i c i t to A u g u s t i n e ' s na r ra t i ve 
o f the F a l l . I n d e e d A u g u s t i n e , f o l l o w i n g P l a t o , h a d h a d s i m i l a r c l ose encoun te rs w i t h 
i m m u t a b l e t r u t h : 
Then indeed I c lear ly saw your " i nv i s ib le th ings, understood by the things 
wh i ch are made." B u t I was unable to fix m y gaze on them. I n m y f ra i l t y I was 
Confessiones. V I I , 20. 
/ Ш , vn,21. 
' De Civitate Dei, VI I I， է 
՝ Job 28:28. 
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struck back . . . I took w i t h me on ly a memory , l ov i ng and long ing for what I had, 
as i t where, caught the odour of, but was not yet able to feed ս բ օ ո . ՛ ^ ՛ ^ 
A n d as he goes on to say: 
I sought for a way o f hav ing strength suf f ic ient for me to have j o y in you , but I 
d i d not find i t un t i l I embraced " the mediator between G o d and man, the man 
Chr is t Jesus. . . " H e cal led to me， and said, " I am the way o f t ru th , and the 
l i fe . " ' ^^ 
W h a t A u g u s t i n e s l o w l y c a m e t o u n d e r s t o o d w a s tha t b y t a k i n g u p o n H i m s e l f the m a n t l e o f 
flesh, Jesus b e c a m e sub jec t to the f u l l v i t i a t i n g p o t e n t i a l o f h u m a n na tu re : T o r at t he i r fee t 
t h e y see the G o d h e a d , w e a k because o f i ts p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n o u r " c o a t s o f รюп".'^^ Y e t H e 
pe rs i s t ed i n ho l i ness a n d p e r f e c t i o n , ' . . . a h u m b l e m a n c l i n g i n g to H i m w h o was 
h u m b l e . . . ' ^ ^ ^ A t t h i s p o i n t , A u g u s t i n e ' s b i g g e s t s t r ugg le w o u l d be t o f a t h o m , ' . . . i n w h a t 
t h i n g H i s l o w l i n e s s [ c o u l d ] be m y t e a c h e r . ' F o r he f a i l e d t o u n d e r s t a n d h o w Jesus c o u l d 
have p a r t i c i p a t e d so c o m p l e t e l y i n the w i l l o f H i s Fa the r ; a n d h o w that w i l l t r ans la ted to 
l a w , a n d t o the w i s d o m so des i red b y P la to . T h e s e ques t i ons t r o u b l e d A u g u s t i n e as he 
p o n d e r e d t h e m i n h i s hear t . O f one t h i n g he k n e w f o r c e r t a i n , tha t , ' . . . t h a t flesh d i d n o t 
d e a v e t o y o u r W o r d e x c e p t t oge the r w i t h a h u m a n s o u l a n d m i n d . A n y m a n w h o has 
k n o w l e d g e o f t he i m m u t a b i l i t y o f y o u r W o r d k n o w s th i s . ' ^ ^^ H e r e i s f o u n d tes tamen t t o the 
i m p o r t a n c e o f A u g u s t i n e ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l r i g o u r ; h i s I n t e l l e c t u a l C o n s c i e n c e h a d d r i v e n h i m 
to accept t ha t i n the m y s t e r y o f the I n c a r n a t i o n a n d the A t o n e m e n t m u s t l i e the o n l y 
p o s s i b l e k e y t o a w i s d o m l y i n g ou ts ide the s u f f o c a t i n g cons t ra i n t s o f C o n c e p t u a l C e r t a i n t y . 
I n i t i a l l y , he h a d , ' . . . c o n c e i v e d [h i s ] L o r d C h r i s t o n l y as a m a n o f su rpass ing w i s d o m , 
'^^ Confessiones, V I I , 17. 
V I I , 18. 
； Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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w h o m n o o the r m a n c o u l d e q u a l . A b o v e a l l , because H e w a s b o m i n a w o n d r o u s m a n n e r o f 
t he V i r g i n , t o g i v e us an e x a m p l e o f d e s p i s i n g t e m p o r a l t h i n g s i n o r d e r to w i n i m m o r t a l i t y , 
H e seemed b y the g o d l i k e care H e h a d f o r us , t o h a v e m e r i t e d such g rea t a u t h o r i t y as a 
t e a c h e r . ' B u t such t hough ts c o u l d i n n o w i s e d i s p e l the q u e s t i o n o f h o w ? Fo r , \..m 
C h r i s t t he re was a c o m p l e t e m a n : n o t m e r e l y a m a n ' s b o d y , n o t an a n i m a t i n g p r i n c i p l e i n 
the b o d y b u t w i t h o u t m i n d , b u t a t rue man . ' ^ ^^ So fa r as A u g u s t i n e c o u l d m a k e ou t , the 
s to ry o f Jesus ' l i f e t h r o u g h S c r i p t u r e b o r e th i s o u t as f ac t : 
N o w to move one's bod i l y members at the command o f the w i l l , and n o w not to 
move t hem; n o w to be af fected by some emot ion , and n o w not to be af fected; 
n o w to ut ter wise judgements by means o f signs, and n o w to remain si lent -
such th ings be long to a soul and a m i n d that are subject to change. 
I n c o n c l u s i o n , A u g u s t i n e , ' . . . a c c o u n t e d H i m a p e r s o n t o b e p r e f e r r e d a b o v e a l l o the r m e n , 
n o t as the pe rson o f T r u t h , b u t because o f s o m e grea t e x c e l l e n c e o f h i s h u m a n na tu re a n d a 
m o r e p e r f e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n w i s d o m . ' ^ ^ ^ 
U p o n t h i s the w h o l e m e a n i n g a n d p u r p o s e o f t h e C h r i s t i a n F a i t h t u r n e d , f o r , ' I f these 
t h i ngs w e r e w r i t t e n f a l s e l y o f H i m , t h e n a l l e lse w o u l d be i n d a n g e r o f b e i n g fa lse , and n o 
s a v i n g f a i t h f o r m a n k i n d w o u l d r e m a i n i n those Scr ip tures . ' ^^ ՚^ B o r n i n t o flesh and 
k n o w i n g H i s Fa the r , Jesus was the s e c o n d A d a m , a n d l i k e t h e f i r s t , H e shared i n the 
t e m p t a t i o n to step o u t o f H i s F a t h e r ' ร w i l l . Y e t , r i g h t t o the v e r y e n d , H e pe rs i s ted i n 
o b e d i e n c e t o H i s Father 's c o m m a n d s . H o w t h e n c o u l d H i s l o w l i n e s s be A u g u s t i n e ' ร 
teacher? V e r y s i m p l y : Jesus r e m a i n e d d o c i l e b e f o r e a v o l u n t a r i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f l a w , 
{^onfessiones, VII， 19. 
' Confessiones, V I I , 19 
Ibid. 
Ibid, 
Ibid. 
71 
o b e y i n g the l i t e r a l W o r d o f H i s Father . So t o o s h o u l d A u g u s t i n e , f o r t h i s c o n s t i t u t e d the 
o n l y r o u t e to tha t c e r t a i n t y des i r ed b y he a n d P l a t o - t h e o n l y r o u t e t o that ce r t a i n t y f o r 
w h i c h the r a t i o n a l c r e a t i o n had been d e s i g n e d . 
I t w o u l d seem, t hen , t ha t ou t s i de the w a l l s o f t he P i l g r i m C i t y , the s y m b i o s i s h o l d i n g 
b e t w e e n the M o m ^ and the I n t e l l e c t u a l C o n s c i e n c e is an uneasy one . A m a n s h o u l d n o t 
c o m m i t t o o f a r e i t he r w a y . T o t r y t o l i v e t o o m u c h i n the s p i r i t o f the M o r a l C o n s c i e n c e 
w o u l d l eave h i m p rey t o an i r r e s p o n s i b l e v i t a l i s m ; t o o f a r i n the d i r e c t i o n o f the 
I n t e l l e c t u a l C o n s c i e n c e a n d he w o u l d lose t o u c h w i t h m o r a l i t y a l t oge the r . A ba lance m u s t 
s o m e w h e r e a n d s o m e h o w be s t ruck . I t is at t h i s p o i n t t ha t those w o r d s o f D a v i d H u m e 
s p r i n g t o m i n d : ' B e a p h i l o s o p h e r : b u t a m i d s t a l l y o u r p h i l o s o p h y , be s t i l l a man. ' *^^ I n d e e d 
i t is t o H u m e tha t a t t en t i on n o w tu rns , f o r h a v i n g set the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the t w o 
consc iences i n i ts b r o a d , s a l v i f i c c o n t e x t , i t i s n o w necessary t o i n v e s t i g a t e the v e r y issue 
o v e r w h i c h t h e y h a v e s u p p o s e d l y been t h r o w n toge the r : the t e m p o r a l i s a t i o n o f the present 
m o m e n t . T o th i s e n d i t w i l l be necessary t ake f o r a c r i t i c a l appara tus H u m e ' s so c a l l e d 
P r o b l e m o f I n d u c t i o n . 
2.3 Hume's Problem of Induction 
B e f o r e b e g i n n i n g , a w o r d o n c o n t e x t . H u m e f i r s t p o s t u l a t e d th i s p r o b l e m i n h i s Treatise on 
Human Nature, p u b l i s h e d i n th ree v o l u m e s f r o m 1739 t o 1740 . I t w a s n o t o r i g i n a l l y a 
success, i n h i s o w n w o r d s f a l l i n g , ' dead -bo rn f r o m the press*. I t w a s o n l y once he h a d r e ­
p a c k a g e d these v o l u m e s i n t o the shor te r Inquiry into Human Understanding t ha t h i s ideas 
me t w i t h the r e a c t i o n he was h o p i n g f o r . I t w o u l d be f a i r t o say tha t the w o r k c rea ted as 
Confessiones, VII， 19. 
D a v i d H u m e , An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, I . 
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great a s t i r i n h i s t i m e as A y e r ' s Language, Truth and Logic d i d i n h i s . A n d as H u m ๙ s 
m a n y c o m m e n t a t o r s w o u l d c o n c u r , h is P r o b l e m o f I n d u c t i o n s t i l l p resents an i nsupe rab le 
obs tac le to e m p i r i c a l r e a s o n i n g , g o i n g , f o r the l a rge pa r t , g r u d g i n g l y uncon tes ted . I t occu rs 
i n b o o k I o f h is Treatise on Human Nature, as pa r t o f a d i s c u s s i o n o f t he p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p o f cause a n d e f f e c t . 
H u m e b e g i n s f r o m the p r e m i s e tha t , T h e r e is n o o b j e c t w h i c h i m p l i e s the ex i s tence o f any 
o ther , i f w e c o n s i d e r these ob jec ts i n t h e ^ a n d n e v e r l o o k b e y o n d the ideas w h i c h 
w e f o r m o f t h e m . S u c h an i n f e r e n c e w o u l d a m o u n t to k n o w l e d g e , a n d w o u l d i m p l y the 
abso lu te c o n t r a d i c t i o n a n d i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n c e i v i n g a n y t h i n g d i f fe ren t . ' ^^^ T h i s w o u l d 
i m p l y tha t i t i s , ' . . .by experience o n l y tha t w e i n f e r t he ex i s t ence o f one o b j e c t f r o m tha t o f 
another. '^^^ H u m e then p r o v i d e s an e x a m p l e o f w h a t he m e a n s : ไ . . w e r e m e m b e r to have 
that species o f o b j e c t w e c a l l flame, and t o h a v e f e l t the spec ies o f sensa t ion w e c a l l heat. 
W e l i k e w i s e c a l l to m i n d the i r cons tan t c o n j u n c t i o n i n a l l past i ns tances . W i t h o u t f u r t h e r 
c e r e m o n y w e c a l l the o n e cause and the o the r ejfect, a n d i n f e r t he ex i s tence o f the one f r o m 
that o f the o ther / ^^^ B u t as H u m e goes o n to a rgue , W e c a n n o t pene t ra te i n t o the reason o f 
t he c o n j u n c t i o n . W e o n l y obse rve the t h i n g i t se l f , a n d a l w a y s f i n d tha t , f r o m the cons tan t 
c o n j u n c t i o n , the ob jec t s r e q u i r e a u n i o n i n the i m a g i n a t i o n . ՚**^ ^ T h i s m e a n s that , 
. . .probabi l i ty is founded on the presumpt ion o f a resemblance be tw ix t those 
objects o f w h i c h we have had experience, and those o f w h i c h we have had none; 
and, therefore, i t is impossib le this presumpt ion can arise f r o m probabi l i ty . The 
same pr inc ip le cannot be both the cause and ef fect o f another; and this is, 
* D a v i d H u m e , A Treatise on Human Nature, B o o k I , 6. 
： Ibid. 
； Ibid. 
' Ibid. 
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perhaps, the on ly proposi t ion concern ing that re lat ion, wh i ch is neither 
in tu i t i ve ly or demonstrat ive ly certain. '^" 
I n Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, K a r l P o p p e r p r o d u c e s a v e r y c lear 
r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f H u m e ' s a r g u m e n t b y separa t i ng i t i n t o t w o d i s t i n c t p r o b l e m s , w h i c h he 
ca l l s the ' l o g i c a l ' and the ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l ' . Because th i s c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z a t i o n w o r k s so 
w e l l t o h i g h l i g h t t he e p i s t e m o l o g i e ฝ issues at s take, I i n c l u d e i t b e l o w : 
Hume'ร logical problem is: 
A r e we jus t i f i ed i n reasoning from (repeated) instances o f w h i c h we have 
experience to other instances (conclusions) o f w h i c h we have no experience? 
Hume's answer... is: N o , however great the number o f repet i t ions. . . 
Hume*ร psychological problem is: 
W h y , nevertheless, do a l l reasonable people expect, and believe, that instances o f 
w h i c h they have no experience w i l l c o n f o r m to those o f wh i ch they have 
exper ience. . . [？] 
Hume 'ร answer... is: Because o f * cus tom or habi t ' ； that is, because we are 
cond i t ioned, by repetitions and the mechanism o f the association o f ideas; a 
mechan ism w i thou t wh i ch , H u m e says, we cou ld hardly survive.*^ ' 
A c c o r d i n g to H u m e , man ' s r e s t r i c t i o n t o the p resen t m o m e n t leaves h i m n o ra t i ona l 
g r o u n d s f o r i n d u c i n g the causa l r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n even ts . W h a t is o r d i n a r i l y t aken to 
be the l o g i c o f cause a n d e f f e c t is a f u n c t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e i m p o s e d i n o rde r to b r i n g 
m e a n i n g and p r e d i c t a b i l i t y i n t o a l i f e tha t is l i v e d i n the f ace o f o v e r w h e l m i n g u n c e r t a i n t y . 
D a v i d H u m e , A Treatise on Human Nature, B o o k I， 6. 
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E v e r y n i g h t t he p i g goes to bed d r e a m i n g o f t he s l o p b u c k e t , t h e n o n e d a y h e ' s b a c o n , 
Russe l l r e c o g n i s e d the g r a v i t y o f H u m e ' s c h a l l e n g e to sc ience a n d those p h i l o s o p h i e s 
c l a i m i n g h i g h l eve l s o f e m p i r i c i s m : 
I t i s . . . impor tant to discover whether there is any answer to H u m e . . . I f no t . . . 
The lunat ic w h o bel ieves that he is a poached egg is to be condemned solely on 
the g round that he is in a m inor i t y , or rather 一 since we must not assume 
democracy - on the grounds that the government does not agree w i t h h i m . Th is 
is a desperate point of view... 172 
H u m e ' s c o n c l u s i o n is tha t shor t o f anarch ic chaos , m e n are p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y c o m p e l l e d to 
base t h e i r l i v e s o n p r o p o s i t i o n s o f i r r a t i o n a l f a i t h . I n r e p l y , R u s s e l l a d m i t s t ha t i f m a n is to 
a v o i d an impasse , he w i l l s i m p l y h a v e to l i v e the l i e , a c c e p t i n g tha t , ' . . . i n d u c t i o n is an 
i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e , i n capab le o f b e i n g i n f e r r e d e i t he r f r o m e x p e r i e n c e o r f r o m 
o the r l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . . . ' 173 
I t w o u l d seem, t h e n , tha t m a n h o l d s t o an i dea l o f c e r t i t u d e tha t c o u l d i n n o w i s e have 
ar isen f r o m the w o r l d o f e m p i r i c a l f ac t , m a k i n g Russe l l ' s ' l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e ' q u i t e i n d i s t i n c t 
f r o m A u g u s t i n e ' s ' va i n p resumpt ion ' . ^^ ՚^ M a n ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o l i v e i n a ce r ta in w a y , tha t 
i s , t o b e l i e v e tha t ( t o p u t a n e w sp in o n R u s s e l l ' s f a m o u s ph rase ) f u t u r e p resen t m o m e n t s 
w i l l r e s e m b l e past p resen t m o m e n t s , m u s t l o g i c a l l y h a v e p r e c e d e d t h e p r i n c i p l e o f 
i n d u c t i o n . T h i s w o u l d su re l y m e a n tha t i n p o i n t o f o p e r a t i o n the p r i n c i p l e o f i n d u c t i o n is 
r e a l l y r a the r s i m i l a r to the N a t u r a l L a w Idea . A f t e r a l l , b o t h address the t e m p o r a l i s a t i o n o f 
the p resen t m o m e n t , and b o t h d o so b y i m p o s i n g o v e r the e te rna l u n k n o w n l a w s o f o rder 
K a r l Popper , Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, ( O x f o r d , T h e C la rendon Press, 1975) , P.4. 
• Be r t rand Russe l l , A History of Western Philosophy, p. 699 . 
Ibid, p. 700 . 
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and procession. F rom this perspective, what Hume's Problem of Induct ion reveals is the 
sheer incongrui ty o f Hor izontal Eternity. In relat ion to the temporal restrictions o f t ime and 
space it appears quite non-sensical. One should not sneer at the man r isk ing all on chance 
and probabi l i ty in the casino, for there is no reason to presume one's money is any safer in 
the bank. Both are a case o f the odds being p l a y e d . A s Edwards observes: 
The number of positive and negative necessary conditions for the occurrence of 
any event is infinite or at any rate too large to be directly observed by a human 
being or indeed by all human beings put together. None of us, for example, has 
explored every corner of the universe to make sure that there nowhere exists a 
malicious but powerful individual who controls the movements of the sun by 
means of wires which are too fine to be detected by any of our microscopes.'^^ 
On this matter, i t seems only r ight to al low Hume to have the last word : 'Nature, by an 
absolute and uncontrol lable necessity, has determined us to judge as we l l as to breathe and 
feel.'^^^ L i f e as man knows i t , and as i t is represented to h i m in the practices and 
institutions o f social organisation, is bui l t on the bel ief that tomorrow the รนท w i l l indeed 
shine. Humani ty could not have achieved what i t has, could not have moved beyond the 
level o f hand to mouth subsistence, had it not chosen to take a leap o f fa i th , prost i tut ing the 
present moment in the name o f future contingency. What remains is to turn to a closer 
appraisal o f the relationship that holds between the Mora l and Intel lectual consciences 
under these condit ions, and to start drawing out the socio-pol i t ical impl icat ions o f the 
See above, p. 17. 
I t is w o r t h p o i n t i n g ou t that H u m ๙ s argument can be con t i nued ad infinitum. I n the contex t o f m y 
examp le , i f the m a n i n the casino were to w i n , then he w o u l d have no reason to in fe r ( f r o m past 
exper ience) that he shou ld be pa id out . 
' Pau l E d w a r d s , B e r t r a n d Russel l 's Doub ts A b o u t Induc t ion* , i n A . G . N . F l e w (ed. ) . Logic and ÎMnguage 
( O x f o r d , O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1968) , p. 58 . 
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conclusions reached thus far. 
2.4 c, ร. Lew is and the Tao 
In 1943, c. ร . Lewis gave the Riddel l Lectures at the Univers i ty o f Durham. These were 
later collated into a single publ icat ion enti t led The Abolition of Man. In section 2.2 above, 
the fo l l ow ing extract was cited f r om the work : There never has been, and never w i l l be, a 
radical ly new judgement o f value in the history o f the wor ld . What р и ф о й to be new 
systems (or, as they now call them) " ideologies", al l consist o f fragments f r om the [Natural 
L a w ] itself, arbitrar i ly wrenched f rom their context in the whole and then swol len to 
madness in their isolation...'^^^ The intention was to provide an i l lustrat ion o f how the 
interaction between the Mora l and the Intel lectual Conscience works i tself out in practice. 
Indeed, i t may be fel t that not enough has been done to t idy up the loose ends. In the 
preface, i t was proposed that Natural Law Theory was s imply one o f a number o f attempts 
to make good the events in Paradise. In that context, the intent ion was to p i l lo ry it. Yet, 
when v iewed in relation to Fallen Reali ty, i t has consistently been regarded in a favourable 
l ight ; f o l l ow ing August ine, as noth ing less than the moderat ing inf luence w i th in the human 
compound. I t is, o f course, a question o f perspective. Augustine's narrative o f the Fall 
shows that man was designed and equipped to l ive under the voluntarist law o f God. From 
this i t can only be concluded that any other state o f being must be o f his own matóng, an 
example o f his w i l l to survive apart f rom God. This has very important impl icat ions for 
Augustine's posit ion w i th in the Natural Law Tradi t ion. Later, there w i l l be opportunity to 
discuss this in far greater detai l , but for now, i t is enough that an out l ine o f the matter is 
provided below. 
'77 D a v i d H u m e , Treatise of Human Nature, B o o k I， part i v , sec. i. 
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August ine is ordinar i ly made to f i t a ready synthesis for the per iod spanning the Stoic 
School o f Ethical Phi losophy, in the four th century B.c., to St. Thomas Aquinas' 
Phi losophy o f Law, in the thirteenth century A . D . More than that, in relat ion to the 
Patristic response to Stoic Natural Law Theory, he is regarded as something o f a founding 
father. As An ton Hermann-Chroust puts i t , he is the thinker attr ibuted w i th having given 
the theistic spin to the Stoic D iv ine Reason, thereby responsible for having, '...laid the 
foundations for the whole пашгаї (moral) law of the fol lowing centuries by introducing the basic 
concept of a theistic 'Чех aeternď\՝^^^ I t is by no means the intent ion to challenge this 
synthesis outr ight (for in broad essentials i t is certainly true) but rather to point out that it 
is on ly half the story; and that by passing over the epistemologica! consequences of 
Augustine's narrative o f the Fall in silence, the r isk is taken o f reading too much into his 
understanding o f the lex aeterna. As w i l l be shown in section 3.3， the fact that the 
August in ian scheme of D iv ine guidance accommodates a who l l y arbitrary and irrat ional 
D iv ine W i l l seriously questions the shared rat ional i ty between God and man that is 
normal ly taken to be the mark o f theistic Natural Law Theories. However , enough has now 
been said on this matter to jus t i f y the or iginal comment and a return should, wi thout 
further delay, be made to c. ร . Lew is ' argument in The Abolition of Man. 
As wou ld have been clear f rom the extract wh ich began this section, i t is c. ร . Lew is ' 
contention that the Tao, for that is what he calls the Law o f Nature, is the sole source of 
l^ ^c. ร . L e w i s , pp . 43 -44 . 
179 A n t o n He rmann -Ch rous t , T h e Ph i l osophy o f L a w i n St. A u g u s t i n e ' , The Philosophical Review, V o l . 53 , 
N o . 2 ( M a r . , เ944 )， p. 196. See also h i s , ' T h e F u n c t i o n o f L a w and Just ice i n the A n c i e n t W o r l d and the 
M i d d l e A g e s ' , Journal of the History of Ideas, V o l . フ， N o . 3 (Jun. , 1946) , espec ia l ly pp . 310-14 fo r a 
de ta i led s u m m a t i o n o f h o w the t rad i t iona l іп іефге їа ї іоп o f A u g u s t i n e ' s con t r i bu t i on p lays i tse l f out in the 
con tex t o f M e d i e v a l legal theory . 
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value w i th in the human compound. I t presents m an w i t h a set o f mora l proposit ions that, 
'...are nowhere else. Unless you accept these wi thout question as being to the wor ld of 
action what axioms are to the wor ld o f theory, you can have no practical principles 
whatever. Y o u cannot reach them as conclusions: they are premises.''^** This is the str ik ing 
feature o f c. ร . Lew is ' work : the sense of tension and f ragi l i ty that provides the backdrop 
to his defence o f Natural Law. He knows f rom the start that he cannot f ight the Value Non-
Cognit iv ists on their o w n terms, that, Y o u must not hold a pistol to the head of the Tao,'^^^ 
T o try to provide some sort o f rational proof for its existence wou ld be to play into their 
hands; for that is precisely what they are contending is impossible. A n d they are o f course 
r ight, c. ร . Lewis knows this; and in l ight o f the fact he decides for a negative argument: 
to show what wou ld be lost w i th the destruction or radical reconst i tut ion o f the Tao. For 
h i m this is quite s imply the abol i t ion o f man: 
There are progressions in which the last step is sui generis 一 incommensurable 
with the others - and in which to go the whole way is to undo all the labour of 
your previous journey. To reduce the Tao to a mere natural product is a step of 
that kind. Up to that point, the kind of explanation which explains things away 
may give us something, though at a heavy cost. But you cannot go on 
"explaining away" for ever: you wi l l find you have explained expłanation itself 
away.'*^^ 
The key is preservation: i t is s imply not possible for there to be a harmonious conjunction 
o f the Mora l and the Intel lectual Conscience, as they ho ld to diametr ical ly opposed ideal-
types o f certainty. In l ieu o f the discussions in section 2. Լ i t might be said that they hold to 
' c. ร . L e w i s , The Abolition of Мши p. 4 0 . 
/ Ш , p. 49 . 
' c. ร . L e w i s , The Abolition of Math p. 8 0 - 8 1 . 
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two diametr ical ly opposed ideal-types o f t ruth. What should never be forgotten, though, is 
that the ideal-type associated w i th the Mora l Conscience represents a fundamental 
i r r i tat ion to man, a direct snub to his intel lectual ambit ions; and the situation only 
deteriorates when i t is considered that i t is in fact this ideal-type o f certitude that he is 
str iv ing to replicate w i th the Natural Law Idea. In fact, i t was precisely this type of 
certitude wh ich Hume's phi losophy revealed could in no wise have arisen f rom the wor ld 
o f empir ical fact. This is not ordinar i ly taken to be the case. W i th i n the social science 
discourses, i t is common to hear talk o f the 'mathematical paradigm o f truth', understood as 
the ult imate standard o f truth or certitude available w i th in the human compound. However, 
i t is bel ieved that the August inian meta-narrative does enough to confute this v iew. It all 
comes down, as might have guessed by now, to a question o f t ime. As was shown in 
section 2.1， (and w i l l be fo l lowed up in section 3.3) the mathematical paradigm o f truth, as 
an example o f Hor izontal Eternity, is in fact a copy o f Ver t ica l Eterni ty; and of course it is 
Vert ical Eterni ty that is gl impsed in the f indings o f the Mo ra l Conscience. This is 
thoroughly disorientat ing; August ine seems to have turned matters on their head. For f rom 
this perspective, i t wou ld seem that i t is man's bel ief in Reason rather than Augustine's 
Doctr ine o f the Fall wh ich is i rrat ional. The opportuni ty should, however, be taken to 
forestall any misapprehensions that may have arisen out o f this portrayal o f the Mora l 
Conscience as an in fa l l ib le source o f t ruth. The Law o f Nature is not indestructible; i t can 
impose no sanction stronger than gui l t , and although this can be very power fu l indeed, 
unless i t resonates w i th the feelings current in society, i t is quicWy overcome. It is not 
inconceivable that man may, at some not too distant point in the future, outstrip the 
received w isdom of the ages in one fatal burst. What philosophers have hitherto conf ined 
to the pages o f books migh t be taken and appl ied beyond the l ibrary, the classroom and the 
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quad. The b l u f f might wel l get cal led on the whole g iddy enterprise and in some hideous 
superman w i l l appear the f irst ch i ld parented exclusively by progress and enlightenment. 
This state o f affairs lies closer than might be thought, for every use made o f the Mora l 
Conscience in the secular sphere constitutes a step in that direct ion. Indeed, some of the 
Law o f Nature's greatest achievements have come about, rather i ronical ly , through appeal ร 
to human self interest. The vir tue o f peace is a classic example, and one wh ich August ine 
held part icular ly dear as nothing less than a precondit ion o f l i fe itself. This is why he 
stressed that: ' . . .every man seeks peace... even robbers.. . i f on ly to invade the peace of 
others w i th greater force and safety. . . ' '^^ I t seems that even wars were conducted in the 
name o f peace, ' · . . for what else is v ictory but the subjugation o f those who oppose us? 
A n d when this is achieved, there w i l l be peace.'^^՚^ Such unf lat ter ing comparisons were 
designed to beli t t le the specialness and importance o f the Classical state in general, and its 
Roman incarnation in particular. For unl ike Aquinas, August ine placed no hope in the 
Earthly Ci ty . His efforts as a theologian were concentrated solely on pu l l ing in citizens for 
the P i lg r im Ci ty , and as might by now be anticipated, outside o f its wal ls, all human 
endeavour was taken to fo rm a single piece. For example, In De Civitate Dei, August ine 
related the tale o f the pirate who answered Alexander the Great 's question as to what he 
meant by infest ing the sea, w i th the f o l l ow ing riposte: 'The same as you do when you 
infest the whole wor ld ; but because I do i t w i th a l i t t le ship I am cal led a robber, and 
because you do it w i th a great fleet, you are an e m p e r o r / A u g u s t i n e then went on to 
De Civitate Dei, X I X , 12. 
Ibid. 
Ibid, IV， 4. 
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declare that, 'Justice removed, then, what are k ingdoms but great bands of robbers? What 
are bands o f robbers themselves but l i t t le k ingdoms?' 186 
As a condi t ion o f l i fe itself, peace w i l l arguably be the last o f the great virtues to go; but 
before that day, many lesser examples w i l l have slipped away unnoticed into the night. For 
the fact remains that i t is almost impossible to resurrect what has already been sacrif iced 
on the altar o f ut i l i ty . The Law o f Nature is supported, ref lected and ul t imately constituted 
in the insti tut ions, conventions and traditions o f a society: whatever happens to i t happens 
in the name of progress and enlightenment, which means that any redress must be put 
through against the social current. As Ar istot le counseled, the w isdom of experience 
should not be ignored: 'We are bound to pay some regard to the long past and the passage 
o f the years, in wh ich these things wou ld not have gone unnoticed i f they had been really 
good. A lmos t everything has been discovered already; though some of the things 
discovered have not been coordinated, and some, though known , are not put into 
practice.'^^^ Or as Edmund Burke rather more passionately vo iced i t : 
By this unprincipled facility of changing the state as often, and as much, and in 
as many ways as there are floating fancies or fashions, the whole change and 
continuity of the commonwealth would be broken. No one generation could l ink 
with the other. Men would become little better than the flies of a summer. 
In the same vein, examining the Republican ideal o f l iberty for contemporary relevance, 
Quentin Skinner concludes that, '...The reason for wish ing to br ing the Republican vis ion 
o f pol i t ics back into v iew is not that it tells us how to construct a genuine democracy... I t is 
s imply because it conveys a warning.. . that unless we place our duties before our r ights, we 
De Civitate Dei՝ I V ,4. 
A r i s t o t l e , Politics, tr . Si r Ernest Ba rke r ( O x f o r d , T h e C la rendon Press, 1960) , 1264a. 
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must expect to f ind our rights themselves undermined.՚*^^ This really is the crux o f the 
matter. I f man neglects his duty to safeguard the Law of Nature in its entirety and instead 
becomes infatuated w i th rights considered in isolat ion f r o m it, in other words, i f , '...he 
merely snatches at some one precept, on wh ich the accidents o f t ime and place happen to 
have r iveted his attention, and then rides i t to d e a t h . . h e runs the r isk o f distort ing the 
mora l edif ice out o f al l recognit ion. In the Republic, Plato was part icular ly anxious to 
make this point w i th regard to the pr inciple o f l iberty or f reedom. In fact, Plato saw the 
unwarranted elevation o f this pr inciple as the most deleterious aspect o f the democratic 
const i tut ion, and indeed the very reason for its eventual descent into anarchy: ไ,.does not 
this excess, this obsession w i th f reedom to the neglect o f everything else, revolut ionize the 
democratic const i tut ion and stimulate a demand for tyrann y ?'^ ^^ L i ke c. ร . Lewis , Plato 
bel ieved that such single-minded devotion to a pr inciple wou ld eventually lead to 
prevai l ing societal norms being turned on their head (it is wor th not ing the great i rony at 
wo rk here 一 for surely the supreme example o f this phenomenon is PI ato'ร ideal republic, 
founded as i t is on a ruthless conception o f natural just ice?): 
Obedient citizens... w i l l be reviled as no men at all but wi l l ing slaves. Praise and 
honour in public and private go to rulers who behave üke subjects and subjects 
who behave like rulers... the father wi l l acquire the habit of imitating his 
children; he wi l l fear his sons. The sons, in turn, imitate the father, showing 
their parents neither deference nor fear... A l l in all, the young mimic their 
elders, competing with them in word and deed. The old respond by descending 
to the level of youth... In sum, you wi l l note that all these things taken together 
1 E d m u n d B u r k e , (ed.) C o n o r Cru i se О Б г і е п , Reflections on the Revolutions in France ( H a r m o n d s w o r t h , 
Pengu in . 1976)， pp. 192-193. 
՚ 8 9 G ise la B o c k , Quen t i n Sk inner and M a u r i z i o V i r o l i (Eds ) , Machiavelli and Republicanism (Cambr idge , 
"0 с. ร . L e w i s , The Abolition of Man, p. 4 7 . 
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make the souls of the citizens so hypersensitive that they cannot bear even to 
hear the mention of authority. A t last they end up ignoring all laws, written or 
unwritten, so that they may be spared the sense of having any master 
whatsoever. 
I t wou ld seem that in order to avoid so gross a distort ion, and given the fact that no society 
can be who l l y in f lex ib le , i t wou ld be necessary to employ a very conservative max im, 
๖hange in order to preserve', c. ร . Lewis il lustrates the point w i t h an analogy concerning 
the development o f language: 
A theorist of language may approach his native tongue, as it were from outside, 
regarding its genius as a thing that has no claim on him and advocating 
wholesale alterations in its idiom and spelling in the interests of commercial 
convenience or scientific accuracy. That is one thing. A great poet, who has 
loved, and been well пигШгесІ in, his mother tongue', may also make great 
alterations in it, but his changes of the language are made in the spirit of the 
ianguage itself: he works from within. 
I t is the case, then, o f maintaining a tenuous equ i l ib r ium. As was noted in section 2,2， 
something is always lost in the translation f r om the Mora l to the Intel lectual conscience, 
f rom a l i v i ng to a static cr i ter ion o f truth. When a part icular pr inc ip le is cul led f rom the 
Law o f Nature, such as L ibe r t y ' or 'equality' or T h e greatest good o f the greatest number', 
i t is not just removed f rom a single context (even though c. ร . Lew is ' quote above seems 
to imp ly that the Law o f Nature does constitutes a f in i te body o f a priori maxims) but 
rather f r o m an in f in i te number, all o f them di f ferent and al l o f them contingent on unique 
Pla to , The Republic, tr. R i c h a r d พ . S te r l i ng & W i l l i a m c. Scott (On ta r i o , พ . w. N o r t o n & C o m p a n y , 
1985) , 562c . 
' P la to , Republic, 562d-563e . 
' c. ร . L e w i s , The Abolition of Man, p. 45 . 
84 
sets o f condit ions. As Isaiah Ber l in noted en route to formula t ing his two concepts of 
l iberty: 'Freedom for an Ox fo rd don is not the same th ing as freedom for an Egypt ian 
peasant. ՚^ ՛^^  Yet by placing the pr inciple in a conceptual context, these vicissitudes o f t ime 
and place are ignored in an effort to evince f r om it an eternal stabi l i ty o f meaning. In so 
doing, the f iner judgments o f the present moment are prost iณted in favour o f the wide 
principles o f future contingency. Freedom, to remain w i th Berl in's example, becomes less 
an expression o f the l i fe l i ved in accordance w i th the Law of Nature and more something 
to be extracted f r om l i fe at all costs, and in the greatest possible quantit ies. The sense of 
balance and compromise which is the key to the Law o f Nature's moderat ing inf luence is 
lost; and i t is qu ick ly forgotten that in order to enjoy the greater goods (such as peace) the 
lesser goods must not be desired to destruction. For as August ine warned: 
Reason makes its judgements in one way, and common sense in another. 
Reason judges by the light of truth so that, by right judgement, it subordinates 
lesser things to the more important ones. Common sense, on the other hand, 
inclines toward the habit of convenience, so that it puts a higher value on those 
things that truths proves to be of lesser value. While reason places celestial 
bodies far over terrestrial ones, what carnal man would not prefer that the stars 
be missing from the sky, rather than a single bush from his field, or a cow from 
his herd? '95 
I sa iah B e r l i n , Four Essays on Liberty ( O x f o r d , O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969) , p. 124. 
De Libero Arbitrio, з, V . 
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Chapter Three 
The Political Animal 
"What is truth?" Pilate asked. 
John 18:37 
3.1 Primus Inter Pares 
In the f i rst chapter o f this dissertation, an attempt was made to show that August ine 
believed man was designed and equipped to l ive according to voluntarist law. In the 
second, efforts were made to discover whether this hypothesis cou ld in any way be borne 
out by certain aspects o f the human condi t ion. I t was hoped that two things in particular 
might be highl ighted by this exercise: 1) the remedial character o f Reason and 2) the 
f ragi l i ty o f the Law of Nature. Bo r row ing aiguments f rom c. s. Lewis , i t was shown why 
genuine progress in the moral sciences is impossible. Indeed, the agenda was taken on one 
step further by declaring that even to see the ordo amoriร in l aw fu l fo rm, through the lens 
o f Reason, is a step in the wrong direct ion. This was not by way o f being pedantic, but 
merely to point up the difference between a l i v i ng and a static conception o f t ruth; that a 
lawfu l 'ought', i.e. the idea that something is always r ight for an in f in i te number of future 
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instances, requires a context quite dif ferent f rom that in wh ich the Law o f Nature arises. 
However, i t may wel l be felt that this thesis does Reason a disservice, and that it even 
conf l icts w i th the esteem in which August ine seems generally to have held the faculty. To 
say that i t is o f merely instrumental signif icance, that it is inteipret ive and destructive, is 
surely to go too far. Yet throughout his career, August ine held to the bel ief that any 
inte l l ig ib le truths grasped by Reason are themselves gifts o f God's Grace. Not dissimilar to 
the 'seeing' A d a m and Eve enjoyed whi ls t in the Garden o f Eden, what men perceive w i th 
the 'eye o f their m i n d ' they see, as i t were, through God's o w n eyes. As such, any truth 
apprehended by the right use o f Reason is a g i f t o f Grace: 1 read that the soul o f man, 
although it gives test imony of the l ight, is not i tself the l ight , but the Word , God Himsel f , 
is "the true l ight, wh ich enlightens every man that comes into the world."^^^ 
This is what August ine meant when castigating the Platonic philosophers w i th the 
f o l l ow ing words: '...they d id not rightly worship God Himsel f , because they paid the divine 
honours wh ich are due to H i m alone to other things also, to wh ich they should not have 
paid them. "Because, knowing God, they g lor i f ied H i m not as God ; neither were thankful , 
but became va in in their imaginations, and their foo l ish heart was darkened. Professing 
themselves to be wise they became f o o l s . T h i s v iew o f in te l l ig ib i l i t y was expounded at 
greater length i n Augustine's De Magistro, whose purpose as a dialogue was to show that, 
Regarding.,, all those things which we understand, it is not a speaker who utters 
sounds exteriorly whom we consult, but it is truth that presides within, over the 
mind itself... And He Who is consulted, He Who is said to "dwell in the inner 
' Confessiones., V I I , 9. 
De Civitate Dei, V I I I , 10. 
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man," He it is who teaches 一 Christ 一 that is, "the unchangeable Power of God 
and everlasting Wisdom. 
Augustine reached this conclusion by f irst establishing that words are but signs, in the 
sense that they s igni fy certain realit ies: '...speech serves only to remind, since the memory 
in wh ich the words inhere, by recal l ing them, brings to m i n d the realit ies themselves, o f 
wh ich the words are s i g n s . A n d as such, ไ..reali ties s igni f ied are to be esteemed more 
h ighly than their signs. For whatever exists for the sake o f something else must be infer ior 
to that for whose sake i t e x i s t s . . . T h i s is al l very we l l in the case of objects and actions 
o f wh ich one has indeed had pr ior experience, but what o f in te l l ig ib le realities? H o w is the 
role o f the memory to be explained in such instances? 
This matter was especially important for August ine because he bel ieved that the business 
o f teaching was to remind, and that learning is real ly a process o f recal l ing f r om memory 
realities previously perceived. T o learn was thus to acknowledge oneself the truth o f a 
proposi t ion; and so to believe that one's teacher was a source o f truth was simply 
fal lacious: his words could serve only to s igni fy the realit ies to wh ich assent had already 
been given: I f one who hears me has personally perceived these things and become aware 
o f them, he does not learn them f rom my words, but recognises them f rom the images that 
are stored away w i th in himself. I f , however, he has had no sense knowledge of them, he 
clearly believes rather than learns by means o f the words.'^^' I t fo l lows, then, that when it 
comes to learning inte l l ig ib le truths, there must be a sense in wh ich a real i ty is being called 
՝՝ De Magistro, X I , 38 . 
՚ ¡bid, I， 2. C f . De Catechizandis Rudibus, շ ։ ' Fo r instance, anger is des ignated b y one w o r d in L a t i n , b y 
another i n Greek , and by others aga in in the var ious other tongues; bu t the express ion on the face o f an 
angry m a n is nei ther L a t i n nor Greek . ' 
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forth f r om memory. But how can this be the case? From whence comes the knowledge of 
the real i ty wh ich is matched to the proposit ion o f the teacher? 
Augustine's answer was that i t is God W h o i l luminates these realit ies: '...if the one who 
hears me l ikewise sees those things w i th an inner and undiv ided eye,., he is taught not by 
my words, but by the realities themselves made manifest to h i m by God revealing them to 
his inner Տ61ք.՛^^^ As such, anything a man learas by use o f Reason he should attribute to 
Christ the W o r d o f God and source o f all W isdom; for, ไ,.He alone teaches who when He 
spoke externally reminded us that He dwells w i th in ԱՏ.՛^^^ 
I t is clear, then, that Reason should never be regarded the source o f anything i t apprehends. 
It is that instrument through which Christ teaches and admonishes men whether they 
realise i t or not. The truth about any matter is only ever a g i f t o f Grace, wh ich perhaps 
makes more sense of the argument in section 2,2 above; for the very intel lectual honesty 
that compels a man to reject in rel igions and philosophies that wh ich appears irrat ional is 
the W o r d o f God wi th in h i m ! For August ine, Plato was the measure o f jus t how far a man 
could advance by Reason alone. In the end, though, where his speculations should have 
dr iven h im to distraction, he adopted a fantastical expedient to reconci le the dichotomy he 
had discovered between the intel l ig ib le and sensible wor lds. Th is is yet more proof for the 
c la im that to August ine, God worked His salvi f ic рифозе through both the Mora l and the 
Intel lectual conscience, biterest ingly enough, i t also provides grounds for c la iming that in 
relat ion to the Christ ian Faith, an A . J. Ayer or a Bertrand Russell is in no worse a posit ion 
De Magistro, IX， 25. 
！bid, }01, 39. 
Ibid, х п , 40. 
[bid, XIV, 46. 
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than a Plato, as their scepticism only removes f rom the radar what Christ ianity is not, 
namely an argument. A n d as August ine showed w i th regard to the Platonists, i t is pride not 
disbel ief that stands in the way o f a man subjecting h imsel f to the Person o f Christ. 
In a short exposit ion o f Russel ľs phi losophy, A . J. Ayer recounted the fo l l ow ing anecdote: 
There is a story that Russell was once asked at a publ ic meet ing what he wou ld say i f after 
his death he found h imsel f confronted by his Maker. He repl ied wi thout hesitation: ไ 
should say: " G o d ! W h y d id Y o u make the evidence for Yourse l f so insufficient?"'^^"^ The 
anecdote brings immediately to mind those words o f Pascal's: 
The metaphysical proofs of the existence of God are so remote from men's 
methods of reasoning and so involved that they produce little impact; and even 
i f they did help some people, the effect would only last for a few moments 
while they were actually watching the demonstration, but an hour later they 
would be afraid that they had made a mistake. "What they had gained by their 
curiosity would be lost through pride" [St. Augustine, Sermons, CXL I ] . That is 
the result of a knowledge of God which is reached without Jesus Christ... 
bstead of which those who have known God through a mediator are aware of 
their own wretchedness.^^^ 
Pascal makes a stark point: the moment in wh ich a man turns to God is not marked by 
ecstasy. I t is a sober th rowing in o f the towe l ; for what else but complete scepticism could 
make h i m turn back, l ike a ch i ld , eschewing al l notions o f Hor izontal Eternity, to l ive 
under a voluntarist conception o f law? 
；므 A . J. A y e r , Russell ( L o n d o n , Fontana. 1972) , p. 128. 
2°5 Pascal , Pensees; t rans. M a r t i n T u r n e l l ( H a r v i l l Press, 1962) , p. 2 1 2 , i n C o l i n B r o w n , Philosophy and the 
Christian Faith ( L o n d o n , T h e Tynda le Press, 1969) , p. 59 
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This, then, is the other hal f o f the story hinted at in section 2.4. Though Natural Law 
Theories are to be regarded very great goods indeed, they are no replacement for the 
Vert ical Eterni ty experienced when l ook ing to God for al l on๙s seeing'. I f anything, they 
represent paradigmatic solutions to the ethical equation w i th wh ich the second chapter was 
begun. Fo l l ow ing c. ร. Lew is ' cue in The Abolition of Man, they search out some moral 
ax iom (or body o f axioms) o f suitably a priori character, and then, by various processes o f 
deduction, produce f r om it legislat ion to cover all aspects o f human act iv i ty. However, i t is 
terr ibly important to bear in mind that all ethical speculation exhibits the same dynamic, 
the same іп Їсф Іау o f the Natural Law Idea and the moral conscience. What separates the 
dif ferent systems in practice, is only the severity o f the cr i ter ion o f truth adopted in each 
case; an Ayer and an Aquinas are both after the same th ing, though whereas Ayer'ร 
cr i ter ion obliterates morฝ i t y , Aquinas ' on ly redefines i t . I t fo l l ows that on these grounds, 
i.e. that they most perfect ly embody principles o f ethical speculation, i t wou ld not be 
inopportune to regard Natural Law Theories as primus inter pares. Stoic Natural Law 
Theory provides a case in point , for the circumstances o f its genesis present a remarkable 
analogue to the August in ian naՄative o f the Fal l . A s the wal ls o f city-state came tumbling 
down, the Greek's eyes were opened and the innocence wh ich had for so long sustained his 
charmed circle o f use and wont was sacrificed on the altar o f moral re lat iv ism. 
3.2 Stoic N a t u r a l L a w T h e o r y 
The Stoic was one o f four great schools o f ethical phi losophy that emerged w i th the 
gradual decline in importance o f the Greek city-state, f r o m the f i f t h century onwards. This 
process, begun w i th the humanist turn given phi losophy by Socrates, was completed by the 
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conquering genius o f the Macedonian Kings. Phi l ip , having made h imsel f master o f Greece 
w i t h his defeat o f the j o in t army of Thebes and Athens, was assassinated on the eve of his 
departure to liberate the Greek cities o f As ia M i n o r and b r ing the Persians and Barbari ans 
under his domin ion. I t was lef t to his son, Alexander, to complete his father's work ; and 
this he d id in imperious fashion, far extending the boundaries o f the Hel lenic wor ld . As 
Fisher notes o f the nature o f his conquests: N o mi l i ta ry career, not even that o f his imitator 
Napoleon has exercised a wider influence on history, opening out as i t d id the whole o f 
hither Asia to Hel lenic speech and culture, and br ing ing to the West a flood of new facts 
relat ing to Oriental lands and peopleร...'^*^^ 
I t was o f the essence of Alexander's rule that he should strive to strike a note o f 
cosmopol i tanism in his governing o f the peoples o f East and West. This conci l iatory 
pol icy, based upon his far-sighted belief in a fundamental equal i ty o f man, led to a hitherto 
unimagined intercourse o f ideas and rel igions. Such an in f l ux o f cultural data served only 
to press an already volat i le phi losophical situation to breaking point. B y the t ime o f 
Alexander's conquests, the Greek had become preoccupied by the discrepancy he perceived 
between the eternal stabi l i ty o f the laws governing the physical wo r l d and the flux and 
change o f human custom and tradit ion. That these doubts and insecurities could come to 
pass was due to the development o f his analytical sensibi l i ty. Where previously his rational 
engagement w i th the insti tut ions o f pol i t ical society had been o f a purely practical bent, i t 
had, in the last one hundred years or so, begun to assume a theoretical edge. For Cornford, 
this development represented the florescence o f the modem, scientif ic inc l inat ion: The 
problem ― something to be done 一 gave place to the theorem 一 something to be 
' H . A . L . F isher . A History of Europe ( L o n d o n , E d w a r d A r n o l d & Co.， 1949) , p. 42 . 
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contemplated... The rise o f science, then, meant that the intel l igence became disinterested 
and now fel t free to voyage on seas o f thought strange to minds bent on immediate 
problems o f action. ՚^ *^ ^ This heightened Intel lectual Conscience was the Greek's inheritance 
f rom the Pre-Socratic philosophers. They constituted an eclectic group of thinkers, all 
sharing an interest in the physical wor ld and al l tracing a l ineage f r om the Greek city-states 
o f Ionia, on the coast o f As ia M inor . They had begun their speculations back in the sixth 
century, employ ing methods coloured, not a l i t t le i ron ica l ly , by a raft o f presumptions 
drawn f r om their experience of l i fe in the city-state. 
Foremost amongst these, and perhaps exercising the greatest inf luence over their 
investigations, was the pr inciple o f just ice or dike. As Guthr ie points out, this pr inciple had 
enjoyed a long and dist inguished career in Greek thought, though not exclusively in its 
moral sense. He regards its earliest signif icance in Greek l i terature as being, '...no more 
than the way in wh ich a certain class o f people usually behaves, or the normal course o f 
nature. ՚^ ^^  A n d as he goes on to show, this was precisely the def in i t ion that Plato wou ld 
eventually return at the complet ion o f the Republic. The reason for dwe l l ing on these 
etymological matters is because the just ice wh ich so impressed the pre-Socratic 
philosophers as they looked upon the city-state was o f this order. In the concord o f its 
insti tut ions and the regulari ty o f its laws, the city-state contrasted sharply w i th the flux and 
change of the natural wor ld . However, i t is important to remember that this v iew could not 
yet amount to a theoretical out look (for that wou ld have to wai t t i l l after the pre-Socratics) 
but issued instead in a sense o f fami l iar i ty . As Barker put i t : M e n were born, and l ived, 
and died, under ancient customs, whose or ig in no man knew. I t was d im ly felt that they 
' F. M . C o r n f o r d , Before and After Socrates (Cambr i dge , C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1950), pp. 6-7. 
' พ . К . С. G u t h r i e , The Greek Philosophers: From Thales to Aristotle ( L o n d o n , M e t h u e n , 1967) , p. 6. 
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were d iv ine: i t was certainly recognised that they were r ig id and fundamental.՚^^^ What the 
Pre-Socratic philosopher hoped to do was to render the natural w o r l d equally fami l iar ; and 
there are, o f course, obvious parallels between this not ion o f fami l iar i ty and the def in i t ion 
o f the Natural Law Idea. For i f the excrescences of scientif ic or theoretical understanding 
are cleared away, what was there left for the Greek to be fami l ia r w i th other than the 
regularit ies o f everyday l i fe? Perhaps, in this sense, 'predictabi l i ty ' wou ld be a better term 
to use. W i th i n the walls o f the city-state the Greek fel t secure and greatly comforted not in 
the substance o f his traditions and beliefs, for those went unquestioned, but in the 
rout inised existence they afforded h im . Thus, when the pre-Socratics turned to consider the 
wo r l d outside the wal ls, i t was its unpredictabi l i ty wh ich struck them above all else. L i t t le 
surprise, then, that they sought to remedy this situation by an appl icat ion o f the Natural 
Law Idea, determining to seek out a material substratum to which all the surface 
machinations o f the natural wo r l d could relate. I t is true, they cou ld have gone high rather 
than low, devolv ing responsibi l i ty to gods rather than material causes, but, as Democri tus 
insisted, they fervent ly believed that, M e n have fashioned an image o f Chance as an 
excuse for their o w n stupidity. For Chance rarely conf l icts w i th Intel l igence, and most 
things in l i fe can be set in order by an intel l igent รЬаф8ІдЬїе0пе88.'^^*^ Such was born the 
analytical sensibi l i ty, not as something new in itself, but as a ref inement upon the Natural 
Law Idea; for the pre-Socratics could never have asked the questions they d id wi thout f irst 
presuming, as Hume called it , 'the constant conjunct ion o f cause and effect.'^'^ 
In section 2.2 was moved a very Socratic mot ion, namely, that al l supposed advances in the 
name o f the Intel lectual Conscience are signif icant on ly insofar as they help delineate 
' S i r Ernest Barker , Greek Political Theory ( L o n d o n , M e t h u e n , 1960) , p. 63 . 
' D e m o c r i t u s , fg t . 119， Aneilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 104. 
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man's epistemologica! l imitat ions. In other words, that the wiser one gets, the more one 
realises one doesn't know. In section 2.3, w i th reference to Hume's Problem o f Induct ion, 
these l imi tat ions were shown as traceable to the metaphysical fact o f temporal i ty. The 
object was to prove that the beating heart o f every intel lectual development has to be the 
Natural L a w Idea, which is the same as saying that al l notions o f enl ightenment and 
progress are based on a fundamental misconcept ion. In section 2.2, things had actually 
been taken a step further, where i t was proposed that 'all the great rel igions and 
philosophies could be diachronical ly arranged in the service o f this pr inciple, each one 
mark ing out perimeter sections o f the 'God-shaped' hole. A l l this is recounted because the 
pre-Socratic 'discovery' o f Western science (or modem phi losophy) wou ld obviously 
constitute a major part o f this project. This is because the problems wh ich the new 
phi losophy la id up for the Greek were o f an exclusively epistemologica! nature. The 
Intel lectual Conscience he received back f rom the pre-Socratics was barely recognisable, 
tuned, as i t was, to an uncommonly high p i tch. As a tool for the elucidat ion o f truth i t now 
possessed a far sharper cut t ing edge, but this meant that once wielded, i t wou ld clearly 
leave very l i t t le standing. This certainly proved to be the case, and in the Sophists o f the 
f i f t h century, i t is possible to catch the mood o f the t ime. 
As was the case w i th the pre-Socratics, the Sophists d id not represent a coherent school o f 
thought. The i r most dist inguishing feature was the fact that they taught, indeed, that they 
were the, 'f irst professional teachers in Greece. ՚^ ^^  In matters o f doctrine and bel ief they 
were seldom dogmatic, and in terms o f the syllabus they taught, happi ly gave over to 
consumer interest. W i t h their students being young and ambit ious Greek men, this meant 
See above , p. 7 1 . 
Barker , Greek Political Theory, p. 67. 
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lessons in the art o f rhetoric and on the more pra^^ sid^^ in how to swing the pol i t ical 
process. Outside their professional duties they represented the whole spectrum of Greek 
thought at the t ime, and were largely responsible for disseminat ing the new advances in 
phi losophy and science. This earned them reproach f rom men such as Plato, who, in the 
Republic, wou ld roundly condemn them for elevating publ ic op in ion and bel ief to the 
status o f w isdom: Each o f these private teachers... in fact teaches noth ing but the opinions 
and beliefs the publ ic i tself expresses when i t crowds into a meeting. ՚ ՛^^  However, i t was 
only the more radical o f the sophists, men such as Hippias o f El is and Ant iphon, who 
directly appl ied the pre-Socratic programme to questions o f ethical import . The result was 
a rampant ind iv idual ism that laughed to scorn the received w isdom o f pol i t ical discourse. 
Their attempt to see through the welter of human laws to a pre-Socratic l ike substratum, far 
f r om setting those laws in more intel l ig ib le relations to one another, succeeded only in 
making them appear r id iculous and ineffectual in proport ion to their remove, by degrees o f 
abstraction, f r om the or iginal substratum. Burnet saw the fu l l poverty o f this method as 
l y ing in its naïve mater ial ism, point ing out that, '...just as cosmologica! speculation had 
been forced to deny the real i ty o f the every-day wo r l d because i t sought for ult imate reality 
in something софогеа і , so the new ethical speculation was soon forced to deny the val id i ty 
o f ordinary mora l i ty , and for just the same reason, because the under ly ing pr inciple i t 
sought was o f one k ind w i th the facts i t was meant to explain.՚^^՛^ Yet this ontologicai 
cr i t ic ism succeeds only in expla in ing things up to a point. What i t does provide is a clear 
i l lustrat ion o f the effect o f seeking out a real 'nature' beneath the conf l ic t ing welter o f 
custom and law. But at the same t ime, what i t does not do is explain why the sophist would 
' P la to , Republic, 4 9 3 . C f . Herac le i tus , fg t . 104， Aneilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, 104: W h a t 
in te l l i gence or unders tand ing have they? T h e y be l ieve the people*ร bards, and use as the i r teacher the 
popu lace , not k n o w i n g that " the m a j o n t y are bad , and the good are f e w " , ' 
^ John B u r n e t , ' L a w and Na tu re i n Greek Eth ics ' , international Journal of Ethics, V o l . 7 N o . 3 ( A p r . , 1897) , 
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choose to adopt this method in the f irst place. I t s imply draws attention to the fact that 
when ponder ing questions o f ethical import , he adopted the methods developed by the pre-
Socratics, thus f o l l ow ing the divorce between appearance and real i ty and the production o f 
a naturalistic ethic. The real solution to this matter lies w i th the Natural Law Idea. 
In section 1,7 was produced the fo l l ow ing def in i t ion o f the Natural Law Idea: that i t 
projects into remote futur i ty the condit ions o f the present moment. I t was developed 
dur ing a discussion o f an exclusively socio-pol i t ical bearing, namely, the innate attraction 
o f legislative order; but since then, in attempts to draw out the meta-narrative potential o f 
the August in ian reading o f the Fal l , the idea's broader appl icat ion has been hinted at - the 
'spring to al l human endeavour' o f the preface. W i th in this scheme, the pre-Socratics 
obviously occupy an important posi t ion; their discovery o f theoret icฝ reasoning mark ing a 
milestone in the development o f the Intel lectual Conscience. I t is, however, important to 
remember that for them the paradigm o f the Natural Law Idea was the city-state itself. 
Indeed i t cou ld be said that pol i t ical society, whatever its f o rm , represents the purest, pre-
scientif ic embodiment o f the idea. For apart f r om the sociable aspect, the advantage which 
men acknowledge in human association is the fact that a d iv is ion o f labour possesses the 
potential to account for far greater tracts o f remote fu tur i ty than a subsistence l i festyle. 
Whi ls t the smallholder remains at the mercy o f seasons and tempests, the ci ty-dwel ler, as 
the beneficiary o f numerous economies o f scale, is cushioned against such eventualit ies. O f 
course these benefits do not come wi thout costs. Wh i l s t temporal i ty may be drawn t ight 
around the smallholder's p lot , he nonetheless enjoys complete responsibi l i ty for, and power 
over, his own destiny. No t so w i th the c i ty-dwel ler . He may have succeeded in banishing 
p. 330. 
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temporal i ty to a distant pr ick on the hor izon, but only for having devolved great amounts 
o f responsibi l i ty over his l i fe to external agencies. Laws must be obeyed, taxes paid, 
tradit ions respected and allegiance given, even, in the case of war, unto death. Such 
curtailments o f his ind iv idual l iberty are required i f the boundaries o f the present moment 
are to be pushed back; but for the major i ty o f men this is a price they are happy to pay, 
indeed unt i l the pre-Socratics came along, i t was a price they were quite unaware o f having 
paid. I t was only w i t h the conscious efforts o f men such as Thales, Anaximander and 
Anaximenes to try and reproduce outside the พ ฝ I s what they had always known wi th in 
them that the next stage i n the development o f the Natural L a w Idea could take place. This 
was its іпсофогайоп in a who l l y theoretical apparatus designed to evince truth by the same 
methods that the city-state had evinced security and wel lbe ing. In other words, to explain 
things on the hypothesis that they held to f i xed laws o f order and procession. As the f i rst 
chapter made clear, Reason cannot operate short o f some sort o f premise. So being 
thoroughgoing materialists, the pre-Socratics spun their cosmogonies out as variations on 
the theme o f a substratum; and as was the case w i th the city-state, just ice was the 
expression o f each law hold ing to its path. In the words o f Heracleitus: The รนท w i l l not 
transgress his measures; otherwise the Furies, ministers o f Justice, w i l l f i nd h im out.՝^^^ As 
such, when a radical sophist such as Ant iphon sought to get at the 'real ' nature under ly ing 
human custom and law, he d id so in order to arrive at an ax iom by wh ich to re-found 
moral i ty , employ ing much the same method out l ined by c. ร . Lewis in section 2.4 (and 
br ie f ly summarised in section 3.1 above). In Ant iphon's case, the ax iom turned out to be 
that men, '...should seek the things that promote l i fe , or comfor t , and shun the things that 
invo lve death, or discomfort.՚^^^ From here he was able to draw his famous nihi l ist ic 
Herac le i tus , f g t , 94， Aneilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 3 1 . 
Barker , Greek Political Theory, p. 77 . 
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conclusions to the effect that, ，A man, therefore, wou ld practise just ice in the way most 
advantageous to h imsel f i f , in the presence o f witnesses, he held the laws in high esteem, 
but, in the absence of witnesses, and when he was by himself , he held in high esteem the 
rules o f nature.'^^^ It is not d i f f i cu l t to imagine the power fu l , iconoclastic al loy that was 
forged f rom the combinat ion o f sentiments such as these and the cultural data heaped up in 
the Greek cities by the sweep o f Alexander's conquests. I t took away f r o m the Greek the 
crutch o f convention and left h i m to stumble his way through a maze o f moral relat iv ism. 
It was into this breach that the Stoic ethic stepped, o f fer ing a new fo rm of certainty for a 
new epoch. Ignorance had been bliss: the 'charmed circle o f use and won t ' had persisted so 
long as the Greek felt no urge to produce a rationale for its existence. H is j o y had been in 
discussing and debating the received w isdom o f pol i t ica l discourse; i t wou ld take the 
confluence o f those circumstances out l ined above to force h i m to make this wisdom stand 
to answer at the bar o f Reason. That i t could not, le f t h i m receptive to a new breed of 
philosophies, all d rawing on the burgeoning sense o f ind iv idua l ism, and al l o f fer ing their 
fo l lowers, ， ...the same good under di f ferent names, a self-suff ic ient, imperturbable 
t ranqui l i ty proof against all the shocks and changes of Fortune, the shi f t ing, restless 
insecurity o f human affairs. ՝^ *^  These were the so cal led e th icฝ schools o f the Cynics, 
Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics; but i t was only the Stoics who packaged their c la im to 
ethical certitude w i th in a theory o f Natural Law . This fact meant that o f the four ethical 
schools, they were best placed to deal w i th the most pressing concerns o f the day. Sabine 
describes them thus: Po l i t i ca l thought had... two ideas to make clear and to interweave into 
a common scheme of values: the idea o f the ind iv idual , a dist inct i tem o f humanity w i th his 
Barker , Greek Political Theory, p. 95. 
A . H . A r m s t r o n g , An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, ( L o n d o n , 1965) , p. 115. 
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purely personal and private l i fe , and the idea o f universal i ty, a wor ld -w ide humanity in 
wh ich al l are endowed w i th a common human nature ƒ 19 O f great signif icance was the fact 
that, as Fr. Copleston points out^^^, the Stoics largely derived their idea of a Law o f Nature 
f r om the pre-Socratic, Heracleitus. This made them direct heirs to the pre-Socratic 
ref inement o f the Natural Law Idea out l ined above. Indeed, Heraclei tus' not ion of the 
Խgos or inte l l ig ib le Law o f the Universe could in many senses be regarded as the 
highwater mark o f the pre-Socratic programme, at least insofar as i t has been defined as an 
attempt to produce a theoretical version o f the Natural Law Idea (for Heracleitus was, o f 
course, v io lent ly opposed to the strict rat ional ism o f the Mi les ian phi losophers); posit ing, 
as i t d id , a universe pel luc id for being ordered to a rat ional good. So far as can be adduced 
f r o m his extant wr i t ings, true happiness consisted in l i v i ng i n accordance w i th this law, 
though the problem, as Heracleitus saw it, was that, '...although the Law is universal, the 
major i ty l ive as i f they had understanding peculiar to themselves.՚^^՛ The simi le he often 
uses is that o f 'waking and sleeping'. Men who do not make the ef for t to seek out and 
fo l l ow the Law of the Universe, '...are unaware o f what they are do ing after they wake, just 
as they forget what they d id whi le asleep.'^^^ Furthermore, Heracleitus seems to equate this 
law w i th the w i l l o f a sovereign god. First he states the f o l l ow ing proposi t ion: Tha t which 
is wise is one; to understand the purpose which steers al l things through all things.'^^^ Then 
he adds a theistic qual i f icat ion: Tha t which alone is wise is one; i t is w i l l i ng and unwi l l i ng 
to be cal led by the name o f Zeus.'^^'* Final ly, he seems to recommend a k ind o f voluntarist 
' G . H . Sabine, A History of Political Theory ( L o n d o n , 1949)， p. 130. 
' F rede r i ck Cop les ton , ร . J . , A History of Pnilosophy: Greece and Rome, рші II ( N e w Y o r k , Image Books , 
1962) , p. 124. 
Herac le i tus , fg t . 2， Aneilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 24 . 
• Ibid, fg t . 1 , Aneilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 24 . 
' Ibid, fg t . 4 1 , p. 27 . 
Ibid] fg t . 32 , p. 27 
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law: T o obey the w i l l o f one man is also Law/그 5 A n d of course, as w i th all the pre-
Socratics, Heracleitus held to a material ist metaphysic: Th i s ordered universe (cosmos), 
which is the same for a l l , was not created by one o f the gods or o f mank ind , but i t was ever 
and is and shall be ever- l iv ing Fire, tóndled in measure and quenched in measure. ՚^ ^^  
In terms o f the Stoic br ief 一 to of fer to the indiv idual an unprecedented level o f certainty 
and security 一 such a metaphysic was too good to pass up. The Stoics quicWy adapted 
Heracleitus' Logos to their Cynic-based ethic, turning it into the law of Right Reason, the 
archetype o f all localised and personal systems o f law. This was a standard o f r ight action 
applicable to all men, whether Greek, slave or Barbarian, by virtue o f their shared 
humanity. The contrast w i th the parochial ism of the city-states cou ld not have been more 
marked. What was good and r ight and just was no longer an accident o f t ime and place, 
station or cit izenship, but determined by an eternal standard o f t ruth. A l l men had access to 
this standard because their souls were composed of the same f ie ry 's tu f f as the Wor l d Soul 
or D iv ine Reason, the logos that had ordered the wor ld to a rat ional good. The possibi l i ty 
o f virtue was thus open to all men, consisting as i t d id , o f action in accordance wi th 
Reason. By this scheme the Stoics succeeded in satisfying Sabine's two criteria. Vi r tue, 
security and wel lbeing, as a funct ion o f r ight action, had become a matter o f personal 
responsibi l i ty, whi ls t the universal appl icabi l i ty o f the Law of Nature supported notions o f 
an ' international brotherhood o f man'. 
There are clear parallels here w i th the August in ian narrative o f the Fal l . In relation to 
events in the outside wor ld , l i fe in the Greek city-state could certainly be described as a 
Heracleitus, fg t . 33， p. 27. 
' Ibid, fg t . 30 , p. 26 . 
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State of blissful ignorance; and as was the case with Adam and Eve, this innocence was 
shattered w i t h the blossoming o f the rat ional faculty and the development o f a new hitherto 
unimagined self consciousness. Where A d a m and Eve f irst conceived themselves apart 
f rom God, in the Greek's case, i t was a question o f conceiv ing h imsel f apart f rom the 
consti tut ion o f the city-state. His freedom and his identi ty were no longer a funct ion o f his 
ci t izenship, but were now a product o f his w i l l . As was the case w i t h A d a m and Eve, this 
change issued in an ini inediate and debi l i tat ing loss o f certainty. The heavi ly prescribed 
routine o f the polis and the unquestioned status o f its laws and customs had gone a long 
way towards loosening the gr ip o f temporal i ty. B u t when these stumbled then fe l l at the bar 
o f Reason, the Greek was lef t to try and recreate outside the wal ls the certainty he had 
enjoyed w i th in them. That this could never be achieved in the same manner as before was 
obvious; for once lost, innocence can never be regained. In that instant, the present 
moment ceased f rom being a source o f comfor t and wel lbe ing and came instead to 
symbol ize his dislocation w i th in a hosti le and mysterious wor ld . In relation to the acuity o f 
this predicament, the appeal o f Stoic Natural Law Theory was obvious. B y advancing the 
ideal o f a legal ly circumscribed Cosmos, the Stoics took the edge out o f tradit ional notions 
o f Fate and Eterni ty. As Cicero proclaimed, ไ,,we must now conceive o f this whole 
universe as one commonweal th o f wh ich both gods and men are memberร ƒ T h a t the 
Natural Law Idea was at work here is obvious when i t is considered that for the Stoic, law 
was merely an expression or a qual i ty o f Reason. It was the outward fo rm o f the stabil i ty of 
meaning that permeated the universe f rom the D iv ine Reason downwards. To return to 
Cicero: 
...most learned men have determined to begin with Law, and it would seem that 
they are right, if, according to their definition, Law is the highest Reason» 
2 " C i ce ro , De Legibus, tr . C l i n t o n Keyes , L o e b Class. L i b . ( C a m b r i d g e Mass . , 1968)， i， 23 . 
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implanted in Nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids the 
opposite. This Reason, when firmly fixed and fully developed in the mind, is 
Law... Law is a natural force; it is the mind and reason of the intelligent man, 
the standard by which justice and injustice are measured.^^^ 
O f course, Stoic Natural Law Theory was only a more expl ic i t version o f what had gone 
before. Its genius lay in awakening man to the cr i ter ion o f truth w i th in h im, so that he 
might conf ident ly take upon himself the responsibi l i ty for goodness, just ice and ult imately, 
temporal i ty, that had previously been devolved, in great measure, to the consti tut ion o f the 
city-state. ' 
3.3 The Political Animal 
As many o f his commentators have pointed out, August ine considered the existence of 
pol i t ical society the surest indicat ion o f man's fal len condi t ion. Un l i ke Plato and Aristot le, 
who bel ieved that man was a pol i t ica l animal by nature, August ine bel ieved he was one by 
necessity. In relat ion to his s inful condi t ion, the State was a necessary, external imposi t ion. 
In the preface, a desire was stated to append to the received or thodoxy o f this interpretation 
a further d imension: that for August ine, the State was not on ly remedial in relat ion to 
human sinfulness but also a metaphysical fact. Th is of fered a chance o f re in teφret ing what 
is ordinar i ly taken to be the least satisfactory element i n his socio-pol i t ical thought: his 
dogged commi tment to the Doctr ine o f Or ig inal Sin. W i t h i n the social science discourses, 
Augustine's narrative o f the Fal l is invoked only insofar as it is necessary to explain his 
intransigent v iews on human sinfulness. Whi ls t his pessimistic psychology o f man has long 
been respected, i t is usually felt that his theology o f man goes too far in its condemnation 
Cice ro , De Legibus, tr. C l i n t o n Keyes , L o e b Class. L i b . ( C a m b r i d g e , Mass . , 1968) , i , 18-19. 
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o f human nat ure. ՚^ ^^  B y re-assessing the signif icance o f Augustine's Doctr ine o f the Fall 
f rom an epistemologica! point o f v iew, i t is hoped that the gap between these two elements 
in his thought might be closed by showing that both contr ibute in equal measure to an 
intel lectual ly solvent account o f secu]arity. T i n fact, he method employed has not been 
unl ike the Hegel ian dialectic - elements o f thesis and antithesis being resolved in a higher 
synthesis. In this case, the 'higher synthesis' has been a set o f meณ^ fe^ principles 
emanating f r om certain epistemologica! l imi tat ions. In essence, these f irst principles 
describe the nature o f man's restr ict ion to the present moment ; the most pressing 
consequence o f the Fal l . B y pursuing this l ine o f attack i t has hopefu l ly been shown that 
the question o f sin is something o f a red herr ing in August in ian thought. When i t is 
considered that any action performed outside o f God's W i l l is technical ly a sin, then f rom 
an analytical point o f v iew, i t becomes a useless concept. In l ight o f this, i t is felt far more 
beneficial to regard sin as an expression of se l fw i l l ing , and as such, the desire to survive 
apart f rom God's W i l l . This ef fect ively al lows for a posit ive rather than a negative 
assessment o f the State's remedial ro le ; that i t is less imposed upon men than imposed by 
them as a way o f attaining to a measure o f Hor izontal Eterni ty. Augustine's narrative o f the 
Fal l provides, then, a number o f important insights in to pol i t ica l behaviourism. Taken 
together, i t might not unfair ly be said that they constitute the l imi ts to pol i t ical phi losophy. 
In the second chapter, there was opportunity to allude to many o f them; what fo l lows is a 
more direct treatment. 
T h e terms 'psycho logy o f m a n ' and ' theo logy o f m a n ' are o f course b o r r o w e d f r o m Deane'ร The Social 
Political Thought OJ St. Augustine, where they head up t w o chapters; t h o u g h i n th is instance I do not 
in tend any reference to the i r content . Fo r an exce l len t appra isa l o f m o d e r n Real ism's debts to St. 
Augus t i ne , see M i c h a e l L o r i a u x T h e Real ists and St. Augus t i ne : Skep t i c i sm , Psycho logy , and M o r a l 
A c t i o n i n In te rna t iona l Re la t ions Though t ' , International Studies Quarterly, V o l . 36 N o . 4 ( D e c , 1992) , 
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1. The difference Between the Moral and the Intellectual Conscience 
Much clar i ty is gained by mark ing a separation o f the two consciences. This becomes an 
obvious necessity when one considers how radical ly they d i f fer at the point o f operation. 
Most important ly, this exercise clears away the confusion that surrounds statements o f the 
type 'χ stands to Reason'; where χ is a moral proposi t ion. Such statements, though very 
comfor t ing, are false. The fact is that moral proposit ions stand to Conscience, not Reason. 
A great deal turns on this difference. To state that the proposi t ion 'to k i l l a man is wrong ' 
stands to Reason, is to grant i t a priori status. In other words, the impl icat ion is that it has 
held true for al l t ime. But surely in such an instance one is gui l ty o f appealing to a cri terion 
o f truth di f ferent to that ordinar i ly associated w i th Reason? For what is in fact being 
appealed to is universal i ty o f belief, which is very di f ferent f r o m being able to prove that 
the proposit ion is true in itself; and it is just this latter type o f proof wh ich Reason 
demands, the type of p roo f (apparently) satisfied on ly in the physical and mathematical 
sciences. However, this should not be confused w i th the issues o f proof surrounding that 
of t quoted sy l log ism 'all men are mor ta l ; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal ' . In 
that example, the issue is the impossibi l i ty o f empir ical ver i f icat ion. Un t i l such t ime as the 
wor ld has run its course and all men have indeed proved morta l , no-one has a right to 
presume the truth o f the def in ing clause 'all men are mortal ' . However, the problem wi th 
moral proposit ions is quite dif ferent. Namely that there exists no conceivable experiment 
by which to ver i fy the truth o f the proposit ion. The impl icat ion here is that objective 
knowledge can only emerge through experimental (empir ical being a subset) ver i f icat ion. 
I t fo l lows that moral proposit ions must always be regarded as a class o f purely subjective 
knowledge. Th is conclusion introduces the important question o f what is actually mean 
pp , 401 -420 . 
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when it is said 'χ stands to Conscience'. There seems l i t t le more that such a statement can 
imp ly other than convict ion. Under interrogation, the only appeal cou ld be to various 
abstractions o f authori ty: ，it is what my brother/parents/ teachers/society/God taught me to 
do'. A n d a clever interrogator wou ld qu ick ly reduce these authorities to examples o f 
conventions or conveniences, and what is more, serving interests other than one's own . 
Yet at the same t ime there seems l i t t le point in denying that a man can ho ld an irrat ional 
bel ief w i t h jus t the same degree o f certitude that he can ho ld a rat ional one. In fact, i t could 
quite successfully be argued that i rrat ional beliefs ho ld by far the greater sway over men's 
l ives and actions, as in the case o f martyrs going to the stake. I t seems, then, that men are 
prepared to ho ld to two markedly dif ferent cr i ter ia o f truth w i th equal tenacity. The f irst is 
that o f object ive, the second that o f subjective t ruth. Yet why the attempts to confuse them, 
to c la im object ive status for subjective truths? 
The simple answer is that the kudos lies w i th object ive truth, for on ly i t possesses the 
capacity to push back the boundaries o f the present moment. In contrast, subjective truth 
exists on ly in the present moment. I f i t is c la imed that a moral proposi t ion stands to 
Conscience, then what is meant is that said proposit ion w i l l be bel ieved by an inf in i te 
number o f men in an in f in i te number o f present moments. The present moments are not, i f 
the expression may be excused, tampered w i th themselves. In no way is an attempt made 
to alter the effects o f temporal i ty. This, however, is exactly what object ive truth seeks to 
do. I t aims to inf late the present moment unt i l i t l i teral ly f i l l s eternity. What is true now has 
to be true then. I f β means some one th ing in this present moment, then i t must mean the 
same th ing in the next present moment ad infinitum. A n d what is this i f not the truth o f 
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logic? A b g i ^ ^ ^ rel^^^ merely transports a f in i te property, or f ini te body o f 
properties, through a series o f present moments. But this o f course begs the question: is 
truth a qual i ty o f the 'some one th ing ' in the present moment, or does i t refer to its 
subsequent extension through time? Is truth the fact that β equals α now, or is i t the fact 
that i f β equals α now, then that relationship w i l l st i l l be found to hold in ten minutes or 
even ten years t ime? Perhaps now it is easier to see the importance o f dist inguishing 
between the two consciences. For whereas moral proposit ions can only stand true in the 
present moment, factual proposit ions can only do so either side o f i t . The truth o f the 
proposit ion ，a ball th rown in the air w i l l eventually come down to earth' ( leaving aside the 
problem o f induct ion) could be proved either w i th reference to experiments conducted in 
the past, such as those o f Sir Isaac Newton, or by a new, future experiment. The point 
being that short o f such appeals to ver i f icat ion, its truth in the present moment remains, so 
to speak, suspended. This is obviously not the case wi th moral proposit ions o f the type ，it is 
wrong to ๒11 a man'. Their truth is apprehended immediately, and it is b ind ing wi thout any 
recourse to processes o f ver i f icat ion. Yet the fact remains that w i th in the bounds of socio­
pol i t ical discourse, this type o f certainty is o f l i t t le use. What men require in these 
instances is precisely the type o f truth that can 'push back the boundaries o f the present 
moment'. A n d so, in the name o f metaphysical necessity, moral proposit ions are made to 
stand to Reason 一 are turned f rom inexpl icable apprehensions into a priori premises. This 
is why it was hinted at in section 3.1 above that in terms of Augustine's meta-narrati ve 
account o f the human condi t ion, Natural Law Theory migh t quite prof i tably be v iewed as 
the paradigm of ethical speculation. 
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2 . Broadening the Compass of Natural Law Theory 
O r d i n a r i l y , N a t u r a l L a w T h e o r y is g ran ted a v e r y n a r r o w c o m p a s s . T h i s is because those 
w h o ana lyse i t m a k e n o separa t ion b e t w e e n the m o r a l a n d the i n t e l l e c t u a l consc i ence . A s 
s u c h , t h e y v i e w the issues at s take as s o l e l y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a ! ra the r t han m e t a p h y s i c a l . T h i s 
b l i n d s t h e m t o the s i m i l a r i t i e s at w o r k , to the fac t tha t N a t u r a l L a w T h e o r i s t s are g u i l t y o f 
the same c r i m e s aga ins t the p resen t m o m e n t as t he i r d e b u n k e r s . A s F e l i x E . O p p e n h e i m 
m a k e s c lear : 
A l l the proponents o f the Namra l L a w thesis agree that there are normat ive 
statements in the area o f law and pol i t ics w h i c h are demonst rab ly true or false; 
that there are certain k inds o f po l i t i ca l behaviour that can be proven to be 
mora l l y right or w r o n g ; that there are po l i t i ca l inst i tut ions w h i c h are ob ject ive ly 
jus t or unjust... The natural law thesis does no t therefore be long to normat ive 
ethics; i t consists o f assertions about the t ru th or fa ls i ty o f normat ive statements, 
rather than o f the statements themselves. ՝^ *^* 
T h e p o i n t O p p e n h e i m is t r y i n g to m a k e is tha t n o r m a t i v e debate i n the spheres o f e th ics 
and p o l i t i c s is n o t , as s o m e N a t u r a l L a w T h e o r i s t s w o u l d c l a i m ^ ^ \ d e n i e d the R e l a t i v i s t , 
b u t ra the r t ha t he m u s t j u s t i f y h is n o r m a t i v e p r o n o u n c e m e n t s w i t h c l a i m s o ther t h a n to 
t h e i r o b j e c t i v e val idi ty.^"^^ H o w e v e r , t h i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e is u n d e r s c o r e d b y a fa r 
m o r e s t r i t ó n g s i m i l a r i t y . N a m e l y , t ha t b o t h s ides , n o t sa t i s f i ed w i t h a m o r a l p r o p o s i t i o n 
s t a n d i n g t o C o n s c i e n c e i n the p resen t m o m e n t , sub jec t i t t o c r i t e r i a o f t r u t h tha t w o u l d 
es tab l i sh o r d i ses tab l i sh i ts v a l i d i t y f o r e te rn i t y . T o b o t h t h e N a t u r a l L a w T h e o r i s t a n d the 
' Felix E. Oppenheim, Natural Law Theis: Affirmation or Deniฝ?', The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 51, No. 1 (Mar., 1957), p. 42. 
In his paper, Oppenheim cites Emil Brunner as an example.. 
As Maurizio Viroli points out in The Idea of the Republic (Cambridge, 2003), p. 62: There is no need of 
absolute moral truths founded on some revelation to give meaning to life and to commitment. The truths 
are the ones that each of us feel to be moral truths. A profound conviction, although not absolute, can 
make someone act with strength and consistency comparable to those of someone who lives by religious 
inspiration 
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R e l a t i v i s t , m o r a l i t y , as i t i s d i s c o v e r a b l e b y m e n i n m o m e n t s o f i n t r o s p e c t i o n , represents a 
subs tan t ia l i n c o n g r u i t y . I t ca l l s f o r n o t h i n g o the r t han o b e d i e n c e i n the present m o m e n t , 
and does n o t i n v i t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T o n e i t h e r s ide c a n t h i s appear sa t i s f ac to r y , f o r m e n n o 
l o n g e r l i v e ，in the h o l y care lessness o f the e te rna l now."^^^ A s s u c h , i f t h i s c r i s i s is to be 
r e s o l v e d , then m o r a l i t y m u s t s o m e h o w be t aken o u t o f i ts s t r a i g h t e n e d c o n t e x t and v i e w e d 
o n an e te rna l s tage. T h i s sees b o t h the N a t u r a l L a w T h e o r i s t s and t he i r debunke rs 
a t t e m p t i n g t o m a k e m o r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s s tand to R e a s o n , a n d as w a s sa id i n sec t i on 2.2 
above , the P o s i t i v i s t a p p r o a c h is b y f a r the m o r e hones t o f t he t w o , i f o n l y because i t dares 
f o l l o w the i n t e l l e c t u a l consc ience t h r o u g h to i ts l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n . T h i s w a s , a f te r a l l , the 
p o i n t A u g u s t i n e h a d t o r e a c h b e f o r e he c o u l d app rec ia te the necess i t y o f h a v i n g t o b e l i e v e 
b e f o r e he c o u l d u n d e r s t a n d ( a n d as W i t t g e n s t e i n c o n c l u d e d h i s Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus: W h a t w e c a n n o t speak abou t w e m u s t pass o v e r i n s i l ence . ՚^^՛^). O n l y f r o m 
such a p o i n t o n w a r d s c o u l d f a i t h e f f e c t the c r o s s i n g o f t he ba r ; o n l y h a v i n g f i r s t u n c o v e r e d 
the f u l l p o v e r t y o f R e a s o n c o u l d m o r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s appear so i n c o n g r u o u s and so 
i m m u t a b l e as to be the r esu l t o f D i v i n e r e v e l a t i o n . 
I n con t ras t , the N a t u r a l L a w T h e o r i s t , b y c o n f u s i n g a p p r e h e n s i o n f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g , sees 
n o reason to so d e l i m i t t he scope o f h i s k n o w l e d g e . T h e f i n d i n g s o f h is m o r a l consc ience , 
c o r r o b o r a t e d w i t h those o f o thers , are taken t o be p r o o f tha t the w o r l d has been o r d e r e d b y 
a m i n d as r a t i o n a l a n d b e n i g n as h is . Y e t as the A u g u s t i n i a n m e t a - n a r r a t i v e s h o w s , he 
l abou rs u n d e r a ca tas t roph i c m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n ; f o r t he w o r l d tha t m e n i n h a b i t is a w o r l d o f 
t he i r o w n c r e a t i o n : T o r a l l the a r r a n g e m e n t s that are i n f o r c e a m o n g m e n . Because t hey 
have ag reed a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s tha t t h e y s h o u l d be i n f o r c e , are h u m a n i n s t i t u t i o n s ; and o f 
See above, p. 18. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London, 
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these, s o m e are ma t te rs o f s u p e r f l u i t y a n d l u x u r y , s o m e o f c o n v e n i e n c e a n d necessity.՚^ ՛^^ 
T h e i n s t i t u t i o n s , p rac t i ces , l a w s a n d c o n v e n t i o n s o f t h i s w o r l d a l l w o r k t o the agenda o f 
e n s u r i n g tha t f u t u r e p resen t m o m e n t s พ ฌ r e s e ^ pas t p resen t m o m e n t s . A n o r d e r e d , 
r easonab le , p e l l u c i d w o r l d is t he p e c u l i a r f a b r i c a t i o n o f t he F a l l e n cas t o f m i n d , a n d as 
A u g u s t i n e m a d e c lear o n coun t l ess occas ions , G o d d i d n o t m e a n f o r the re t o be p o l i t i c a l 
s o c i e t y ; m e n w e r e n o t c rea ted t o h a v e d o m i n i o n o v e r each o the r . F r o m th i s pe r spec t i ve the 
( c o n d i t i o n e d ) p o s i t i o n o f the N a t u r a l L a w T h e o r i s t is ra the r l i k e a c o l o u r b l i n d m a n w h o 
h a v i n g g o t t o H e a v e n , t r ies t o c o n v i n c e G o d tha t the grass o n ea r th is i n f a c t r e d . B u t t hen 
th i s t o p s y - t u r v y state o f a f f a i r s is i n e v i t a b l e w h e n i t is c o n s i d e r e d tha t m e n c o m e i n t o th is 
w o r l d h a v i n g neve r k n o w n G o d . A u g u s t i n e w o u l d h a v e ag reed w i t h Feuerbach ' ร d i c t u m 
tha t , ' t h e o l o g y is a n t h r o p o l o g y ' . A s he u n d e r s t o o d i t , m e n , ' . . .because t hey do n o t 
i m a g i n e G o d , W h o m they c a n n o t i m a g i n e , b u t t h e m s e l v e s i ns tead o f H i m , t h e y c o m p a r e 
n o t G o d , b u t t hemse l ves , a n d n o t w i t h H i m , b u t w i t h themselves. ' ^^^ I n f ac t the g e r m o f 
t h i s i dea can be t raced a l l the w a y b a c k t o X e n o p h a n e s o f C o l o p h o n , w r i t i n g i n the s i x t h 
c e n t u r y B.c., w h o d e c l a r e d tha t , ' „ , i f o x e n ( a n d horses) a n d l i o n s h a d hands o r c o u l d d r a w 
w i t h hands and create w o r k s o f ar t l i k e those m a d e b y m e n , horses w o u l d d r a w p i c tu res o f 
gods l i k e horses ， a n d o x e n o f gods l i k e o x e n , a n d t h e y w o u l d m a k e the b o d i e s ( o f t he i r 
g o d s ) i n acco rdance w i t h the f o r m that each spec ies i t s e l f possesses.՚^՛^^ 
C o n s u m e d b y the N a t u r a l L a w I dea w h e n a p p r e h e n d i n g the m o r a l c o n s c i e n c e , the N a t u r a l 
L a w T h e o r i s t i m a g i n e s f i r s t a r a t i o n a l u n i v e r s e , t h e n a r a t i o n a l g o d . I n The Elements of 
1981), p. 74. 
' Contra Faustum Manicheum, XXII , 47. 
' Ludwig Feuerbach, tr. George Eliot, The Essence of Christianity (New York, Нафег & Row Publishers, 
, 1957), p. 270. 
' De Civitate Dei XL, 18. Cf. XIX, 14: Îman] ...has need of divine guidance, which he may obey with 
confidence, and of divine ฝd， so that he may obey it freely. Otherwise, in his zeal for Knowledge, he may 
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Moral Theology, R. с. M o r t i m e r b e g a n C h a p t e r V， e n t i t l e d 'Consc ience ' , b y e c h o i n g j u s t 
s u c h a s e n t i m e n t : 'As the o b j e c t i v e s tandard o r n o r m o f m o r a l i t y is t he W i l l o f G o d , as that 
is p e r c e i v e d b y r i g h t reason , so the s u b j e c t i v e n o r m f o r each i n d i v i d u a l is h is o w n 
consc i ence , A s C i c e r o d e c l a r e d , L a w is the highest Reason, imp lan ted in N a t u r e ไ T h e r e 
is a g rea t i r o n y here , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n t h e c l o s e h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n N a t u r a l L a w 
T h e o r y a n d C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y is t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t ; f o r b e t w e e n the P o s i t i v i s t and the 
N a t u r a l L a w T h e o r i s t , b e t w e e n , say, a W i t t g e n s t e i n a n d an A q u i n a s , w h o s h o w s the 
greates t r eve rence f o r the i m m u t a b i l i t y o f m o r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , tha t i s , o f t r u t h i n the present 
m o m e n t ? I t is a rguab le tha t W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s s i l ence is the m o r e p o w e r f u l o f the t w o 
responses . I n d e e d i t a l l ha r ks b a c k t o B o b b i o ' s s ta tement , q u o t e d i n sec t i on 2 .2 : Vor m e 
e v e r y t h i n g is so h u m a n tha t I e v e n b e l i e v e tha t r e l i g i o n i t s e l f is a p r o d u c t o f h u m a n i t y . , . 
C a n y o u i m a g i n e the T e n C o m m a n d m e n t s i n r e l a t i o n t o the i m m e n s i t y o f space? Y o u 
w o u l d h a v e y o u r w o r k cu t o u t , i f y o u t r i e d t o s h o w tha t there is o r d e r i n the universe.՝^ ՛^* 
T h e lesson seems c lea r e n o u g h : t he p r o m p t i n g s m e n r e c e i v e t h r o u g h t he i r C o n s c i e n c e 
s h o u l d n o t be c o n f u s e d w i t h the e th i ca l sys tems a n d m o r a l ca tego r i es tha t r esu l t f r o m 
t h e m . T h e f o r m e r are g i f t s o f G o d ; t he la t te r p r o d u c t s o f the N a t u r a l L a w Idea . A f t e r a l l , as 
w a s p o i n t e d o u t i n sec t i on 3.2 a b o v e , the p r e s u m p t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g l a w a n d o r d e r w h i c h 
w e r e p r o j e c t e d b y the p r e - S o c r a t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s u p o n the C o s m o s w e r e those t hey had 
i n h e r i t e d f r o m the na tu re o f p o l i t i c a l soc ie t y . Perhaps , t h e n , t he s i n g l e m o s t i m p o r t a n t 
i n s i g h t t o e m e r g e f r o m the A u g u s t i n i a n n a r r a t i v e o f t he F a l l is tha t r a t i o n a l t h o u g h t i t se l f , 
i .e. t h o u g h t apar t f r o m G o d , is a p r o d u c t o f the F a l l e n cast o f m i n d ; a n d tha t p o l i t i c a l 
fall into some deadly error because of the infirmity of the human mind.' ՜^Լ Xenophaneร, fgt. 15， Aneilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 22. 
R. C-Mortimer, The Elements of Moral Theology (London, Adam & Cha^^ Black, 1947). 
2 4 0 See above, p. 101. 
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soc ie t y is t he resu l t o f i ts i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h an i m m u t a b l e a n d i n d i s p e n s a b l e b o d y o f m o r a l 
p r o p o s i t i o n s w h o s e absence w o u l d r e n d e r l i f e , i n those i n f a m o u s w o r d s o f H o b b e s ' , 'nasty, 
b r u t i s h and տհօւէ՛.^՛^՛^ T h e r e is thus n o such t h i n g as an o b j e c t i v e t h o u g h t ; e v e r y m o v e m e n t 
o f t he m i n d is c h a r g e d w i t h a r e m e d i a l d i m e n s i o n a n d t r u t h i t se l f , i s a f u n c t i o n o f 
v e r i f i c a t i o n t h r o u g h t i m e . T o l i v e i n the 'eternal now' o f t h e p resen t m o m e n t requ i res the 
a b a n d o n m e n t o f a l l the sa feguards , b o t h r e l i g i o u s , p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l , d r e a m t 
up t o arrest the e n c r o a c h m e n t o f a p a r a l y s i n g u n c e r t a i n t y . T h i s is w h y A u g u s t i n e 
repea ted l y p r e a c h e d tha t at a l l cos ts , the i n d i v i d u a l p i l g r i m m u s t a v o i d b e i n g c o n f o r m e d t o 
the w a y s o f the w o r l d . B u t b y th i s he d i d n o t j u s t m e a n the w a y s o f the flesh, the o u t w a r d 
s ins a n d v i ces , b u t r a the r the w a y s o f the H e s h l y Sense^"^^ i t se l f : 
B u t Y o u r W o r d ， О God , is the founta in o f eternal Ufe, and i t does not pass 
away. Therefore, this departure o f the soul is restrained by Y o u r W o r d , when i t 
is said to us, " D o not be con fo rmed to this w o r l d , " so that the earth may b r ing 
fo r th in the founta in o f l i fe a l i v i ng soul , a soul cont inent i n Y o u r W o r d through 
the evangelists, by im i ta t ing the imi tators o f Y o u r Christ.^'*^ 
T h i s w a s an u n c o m p r o m i s i n g c a l l n o t t o a r m s b u t t o de fea t , t o a p resen t m o m e n t i n w h i c h 
the is need neve r be q u a l i f i e d b y an ought, w i t h there b e i n g n o p o s s i b i l i t y o f a pe rspec t i ve 
apar t f r o m G o d ' s . A n d as was s h o w n i n sec t i on 2 .2 a b o v e , A u g u s t i n e e v e n t u a l l y c a m e to 
r e d i s e tha t the e x a m p l e o f Ch r i s t ' s l i f e to the d i s c i p l e w a s i n H i s u n q u e s t i o n i n g obed ience 
to h i s Father 's W i l l , w h i c h is the c r u x o f the m a t t e r . T h u s , i f F a l l e n R e a l i t y is to be 
f o r s a k e n , t h e n o u t m u s t g o C o n c e p t u a l C e r t a i n t y a n d t h e f a b r i c a t i o n o f t r u t h ; a n d w h e n t h i s 
ought has been r e m o v e d o n l y the is r e m a i n s : the v o l u n t a r i s t l a w o f G o d ' s l i t e r a l W o r d . 
Nobērto Bobbio and Maurizio Viroli, The Idea of the Republic (Cambridge, 2003), p. 61. 
' Hobbes, Leviathon 
՝ See section 1.6. 
ConfessioneSy xrn, 21. 
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Chapter Four 
Conclusions 
T h e t i m e has a r r i v e d to assess the i m p a c t o f th is thes is o n A u g u s t i n e ' s p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the 
N a t u r a l L a w T r a d i t i o n . I n sec t i on 2 .4 above , i t w a s e x p l a i n e d tha t t h e o r t h o d o x v i e w 
accords A u g u s t i n e a v e r y p r o m i n e n t r o l e i n d e e d , as n o n e o the r t h a n the t h i n k e r r espons ib l e 
f o r h a v i n g p e r s o n a l i s e d the S to ic D i v i n e R e a s o n , m a k i n g i t the s o v e r e i g n W i l l o f G o d . A t 
t he t i m e t h i s w a s q u e s t i o n e d , as t h e shared r a t i o n a l i t y b e t w e e n G o d a n d m a n p r e s u p p o s e d 
b y th i s v i e w , i n d e e d p r e s u p p o s e d b y a l l t he i s t i c N a t u r a l L a w T h e o r i e s , c o n t r a d i c t s the 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a ! c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m A u g u s t i n e ' s n a r r a t i v e o f the F a l l . W h y th i s w a s f e l t th is 
t o be t h e case s h o u l d n o w b e a l o t c learer , f o r as chap te r t h ree s h o w s , ' r a t i ona l i t y ' , as a 
p r e d i c a t i v e v a l u e , is an i r r e d u c i b l y f a l l e n c o n c e p t . I t с a r r ies w i t h i t a r a f t o f 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , a l l o f t h e m r e m e d i a l i n r e l a t i o n to t h e t e m p o r a l i s e d p resen t m o m e n t . T h i s 
o b j e c t i o n as ide, there is l i t t l e q u e s t i o n tha t A u g u s t i n e ' s w r i t i n g s a c c o m m o d a t e a s o l i d 
N a t u r a l L a w T h e o r y . A l l the i m p o r t a n t e l emen ts are the re . O n e f i n d s a, ' . . . law c a l l e d the 
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h ighes t r eason , w h i c h o u g h t a l w a y s t o be o b e y e d , the l a w t h r o u g h w h i c h e v i l m e n deserve 
a w r e t c h e d l i f e a n d g o o d m e n a h a p p y one , a n d t h r o u g h w h i c h , f i n a l l y , the l aw . . . c a l l e d 
t e m p o r a l is r i g h t l y passed a n d rightly c h a n g e d . T h i s is a t r u l y u n i v e r s a l , e te rna l l a w , 
f r o m w h i c h m e n d e r i v e , t h r o u g h the r i g h t use o f R e a s o n , the i m m u t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s o f 
j u s t i c e : O n e m a n i n the east unders tands j u s t i c e , a n o t h e r m a n i n the w e s t unders tands 
j u s t i c e ; is j u s t i c e w h i c h the one unders tands a d i f f e r e n t t h i n g f r o m that w h i c h the o ther 
unders tands? I n b o d y t h e y are fa r apar t , a n d ye t t hey h a v e the eyes o f t h e i r m i n d s o n one 
o b j e c t . A n d as w a s p o i n t e d o u t i n sec t i on 3.1 a b o v e , i n t e r m s o f the the A u g u s t i n i a n 
m e t a - n a r r a t i v e , the re is e v e r y reason f o r r e g a r d i n g N a t u r a l L a w T h e o r y as the p a r a d i g m o f 
e th i ca l s p e c u l a t i o n ; f o r i t p r o v i d e s a p e r f e c t e x a m p l e o f t ha t a l l o y o f G r a c e a n d the N a t u r a l 
L a w I dea w h i c h is the o n e m o d e r a t i n g i n f l u e n c e l e f t F a l l e n m a n . H o w e v e r , as D e a n e p o i n t s 
ou t , u n l i k e A q u i n a s , A u g u s t i n e n e v e r i ns i s t ed tha t the v a l i d i t y o f t e m p o r a l l a w s s h o u l d 
d e p e n d o n t he i r m o r a l content.^"^^ T h i s f ac t w a s , o f cou rse , t he r a d i c a l fea tu re o f the 
T h o m i s t s y s t e m . H . L . A . H a r t s u m m e d i t as c o m p r i s i n g a, '...a t w o f o l d c o n t e n t i o n : f i r s t , 
tha t there are c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s o f t rue m o r a l i t y o r j u s t i c e , d i s c o v e r a b l e b y h u m a n reason 
w i t h o u t the a i d o f r e v e l a t i o n e v e n t h o u g h they have a d i v i n e o r i g i n ; s e c o n d l y that m a n -
m a d e l a w s w h i c h c o n f l i c t w i t h these p r i n c i p l e s are n o t v a l i d law.*^"^^ B u t o f course , the 
m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the A u g u s t i n i a n a n d the T h o m i s t sys tems o f N a t u r a l L a w is the 
fac t tha t the f o r m e r is o n l y primus inter pares - o n e o f coun t l ess p o s s i b l e c o m i n g s toge the r 
o f t he m o r a l and the i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n s c i e n c e . F o r o u t s i d e o f the P i l g r i m C i t y , a l l h u m a n 
e n d e a v o u r f o r m s a s i n g l e p i e c e ; a l l m e n are e n g a g e d i n f a s h i o n i n g r ep lacemen ts f o r the 
Parad is ia l state o f b e i n g , o f o b t a i n i n g , b y w h a t e v e r m e a n s , to s o m e degree o f H o r i z o n t a l 
De Libero A r b i t r i o , 1， VI. 
՚ In loanniร Evangelium, xxxv. 
Herbert A. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine (Columbia, 1963), p. 90-91. 
H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, 1961), p. 152. 
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E t e r n i t y . A n d w h e t h e r t h i s is a c h i e v e d b y a i d o f r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , p h i l o s o p h i c a l p recep ts o r 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s is r e a l l y o f v e r y l i t t l e consequence ; f o r c i t i z e n s h i p o f the P i l g r i m C i t y 
is s o l e l y d e p e n d e n t o n s u b j e c t i o n to a v o l u n t a r i s t f o r m o f l a w , o f p e r f e c t obed ience t o the 
L i t e r a l W o r d o f G o d . I t f o l l o w s f r o m th is tha t any scheme o f D i v i n e g u i d a n c e w h i c h makes 
p r o v i s i o n f o r an i n d e p e n d e n t a u t h o r i t y f o r t he v e r i f i c a t i o n o f r e v e a l e d t r u t h f a i l s to m o v e 
m u c h b e y o n d the p r e m i s e s o f N a t u r a l L a w T h e o r y . T h i s i s an a v o w e d l y b o l d s ta temen t t o 
m a k e , b u t o n e based e n t i r e l y o n the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a ! l i n e l a i d d o w n b y A u g u s t i n e i n h is 
n a r r a t i v e o f the F a l l . Perhaps i t w o u l d be best i f a su i t ab le e x a m p l e c o u l d be p r o v i d e d . 
I n 1973 , P ro fesso r P a c k e r f i r s t p u b l i s h e d Knowing God\ i t has s ince g o n e o n t o b e c o m e a 
m o d e r n c lass ic . I n i ts f i n a l chapters i t p r o v i d e s a c lea r o u t l i n e o f the accep tab le l i m i t s to 
G o d ' s c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h H i s r a t i o n a l c r e a t i o n . T o star t w i t h , Packe r a f f i r m s tha t , 
' . . . g u i d a n c e is a r e a l i t y i n t e n d e d f o r , and p r o m i s e d t o , e v e r y c h i l d o f God. '^"^^ Y e t , 'Ea rnes t 
C h r i s t i a n s s e e k i n g g u i d a n c e o f t e n g o w r o n g a b o u t i t . . . T h e i r bas i c m i s t a k e i s t o t h i n k o f 
g u i d a n c e as essen t i a l l y inward prompting by the Holy Spirity apart from the written 
Word.՝^^^ I t is c l e a r l y P a c k e r ' ร i n t e n t i o n t o t reat the ' w r i t t e n W o r d ' as the p r i m a r y c h e c k 
u p o n s p u r i o u s іп!ефге1аЇІ0П8 o f G o d ' s W i l l . N a t u r a l l y , the o u t d a t e d s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l 
c o n t e x t o f S c r i p t u r e p r o v e s a severe r e s t r i c t i o n o n the m o d e m a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f sa id c h e c k . I t 
p r o v e s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a d e q u a t e i n the face o f w h a t P a c k e r t e r m s ' v o c a t i o n a l c h o i c e s ' , w h i c h 
are, ' . . . b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g o p t i o n s , a l l o f w h i c h i n t h e m s e l v e s appear l a w f u l and good.，251 
E x a m p l e s P a c k e r g i ves i n c l u d e ques t i ons o f m a r r i a g e a n d career c h o i c e . T h e d i f f i c u l t y 
w i t h s u c h c h o i c e s is tha t b o t h o p t i o n s are m o r a l l y c r e d i b l e , s u c h tha t an u n a m b i g u o u s 
' e i t h e r - o r ' a n s w e r is r e q u i r e d : i t is n o t the case tha t one o f the o p t i o n s c o u l d be re jec ted on 
J. I. Packer, Knowing God (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1974)， p. 212. 
' Ibid. 
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a m a t t e r o f p r i n c i p l e , f a l l i n g o u t s i d e a m o r a l f r a m e w o r k . C l e a r l y , ' . . . t h e s e p r o b l e m s c a n n o t 
be s o l v e d b y a d i r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n o f B i b l i c a l t e a c h i n g . A l l one c a n d o f r o m S c r i p t u r e is 
c i r c u m s c r i b e the l a w f u l p o s s i b i l i t i e s b e t w e e n w h i c h the c h o i c e has t o b e made . ' ^ ^^ T h u s the 
w r i t t e n W o r d serves t o de l i nea te a m o r a l l y accep tab le arena f o r a c t i o n , t he spec i f i cs o f 
w h i c h h a v e ye t to be d e t e r m i n e d . So w h a t happens n e x t ? W e l l , ' . . . j u s t because S c r i p t u r e 
c a n n o t dec ide o n e ' s c h o i c e d i r e c t l y , the f a c t o r o f God֊given p r o m p t i n g a n d i n c l i n a t i o n , 
w h e r e b y o n e is d r a w n t o c o m m i t o n e s e l f t o o n e set o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , r a the r t han ano ther , 
a n d f i n d s o n e ' s m i n d se t t led i n peace as one c o n t e m p l a t e s t h e m , b e c o m e s dec is i ve . ' ^ ^^ T h e 
c h e c k i n g a c t i o n o f the w r i t t e n W o r d i s , o n th i s accoun t , i t s a b i l i t y to f i l t e r t h r o u g h o n l y 
those cho i ces tha t c o n f o r m to B i b l i c a l l y c o h e r e n t pa t te rns o f m o r a l i t y : T h e bas ic f o r m o f 
d i v i n e g u i d a n c e , t he re fo re , is t he p resen ta t i on t o us o f p o s i t i v e idea ls as g u i d e l i n e s f o r a l l 
o u r l i v i n g / ^ ^ ' * I n e f f ec t , t he w r i t t e n W o r d f u n c t i o n s t o r a t i o n a l l y c i r c u m s c r i b e the f i n a l 
decree o f G o d ' s W i l l , such tha t , O n l y w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f this [ w r i t t e n ] g u i d a n c e does G o d 
p r o m p t us i n w a r d l y . ' ^ ^ ^ I t is thus n o t poss i b l e f o r G o d t o c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h one ou ts ide 
th i s B i b l i c a l p a r a d i g m o f t r u t h . S c r i p t u r e , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g i ts o u t d a t e d c o n t e x t , c o n v e y s a 
m o r a l f r a m e w o r k tha t s tands to Reason . T h i s b e c o m e s the l i t m u s test o f G o d ' s v o i c e ; and 
t o n o t p u t G o d ' s v o i c e t o the test , i n d e e d , T h e i d e a o f a l i f e i n w h i c h t h e i n w a r d v o i c e o f 
t he S p i r i t dec ides a n d d i rec ts e v e r y t h i n g . . . leads o n l y t o f r a n t i c b e w i l d e r m e n t o r 
l unacy . ' ^ ^^ I n e f f ec t , o n e is b e i n g e x p l i c i t l y w a r n e d aga ins t u n t h i n k i n g ac t i on o n a 
v o l u n t a r i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f l a w . I t is u n e q u i v o c a l l y r u l e d o u t o n the p r e m i s e that i t f a l l s 
ou t s i de o f a n y r a t i o n a l l y c r e d i b l e test o r p a r a d i g m o f t r u t h . 
J. I. Packer, Knowing God, p. 212. 
/ ш , р . 213. 
Ibid, p. 214. 
Ibid, p. 215. 
7 Ш , p. 215. 
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A g a i n s t t he r e c e i v e d o r t h o d o x y o f th is p o s i t i o n , the t e rms o f t h i s thes is s t and o u t i n sharp 
re l i e f . T o b e g i n w i t h , V e r t i c a l E t e r n i t y appears i n i m i c a l t o the c a r e f u l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s o f 
P a c k e r ' ร ' w r i t t e n W o r d ' . T h e t e r m sees t r u t h as a q u a l i t y o f G o d ' ร l i t e r a l W o r d , n o t 
s o m e t h i n g e x i s t i n g i n d e p e n d e n t o f i t . B y P a c k e r ' ร r e c k o n i n g , S c r i p t u r e med ia tes , 
' . . . p o s i t i v e idea ls as g u i d e l i n e s f o r a l l o u r l i v i n g ' i n o t h e r w o r d s , a m o r a l - r a t i o n a l 
c o n t e x t an tecedent t o the i n w a r d p r o m p t i n g o f t he H o l y S p i r i t , a n d w h o s e p recep ts i t can 
n e v e r c o n t r a d i c t . A s he makes c lear : T h e S p i r i t l eads w i t h i n the l i m i t s w h i c h the W o r d 
sets, n o t b e y o n d t h e m / ^ ^ ^ I n c o n c l u s i o n : ' I t is fa l se p i e t y , s u p e r - s u p e m a t u r a l i s m o f an 
u n h e a l t h y a n d p e r n i c i o u s sor t , t ha t d e m a n d s i n w a r d i m p r e s s i o n s tha t h a v e n o r a t i o n a l 
b a s e . . . ' ^ ^ ^ I t w o u l d appear tha t t h i s ' r a t i o n a l base ' l eve l s b o t h m a n a n d G o d o n a s ing le , 
h o r i z o n t a l p l a n e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B u t m o r e t o the p o i n t , does th i s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a ! s tance, 
the 'shared r a t i o n a l i t y b e t w e e n G o d and m a n ' , have a m e t a p h y s i c a l consequence? I n d e e d i t 
does ; G o d m a y h a v e t h e advan tage o f an a l l - s e e i n g e te raa l p e r s p e c t i v e , b u t H e can neve r 
act o u t o f t u r n : ' S o n e v e r e x p e c t t o be g u i d e d t o m a r r y an u n b e l i e v e r , o r e l o p e w i t h a 
m a r r i e d p e r s o n , as l o n g as 1 C o r i n t h i a n s 7 : 3 9 a n d the seven th c o m m a n d m e n t stand!՛^՛^*^ 
T h u s , b y P a c k e r ' ร scheme , G o d c a n n o t l a y up any ՏԱՓՈՏ6Տ i n the f u t u r e . H e canno t , f o r 
i ns tance , c o m m a n d a n y t h i n g so i r r a t i o n a l as b u i l d i n g an A r k o r s a c r i f i c i n g a son, o r 
i n d e e d , as w a s the case w i t h H o s e a , m a r r y i n g a pros t i tu te .^^* A s C h r i s t i a n s , i t is poss i b l e to 
rest safe i n the k n o w l e d g e tha t the shared r a t i o n a l i t y b e t w e e n G o d a n d m a n m e a n s a 
separa t i on o f degree , n o t tónd. B e t w e e n the e th i ca l va r i ab les o f e t e r n i t y a n d t e m p o r a l i t y , 
J. I. Packer, Knowing God, p. 214. 
； Ibid. p. 215. 
' I b i d , p. 215. 
' I b i d , p. 215. 
Hosea 1:2: 'When the Lord began to speak through Hosea, the Lord said to him, "Go, take to yourself an 
adulteress wife and children of unfaithfulness...' 
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R e a s o n s tands as a r e a s s u r i n g cons tan t . O n th i s r e a d i n g , t he 'shared r a t i o n a l i t y b e t w e e n 
G o d a n d m a n ' i m p l i e s the l o g i c a l p recedence o f t he r a t i o n a l e l e m e n t o v e r b o t h C rea to r and 
c rea ted , a n d w h a t is t h i s i f n o t the r o o t o f N a t u r a l L a w T h e o r y ? 
I t is w o r t h r e c a l l i n g aga in the w o r d s w i t h w h i c h the t h i r d chap te r w a s e n d e d : ' i f F a l l e n 
R e a l i t y is t o b e f o r s a k e n , t hen o u t m u s t g o C o n c e p ณ a l C e r t a i n t y a n d the f a b r i c a t i o n o f 
t r u t h . A n d w h e n th i s ought has been r e m o v e d o n l y the is r e m a i n s : the v o l u n t a r i s t l a w o f 
G o d ' s l i t e r a l W o r d ' . W h a t Packer 's scheme o f D i v i n e G u i d a n c e s h o w s is t ha t so l o n g as the 
s l i gh tes t s e m b l a n c e o f an ought is r e t a i n e d , t h e o l o g y reduces to p o l i t i c s , o r at least t o a 
v e r y spec ia l f o r m o f e th i cs . T h i s leaves th i s thes is t o a n s w e r f o r h a v i n g so d e l i m i t e d the 
N a t u r a l L a w T r a d i t i o n as t o m a k e i t less a spec ies t h a n a genus : the u m b r e l l a u n d e r w h i c h 
a l l l e f t o u t s i d e the P i l g r i m C i t y m a y shel ter . V e r y b r i e f l y t h e n , i f t he N a t u r a l L a w T r a d i t i o n 
is i n t e r p r e t e d i n i t s n a r r o w sense, as d e n o t i n g the career o f a p a r t i c u l a r t y p e o f l ega l t h e o r y 
b a s e d o n V a l u e - C o g n i t i v i s m , then there is e v e r y r eason t o i n c l u d e A u g u s t i n e w i t h i n i t . 
H o w e v e r , i f i t is t a k e n i n i ts b r o a d sense, as r e f e r r i n g t o a l l t heo r i es a n d b e l i e f sys tems 
a s p i r i n g t o a m e a s u r e o f H o r i z o n t a l E t e r n i t y , t h e n A u g u s t i n e v e r y o b v i o u s l y s tands ou ts ide 
i t . A s a l w a y s w i t h A u g u s t i n e , i t i s a q u e s t i o n o f p e r s p e c t i v e . 
Is i t t r ue t h a t A u g u s t i n e ' s v i e w o f the F a l l does r e a l h a r m t o h i s a r g u m e n t , o r is i t cons i s ten t 
w i t h h i s l o g i c a l m i n d ? Perhaps th is is w h e r e the rea l d i v i d e b e t w e e n R e a s o n a n d B e l i e f is 
u n c o v e r e d . W e t e n d n o t t o q u e s t i o n tha t w h a t p reven t s us f r o m g o i n g a l o n g f u l l y w i t h 
A u g u s t i n e , i s an i n t e l l e c t u a l r e g a r d f o r R e a s o n . T h e q u e s t i o n tha t t ha t t h i s thes is has t r i e d 
t o ra ise is i f i t is less t o d o w i t h Reason tha t d ic ta tes o u r response t o A u g u s t i n e ' s ' f l a w e d ' 
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a r g u m e n t , and m o r e t o d o w i t h o u r essent ia l B e l i e f , t ha t is so p r o f o u n d l y at odds w i t h h i s . 
A B e l i e f tha t i n the l i g h t o f t e m p o r a l i t y appears a l a r m i n g l y n a ï v e . 
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